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Better representation of ‘the black’ and of ‘black life’ in ‘public’ and 
recognition of black culture are often assumed to be necessary parts of any 
political project on behalf of black people.   Major black artists and black 
artistic movements are, therefore, commonly understood to re-represent black 
identity and, through their renovation of ‘blackness,’ to justify black 
participation in public life.  This dissertation investigates the writings of the 
black philosopher and cultural critic Alain Locke.   In a series of inter-related 
essays that both situate Locke in a particular context (by examining his 
relationships to his contemporaries) and bring his work into conversation with 
current debates in political theory (by comparing/contrasting his 
theorizations of race and culture with those of contemporary theorists), I 
suggest that Locke’s critical approach to ‘black’ artwork was novel because it 
refused to demand that artwork renovate black life or reduce its variety to a 
black identity worthy of recognition.    While Locke’s refusal to pursue better 
representations of blackness has been, in some circles, called ‘naïve’ and ‘a-
political,’ I argue that Locke’s criticism of art is informed by a rich and subtle 
theorization of ‘race’ as an identity-producing center of meaning and of ‘race 
thinking’ as a particular form of ‘dogmatism,’ which prevents both intellectual 
and political democracy. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: ALAIN LOCKE, THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE AND 
THE PLURALITY OF BLACK LIFE 
 
Something beyond the watch and guard of statistics has happened in 
the life of the American Negro and the three Norns1 [the Sociologist, 
the Philanthropist, the Race-leader] who have traditionally presided 
over the Negro problem have a changeling in their laps....  the new 
spirit is awake in the masses, and under the very eyes of the 
professional observers is transforming what has been a perennial 
problem into the progressive phases of contemporary Negro life... But 
while the minds of most of us, black and white, have thus burrowed in 
the trenches of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the actual march of 
development has simply flanked these positions, necessitating a sudden 
reorientation of view.  We have not been watching in the right 
direction; set North and South on a sectional axis, we have not noticed 
the East till the sun has us blinking.2 
  
I. Scope and Objectives 
This dissertation examines how Alain Locke, the philosopher and art 
critic best known as the chief interpreter of the Harlem Renaissance literary 
movement and editor of its preeminent text, The New Negro: an Interpretation, 
articulated the plurality of black life in his art and literary criticism. Locke 
argued that ‘race’ and ‘race-thinking’ had ascribed a false identity to black 
people, which foreclosed the recognition of black plurality.  He saw in 
“modernity” hints that black people were abandoning this falsely ascribed 
identity in favor of self-expressiveness and argued that the artistic products of 
self-expression would enter the cosmopolitan realm of culture, where they 
                                                           
1 Norns are goddesses who rule the fates in Norse mythology.  Locke’s use of “Norns” here is 
interesting, for it suggests that until the advent of the Harlem Renaissance, certain modes of 
thinking and practice—the ‘knowledge’ of black life provided by the social sciences, the 
(perhaps questionable) patronage of white philanthropists and political leadership based on 
the racial identification of the group—had determined the circumstances of black people.  
During the Harlem Renaissance period, Locke suggests, something new was afoot that even 
the best science, the most generous gifts and the most familiar political practices failed to 
adequately understand or benefit from.  Artwork, Locke makes clear in the essays he wrote 
for the New Negro: an Interpretation, captured these changes.   
2 Alain Locke, The New Negro: an Interpretation (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1925) 
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would serve as sources of self-cultivation for all people.   I want to suggest 
that Locke’s primary significance to (black) political thought is that he 
envisioned the “black imagination” freed of the misrepresentations of the past 
without imposing what I see as a new constraint— a reconstituted black 
identity that was to arise from black art.    In part, this is because though Locke 
recognized the negative impact of racism and ‘race thinking’ on the black 
imagination, he did not suggest that these effects could be repaired by 
recourse to a new identity or by public recognition of black culture.  Rather, 
with time, new forms of group relations arise. The constellation of 
developments, events and ideas that was ‘modernity’ would usher in the 
possibility of ‘expression’ in black Americans and the influence of ‘race theory 
and thinking’ would wane.   
Locke suggested that black artists were becoming liberated from 
externally imposed expectations of black art and, just as important, from the 
social and political duty to represent ‘the race.’  Against W.E.B. Du Bois 
among others, Locke insisted that black artists (and for that matter, white 
artists who depicted black life) should neither serve political objectives in 
artwork, nor be forced to portray black people positively.  Writing about and 
on behalf of black artists, Locke refused the responsibilities and limits of 
politics in artwork in favor of ‘expression.’ He argued that the purpose of 
black artwork was not to correct white supremacist misrepresentations of 
black life or history or to ‘demonstrate’ that black people were, in fact, worthy 
of social and political inclusion.  (That he took for granted, just as he should 
have.) Rather, Locke thought that (black) artwork should be “expressive of” 
‘Negro life,’ in all its variety and vitality.   Expressiveness was for Locke the 
mark of the most successful modern art.   
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But Locke did not ‘demand’ autonomy for black artists. Rather he 
observed its expression in contemporary black artwork and exhorted black 
artists to pursue it.  Several indicators attracted Locke’s attention: in poetry, 
writers turned from argument and exhortation to (self and group) 
representativeness, taking advantage of modern developments in poetic form: 
 
From the bathos of sentimental appeal and the postures of 
moralizing protest, Negro poets have risen to the dignity and 
poise of self-expression.  Freed from the limitations of dialect 
that made the technique of the nursery rhyme tolerable, they 
have not only achieved a modernism of expression, but are 
attempting to develop new characteristic idioms of style.3   
 
No longer forced to ‘protest,’ engage in moral argument or to write in 
black dialect, black poets could express themselves as they wished. A (new) 
‘Negro’ poetry was born.  Though black poets found themselves freed of 
representative responsibilities and thereby able to produce authentic ‘Negro’ 
poetry, there was “…no unity of style or school [but rather] a unity of spirit 
and sense of tradition…”4 If unity of style was to arise (and Locke certainly 
does not call for it), it would derive from both a modernist spirit (open to 
various styles) and a sense of the past, vis-à-vis modern interpretations of 
‘Negro’ folk art.     In painting, the ‘Negro’ subject was being seen and 
represented anew by black and white artists alike.  Referring to Austrian 
painter Winold Reiss’s5 “Harlem types,” Locke wrote, 
 
                                                           
3 Alain Locke, “The Negro Poets of the United States,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A 
Selection of His Essays on Art and Culture, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart, vol. 8, Critical Studies on Black 
Life and Culture (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc.), 43 - 49. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Winold Reiss, an Austrian painter, provided the artwork for “Harlem,” a special edition of 
Survey Graphic magazine, published in March, 1925, dedicated to ‘black life’ in Harlem.  Alain 
Locke edited this issue, which became the basis for The New Negro: an Interpretation. Reiss’s 
artwork appeared in The New Negro along with Aaron Douglas’s.   
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…Winold Reiss presents us a graphic interpretation of Negro 
life, freshly conceived after its own patterns. [He] has aimed to 
portray the soul and spirit of a people.  And by the simple but 
rare process of not setting up petty canons in the face of nature’s 
own creative artistry, Winold Reiss has achieved what amounts 
to a revealing discovery of the significance, human and artistic, 
of one of the great dialects of human physiognomy, of some of 
the little understood but powerful idioms of nature’s speech.6 
   
Not only were black poets ‘freed’ up to be self-expressive, but the black 
subject was also receiving better treatment in painting.  Winold Reiss revealed 
the variety of black life (multiple “patterns”) by allowing his subject to suggest 
his style.  Instead of confronting black life with new (or for that matter already 
established schools of painting), by Locke’s reading, Reiss presented it as it 
was (one of many results of ‘nature’s creativity.’)  
The new variety of black artwork (in terms of theme, form, voice and 
style) reflects two developments that were significant for Locke: first, black 
artists (and by extension the black imagination) were becoming unbound from 
externally imposed imperatives and second, the black subject was beginning 
to receive new and better treatment, which reflected the variety and 
particularity of black life.   For Locke, this meant that black artists achieved 
autonomy from earlier representational demands and standards and that the 
black subject was freed from its one-sided representation as “caricature.”7   
New representations of black life became possible.  I am interested in 
exploring the political theoretical significance of Locke’s account of these new 
representations.   
                                                           
6 Ibid. 
7 Locke wrote, “[caricature] has put upon the countenance of the Negro the mask of the comic 
and the grotesque, whereas in deeper truth and comprehension, nature or experience have 
put there the stamp of the very opposite, the serious, the tragic, the wistful.” Ibid. 18 
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 This dissertation is by no means a full, intellectual history of Alain 
Locke’s life, interests or intellectual development (indeed, I focus almost solely 
on his Harlem Renaissance era writings and earlier texts that I believe 
influence his art criticism).  While I characterize the “great debate” between 
Locke and W.E.B. Du Bois over the function of artwork, I do not attempt to 
situate Locke in the “black intellectual tradition.”  And though I 
compare/contrast Locke’s theorization of culture/cultivation to that of the 
German sociologist Georg Simmel, one of his teachers, I do not exhaustively 
trace the rich and varied intellectual traditions—American Pragmatism, 
Austrian Gestalt Psychology, German Sociology and the Bahá’í faith among 
others—that inform Locke’s work on race, culture and artwork.  Locke is an 
incredibly rich subject, no doubt worthy of each of the projects I have 
described.  Instead, I suggest that Locke’s articulation of black plurality, 
though synthesized from various intellectual traditions, can best be grasped in 
view of contemporary theories of recognition and difference/identity. As 
“midwife” to the Harlem Renaissance and the chief representative of its artists 
and artworks, Locke sought to articulate the Renaissance’s ‘future’ impact: 
intellectual and political democracy made possible by pluralistic thinking.  As 
I see it, Locke is a useful partner in today’s political theoretical accounts of the 
relationship between personal identity and democratic politics.  As I read 
Locke, he is interesting because he offers a critical theoretical account of ‘race 
thinking’ as a form of identity-thinking, which influences an understandable, 
if not defensible “counter-jingoism” among “submerged groups,” while at the 
same time recognizing that “counter-jingoism” (i.e.: defensive parochialism) is 
just as much a danger to democracy as is the ‘race thinking’ that elicits it.   
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I thus take Locke’s 1942 warning against “absolutisms” to include both ‘race 
thinking’ and oppositional “race pride.”  
 
[We] do not always realize the extent to which these modern 
Frankensteins [“new secular absolutisms”] are the spawn of 
older absolutistic breeds, or the degree to which they are 
inherent strains, so to speak, in the germ plasm of our culture.  
… [In] the zeal of culture defense, in the effort to bring about the 
rapprochement of a united front, we do not always stop to 
envisage the danger and inconsistency of a fresh crisis 
uniformitarianism of our own. A sounder and more permanent 
alternative [is] the possibility of a type of agreement such as may 
stem from a pluralistic base.  [This would] provide a flexible, 
more democratic nexus, a unity in diversity rather than another 
counter uniformitarianism.8 
  
I.  Biography of Alain Locke 
 Before further clarifying the theoretical scope and purpose of the 
project, I turn to Alain Locke’s biography.  It is, of course, not exhaustive.  It 
outlines his life and work, with a particular focus on his influences and 
activity on behalf of black artwork.  
Alain Leroy Locke was born in 1885 to Pliny and Mary Hawkins Locke 
in Philadelphia, PA.  Both teachers, his parents inspired a lifelong love of 
learning in Locke.  He graduated from Central High School in Philadelphia 
and attended Harvard University, where he took part in courses taught by 
Josiah Royce, George Herbert Palmer and Ralph Barton Perry.9 
Locke graduated magna cum laude from Harvard in 1907 after just 
three years of study.  He was the first black to receive the Rhodes Scholarship.  
Several Oxford colleges refused to admit Locke because of his race but he was 
                                                           
8 Alain Locke and Leonard Harris, The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989), p. 51  
9 Ibid. 3  Harris includes Hugo Muensterberg among Locke’s Harvard philosophers and 
Muensterberg did teach at Harvard.  Nevertheless, records show that Locke did coursework 
with Muensterberg at Berlin Universitaet during his year of study there.  
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finally accepted by Hertford College.   At Hertford, he studied Classics and 
philosophy but never completed his MA degree.   In 1910, Locke moved to 
Germany and became a (non-matriculated) student at University of Berlin. 
There, Locke studied modern continental philosophy.  He did course work on 
epistemology, philosophy of the 19th century, an introductory course on the 
philosophy of aesthetics, a reading course on Kantian Idealism, a seminar on 
Kant’s Antinomies, foundations of science, modern culture and a psychology 
course on the will. Among his professors in Berlin was philosopher and social 
theorist Georg Simmel, who, as I will argue in Chapter Three profoundly 
affected Locke’s thinking on culture and modernity. 
In 1911, Locke attended the Universal Races Congress in London.  It 
was a truly remarkable event.  It brought together the very best minds from 
the physical and social sciences, with important contributions from the 
relatively new fields of anthropology and sociology.  The purpose of the 
Congress was to: 
 
…discuss, in light of science and modern conscience, the general 
relations subsisting between the peoples of the West and those of 
the East, between so-called white and so-called coloured 
peoples, with a view to encouraging between them a fuller 
understanding, the most friendly feelings, and a heartier co-
operation.10 
 
Some of the best-known sociologists and anthropologists attended.     
Generally agreeing on the "biological unity and racial intermixture" of 
mankind, scholars presented papers describing the meaning of race from an 
anthropological and sociological standpoint, theorized differences among 
racial groups, described the governments and peoples of "other civilizations" 
                                                           
10 Gustav Spiller, Interracial Problems (London: P.S. King and Son, 1911)., p. xiii 
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including China, Japan, Turkey, Persia, Russia and Egypt, related the 
possibility of "peaceful contact between civilizations" to the work of private 
associations, characterized "the modern conscience in relation to racial 
questions, " and differentiated the basic "modern conscience" in relation to the 
‘Negro’ and American Indians. The conference closed with several sessions on 
"promoting interracial friendliness."  Inspired by the new approaches 
suggested at the conference, Locke returned to the United States in late 1911, 
ready to introduce a new field of study to the world: Race Contacts.11    
Locke took an assistant professorship in English at Howard University 
in 1912.  At Howard, Locke hoped to establish a course—and later an 
institute— dedicated to the study of race contacts and interracial relationships.  
He was unsuccessful in this attempt but eventually allowed, after much 
struggle, to offer a series of lectures on the topic.12    These lectures, to which I 
turn in Chapter Two, treat race as a “center of meaning” and not, as was 
common during this period, a biological category.    In 1916, Locke took a 
leave of absence from his teaching duties at Howard and completed his 
dissertation, “Problems of Classification in the Theory of Value,” with Ralph 
                                                           
11 Locke opened the first of the race contacts lectures with the following: “Ladies and 
Gentlemen, ever since the possibility of a comparative study of races dawned upon me at the 
Race Congress in London in 1911, I have had the courage of a very optimistic and steadfast 
belief that in the scientific approach to the race question, there was the possibility of a 
redemption for those false attitudes of mind which have, unfortunately, so complicated the 
idea and conception of race that there are a great many people who fancy that the best thing 
that can possibly be done, if possible at all, is to throw race out of the category of human 
thinking.”  Alain Leroy Locke and Jeffrey C. Stewart, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations 
(Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992)., p. 1 
12 Locke was very active during his early years at Howard.  Historian Jeffrey Stewart has 
written, “After Jesse Moorland had donated his enormous collection of books and 
manuscripts of Afro-Americana to Howard University in December 1914, Locke had proposed 
that Howard inaugurate a research project to produce a bibliography of the collection and 
other works of “Negro Americana.”  That request was not approved.  Then in the summer of 
1915, the board of trustees denied Locke’s request to give his lectures as part of the regular 
curriculum.  Reportedly, the Board felt that Howard should avoid potentially controversial 
subject such as race relations and confine itself to the teaching of basic knowledge required to 
create teachers, doctors, and other professionals.”  Ibid. xx  
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Barton Perry as his advisor.     In the dissertation, Locke explored whether 
“…classifications actually picture objective reality or do classifications 
arbitrarily shape our picture of reality?”13  As Locke’s biographer, Leonard 
Harris points out, “[theories] of classification differ over whether classifying 
can be best explained by logical structures, rather than, say, psychological 
dispositions.”14   Locke takes neither side.  Foreshadowing his later (and life-
long) interest in artwork, Locke calls into question those philosophical 
approaches, which suggest “…aesthetic values… [to] have a psychological 
rather than a logical [ground.]”15  According to Harris, Locke’s questioning 
“frees the way for esthetic judgment to have more cognitive force.”16  Harris 
argues that Locke therefore saw ‘art’ as the means by which to condition better 
‘judgments’ – re-evaluation – of black people.   I take this argument up in 
Chapter Five.   
Locke traveled extensively—to Europe and Africa— after completing 
his dissertation,17 and published several articles about culture.  While 
maintaining a busy teaching schedule at Howard, Locke also offered lectures 
outside of the university.   
 
In 1921 he spoke on the “The Problem of Race and Culture” in 
front of the Negro Academy in Washington… Locke returned in 
1922 to speak on “The American Literary Tradition and the 
Negro,” and in the following year on “Notes Made at Luxor, 
Egypt.” In early 1924 the Society for Ethical Culture sponsored a 
three day public conference on “Interracial Harmony and 
Peace.” Locke chaired a session there… Later that year Locke 
spoke at the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the NAACP in 
Philadelphia, addressing the question of educational theory as 
                                                           
13 Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth, Alain Locke: The Biography of a Philosopher., 131 
14 Ibid. 
15 qtd. in Harris and Molesworth, 131 
16 Ibid. 
17 For an excellent account of Locke’s pre-Renaissance travels, see chapter five, “Howard and 
Beyond,” pp. 142 – 178, Harris and Molesworth, Alain Locke: The Biography of a Philosopher.   
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applied to the race problem…. Locke [also] served as the 
secretary of the  [Sanhedrin] conference.18 
The primary subject of this dissertation is Locke’s work during the 
1920s – 30s, as the “dean” of the Harlem Renaissance movement. It was during 
this period, that Locke edited and published the work for which he is best 
known, The New Negro: an Interpretation.   Locke thought of himself as the 
“midwife” to the Harlem Renaissance; he worked to see famous authors— 
Countee Cullen, Claude McKay, Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston 
among others—published.  Locke’s own output during the period was 
extraordinary.  He wrote about or critiqued nearly every novel, poem, play or 
painting produced by a black person during the period because, for Locke, 
each production was indicative of positive socio-political developments on the 
horizon.   But Locke’s relationship with ‘his’ artists was not always easy.  He 
tried to convince Langston Hughes to acquire a “…sense of European culture 
and high estheticism...,” wrote such a critical review of Hurston’s Their Eyes 
Were Watching God that she later told James Weldon Johnson that Locke was 
“…a malicious, spiteful little snot that thinks he ought to be the leading Negro 
because of his degrees,”19 and in a scathing review of Claude McKay’s Home to 
Harlem,  accused the author of “spiritual truancy.”  Wallace Thurman 
parodied Locke as the elitist and effete Dr. Parkes20 in Infants of the Spring and 
W.E.B. Du Bois took Locke to task for ignoring the socio-political purposes of 
art.  
                                                           
18 Ibid. 151   Sanhedrin gathered together that best black minds to set objectives for and serve 
as an umbrella organization for other black organizations.   
19 Robert Hemenway, Zora Neale Hurston: a Literary Biography, (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1977), p. 40 
20 “He was a mother hen clucking at her chicks.  Small, dapper, with sensitive features, 
graying hair, a dominating head, and restless hands and feet, he smiled benevolently at his 
brood.  Then in his best continental manner, which he had acquired during four years at 
European universities, he began to speak.” Wallace Thurman and Amrijit Singh, Infants of the 
Spring, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), p. 233 
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Locke’s Harlem Renaissance art criticism reflects his sincere belief in 
the possibilities of artwork to express the variety of black life. Though he later 
tempered his faith in effects of artwork on social consciousness, he never 
abandoned his commitment to black artwork.   
 
As the articulate voices of an oppressed minority, one would 
naturally expect the work of Negro poets to reflect a strongly 
emphasized social consciousness.  That is the case, if gauged by 
their preoccupation with the theme of race…The gradual 
conversion of race consciousness from a negative sense of social 
wrong and injustice to a positive note of race loyalty and pride 
in racial tradition came as a difficult and rather belated 
development of spiritual maturity…I would not recant my 1925 
estimation of this, either as symptom of cultural maturity or as a 
sign of a significant development in the Negro folk 
consciousness.  However, I would not confuse this upsurging of 
race consciousness with a parallel maturing of social 
consciousness…21    
After the Harlem Renaissance came to a close, Locke wrote an extensive 
review of each year’s black publications, which appeared in Opportunity 
Magazine (house organ of the Urban League) from 1929 – 1942 and in Phylon  
(Howard University literary magazine) from 1946 – 1953.  He continued, 
furthermore, to promote black art in every arena and to influence the 
development of “democratic attitudes” among all people.   
He pursued these objectives on a number of fronts.  As a member of the 
Ba’há’í faith, which I do not address in the dissertation, Locke traveled to its 
headquarters in Haifa, offered a number of lectures on various topics, and 
published articles in Ba’há’í World.   According to Harris, 
 
The Ba’há’í offered a wide array of spiritual comfort, such as a 
belief in the co-fraternity of humanity across lines.  Their 
                                                           
21 “Alain Locke, “Propaganda-- or Poetry?,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection of 
His Essays on Art and Culture, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983), 
55 - 56.  
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acceptance of all racial groups, their consideration of racism as a 
religious sin, their integration of cultures as ‘reciprocal’ sources 
of value, and their democratic governance all were a welcome 
reprieve from the racially segregated world of black-white 
Christianity and its accompanying chauvinism and bigotry.22 
 
Later in his life, he participated in a number of academic conferences, 
including “The Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion and Their 
Relation to the Democratic Way of Life” (in 1941, 1943 and 1950).  At the 1941 
conference, Locke presented the paper I mentioned above, “Pluralism and 
Intellectual Democracy,” in which he assessed the effects of and suggested the 
“cure for…calcified scientific or religious views…”23 that would negatively 
affect democratic practice.  In 1942, Locke and the sociologist Bernhard Stern, 
edited When Peoples Meet, a collection of essays theorizing inter-cultural 
contact.  The book contains essays by well known intellectuals and activists 
including, “…Randolph Bourne, Margaret Mead, Arnold Toynbee, Charles S. 
Johnson…and E. Franklin Frazier.”24  
   Always committed to the possibilities of education, Locke became a 
respected and sought after teacher.  He taught as a guest professor at the New 
School for Social Research, City University and at University of Wisconsin. He 
taught courses on the Philosophy of Democracy, the Philosophy of Art, 
Minority Group Relations and the Negro’s Contribution to American 
Culture.25    
                                                           
22  Harris and Molesworth, Alain Locke: The Biography of a Philosopher, 401n8  Christopher Buck 
examines the influence of Locke’s Ba’há’í faith in Alain Locke: Faith and Philosophy (Los 
Angeles, Kalimat Press, 2005) Buck emphasizes the effects of Ba’há’í on Locke’s theorization of 
democracy.   
23 See Chapter Ten, “Theorizing Democracy,” pp. 328 – 357, Harris and Molesworth, Alain 
Locke: The Biography of a Philosopher.  
24 Ibid. 341 
25 Alain Locke Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Howard 
University Catalogue, 1947, box 164 – 164, folders 16, 17, 18.  
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  Locke remained committed to black artwork and the cultivation of 
intellectual democracy to the end of his life.  He died in New York City on 
June 9, 1954  just a month after the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of 
Education.  W.E.B. Du Bois spoke of Locke’s legacy at his funeral.  
 
Alain Locke was a man who deliberately chose the intellectual 
life; not as a desirable relief from reality, but as a vocation 
compared with which all else is of little account. In a land like 
America and among a group as inexperienced as American 
Negroes this was simply not understandable... [In] truth Alain 
Locke stood singular in a stupid land as a rare soul.26  
 
II.  Self-expression, Culture and the Politics of Recognition 
Since Locke both wrote about ‘race’ and worked to see black artwork 
and culture publicized, it may seem obvious that he thought artwork might 
somehow mitigate the effects of racism.   On this view, the negative effects of 
racism—a depreciatory image of self and group—could be repaired by 
recognition of the ‘true’ worth of black people and culture. Thus, it could be 
argued that Locke publicized black artwork and culture because they 
demonstrated that black people were worthy of recognition and value.     
Locke could, therefore, be seen to foreshadow the insights of contemporary 
theorists and defenders of ‘recognition.’  I disagree with this interpretation of 
Locke’s approach to artwork and culture.    First, as I mentioned above, Locke 
thought that artwork should not serve a political function.  That artwork did 
not serve merely political purposes opened the possibility that it was ‘merely’ 
expressive of black life. Locke did think that black people had been 
‘misrecognized’ but not (only) as an undeserving or despised group.  Rather, 
                                                           
26 Qtd in Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth, Alain L. Locke: The Biography of a Philosopher 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008)., p. 380 
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black people had been misrecognized as belonging (either naturally or by 
virtue of their status as a ‘problem’) to an identity.  Locke named this identity 
“old Negro.”  
 
…[The] Old Negro had long become more of a myth than a 
man… a creature of moral debate and historical controversy.  
His has been a stock figure perpetuated as an historical fiction 
partly in innocent sentimentalism partly in deliberate 
reactionism…. [For] generations the Negro has been more of a 
formula than a human being—a something to be argued about, 
condemned of defended, to be kept down or in his place or 
helped up, to be worried with or worried over, harassed or 
patronized, a social bogey or a social burden.27  
 
For Locke, the ‘new Negro’ is new, not because he is now seen as 
worthy of respect because of its particularity,  but instead because he has 
escaped or is in the process of escaping his identity as a social burden.  That is 
the new spirit “awake in the masses.” I argue that Locke did not see in artwork 
the source of a new, more worthy identity, secured by proper cultural 
recognition. 
To begin to articulate the case against the recognition interpretation, I 
shall briefly characterize the best-known defense of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘the 
politics of recognition,’ Charles Taylor’s 1994 essay, “The Politics of 
Recognition” and contrast Locke’s thinking about culture and self-hood from 
it.   To be clear, my purpose here is not to criticize ‘recognition’ as Taylor 
understands it28 but instead to delineate the significant differences in his 
                                                           
27 Alain Locke, “Enter the New Negro,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection of His 
Essays on Art and Culture, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart, vol. 8, Critical Studies on Black Life and 
Culture (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983), 7 - 12., p. 7 
28 For an excellent critique of Taylor’s “The Politics of Recognition,” see ch. 2, “The 
Distinguishing Mark: Taylor, Herder and Sovereignty,” in Patchen Markell, Bound by 
Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003)., pp. 39 – 61.  Markell traces two 
“senses” of recognition in Taylor, “a cognitive sense” of recognition in which one is ‘seen as 
one is’ and a second, “constructive sense,” in which the act of recognition constitutes the 
“identities to whom it is addressed.” (40 – 41)  Markell argues that these two forms of 
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thinking from Locke’s about the modern sources of identity and culture.  
Emphasis here is on the modern, for as I will argue in Chapter Two, the 
modern moment is very significant to Locke.   
While Taylor theorizes the ‘ideal’ of modern self-hood as “authentic 
identity,” sees culture as representing the unique, authentic identity of a 
particular ‘folk,’ and “…proposes that many contemporary social and political 
movements can be understood as struggles for recognition—that is, as 
attempts to secure forms of respect and esteem that are grounded in and 
expressive of the accurate knowledge of… particular identities,”29 Locke 
identifies in the work of Harlem Renaissance authors hints of a newfound 
“self-expressiveness” that is born of modern developments and experiences 
and sees culture as a cosmopolitan realm of contact in which the products of 
black artistic “self-expressiveness” become one of many sources for the self-
cultivation of all people.    
According to Taylor, contemporary demands for recognition derive 
from modern political and philosophical developments whereby a “…new 
understanding of individualized identity…emerges at the end of the 
eighteenth century.”30   Taylor characterizes “individualized identity” as 
“authenticity,” the idea that each individual has a “voice within…”31 and 
                                                           
recognition are exist “uneasily” together and treats the tension between the two as a point of 
departure.  He demonstrates that while Taylor claims the politics of recognition “…is 
supposed to break with the aspiration of sovereignty,” it ultimately fails to do so.  (53) This is 
because ultimately, the “cognition sense” of recognition “…helps Taylor explain what it 
means for intersubjective action to go well or go poorly…[Injustice] on the terrain of identity 
and difference is to be understood as misrecognition…the failure to perceive people…as they 
really are,”  (59) thereby reinstating (in the form of demands for recognition) the aspiration to 
sovereignty.    
29 Ibid. 39 
30 Ibid. 28 
31 Taylor argues that the original notion of authenticity derives from the idea that “human 
beings are endowed with a moral sense, an intuitive feeling for what is right and wrong…The 
idea was that understanding right and wrong was not a matter of dry calculation, but was 
anchored in our feelings.”  Taylor suggests further, that the “…notion of identity develops out 
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“…that each of us has an original way of being human.”32 Significantly for 
Taylor’s account of recognition, individualized or authentic identity requires 
“others.”   
 
We become full human agents, capable of understanding 
ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our 
acquisition of rich human languages of expression. For my 
purposes here, I want to take language in the broad sense, 
covering not only the words we speak, but also other modes of 
expression whereby we define ourselves, including the 
“languages” of art, of gesture, of love and the like.  But we learn 
these modes of expression through exchanges with others.33 
 
Because our senses of ourselves (and our human agency) depend upon 
dialogue with others, to be refused participation in such dialogue or to be 
misrecognized is profoundly damaging.  We can see how in what Taylor calls 
the “intimate sphere,” this might be.  Taylor writes, “[on the intimate level, we 
can see how much an original identity needs and is vulnerable to the 
recognition given by or withheld by significant others.  It is not surprising 
that…relationships are seen as the key loci of self-discovery and self-
affirmation.”34  But how does misrecognition come to constitute a political 
injustice?    
 Though political demands for recognition are legitimate because 
misrecognition can result in real harm, Taylor argues that the source of 
contemporary recognition demands can be found in the modern period, which 
he argues begins in the 18th century with the decline of social hierarchy, the 
rise of democracy, the concomitant displacement of ‘honor’ with the notion of 
                                                           
of a displacement of the moral accent of idea,” in favor of the idea that one has “intimate 
contact with oneself.” Ibid. 29 - 30 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 32 
34 Ibid. 36 
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equal dignity and the rise of the modern notion of individualized identity, 
which refers to each person’s particular way of being human.35 Taylor traces 
these developments through the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Johann Gottfried Herder among others, which I will not rehearse here.  What 
is important to Taylor is that these ideas are “familiar” to us today and have 
crystallized in two competing ideals, the politics of universalism 
(“emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens”) and the politics of difference, 
which insists that “[everyone] should be recognized for his or her unique 
identity.”36  Taylor argues some groups have been misrecognized in public so 
that members “…have been induced to adopt a depreciatory image of 
themselves.  They have internalized a picture of their own inferiority, so that 
even when some of the objective obstacles to their advancement fall away, 
they may be incapable of taking advantage of the new opportunities,37” 
constituting a “form of oppression” and a grave injustice.  Misrecognized 
groups pursue recognition to mitigate the effects—personal and political—of 
misrecognition.   
  Locke was, on the other hand, quite clear that any “sense of inferiority 
[black people had] had to be innerly compensated.”38  This was, as we will see, 
                                                           
35 “We can distinguish two changes that together have made the modern preoccupation with 
identity and recognition inevitable.  The first is the collapse of social hierarchies, which used 
to be the basis for honor…which is intrinsically linked to inequalities.  For some to have 
honor…it is essential that not everyone have it….As against this notion of honor, we have the 
modern notion of dignity, now used in a universalist and egalitarian sense, where we talk of 
the inherent ‘dignity of human beings,’ or of citizen dignity.  The underlying premise here is 
that everyone shares in it.  It is obvious that this concept of dignity is the only one compatible 
with a democratic society.” (27) 
36 Ibid. 38 
37 Ibid. 25 
38 Alain Locke, “Art or Propaganda,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection of His 
Essays on Art and Culture, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart (New York and London: Garland Publishing 
Inc., 1983), 27 - 28. p. 27 
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only possible as a result of broad scale change. The advent of black modernity 
would make such ‘inner compensation’ possible.   
 
A railroad ticket and a suitcase, like a Bagdad  [sic] carpet, 
transport the Negro peasant from the cotton field and farm to 
the heart of the most complex urban civilization. Here, in the 
mass, he must and does survive a jump of two generations in 
social economy and of a century and more in civilization.  
Meanwhile, the Negro poet, student, artist, thinker, by the very 
move that normally would take him off at a tangent from the 
masses, finds himself in their midst, in a situation concentrating 
the racial side of his experience and heightening his race-
consciousness.39 
 
Urbanization and migration brought black people into modern 
‘civilization,’ where they would become ‘race conscious.’ For Locke, (black) 
modernity provides an opportunity. 
As political theorist Patchen Markell has argued, for Taylor, modernity 
is ultimately tragic. After all, one result of the decline of hierarchy is that as 
old identities fall away, the certainties of recognition upon which they 
depended are lost, too.  
 
…Harmonious (if inegalitarian) recognition [and] throws old, 
established hierarchies into question, giving rise to the ideal of 
“inwardly generated” identity that can come into conflict with 
socially ascribed roles….making misrecognition among persons 
possible in the same way that the wrenching apart of signifier 
and signified after Babel subjected the world to confusion, error, 
and misunderstanding.40 
 
Where for Taylor, early modernity brought with it a tragic break with the past 
so that misrecognition became a real possibility, for Locke, late (or at least 
later) modernity (early 20th century) brought about a positive change: black 
                                                           
39 Alain Locke, “Harlem,” Survey Graphic 53, no. 11 (March 1, 1925): 629 - 630 
40 Markell, Bound by Recognition, 55 
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people, heretofore misrepresented and misrecognized were beginning to 
achieve “self-expressiveness.”  Crucially, ‘race’ as theory and practice 
produced the particular forms of exclusion, misrecognition and 
misrepresentation experienced by black people.    “Self-expressiveness” did 
not depend on the recognition of ‘others’ but rather on the experience of 
modernity itself.  Mass migration and urbanization, for example, forced inter 
and intra-racial assimilation/differentiation. In “Negro Youth Speaks,” one of 
four essays Locke penned for The New Negro: an Interpretation, Locke argues,  
 
From the racial standpoint, our Harlems are themselves 
crucibles.  Here in Manhattan is not merely the largest Negro 
community in the world, but the first concentration in history of 
so many diverse elements of Negro life.  It has attracted the 
African, the West Indian, the Negro American; has brought 
together the Negro of the North and the Negro of the South; the 
man from the city and the man from the town and village; the 
peasant, the student, the business man, the professional man, 
artist, poet, musician, adventurer and worker, preacher and 
criminal exploiter and social outcast.41 
 
Through migration into the cities, blacks had “their greatest experience [that 
of] finding each other.” In the cities, blacks would (finally) experience and 
observe their differences, necessitating and producing new,  (black) 
collectivities.  Formerly ‘(mis)identified’ as a single, undifferentiated people, 
regardless of their national origins, social class, religious beliefs, or life 
experiences, black people moved to the cities of the American north en masse, 
and by Locke’s account, began to experience the plurality of black life in new 
ways.   Black artwork and its public reception changed in parallel with these 
developments. “Our poets,” wrote Locke, 
 
                                                           
41 Locke, “Enter the New Negro,” 9 
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…have now stopped speaking for the Negro—they speak as 
Negroes.  Where formerly they spoke to others and tried to 
interpret, they now speak to their own and try to express.  They 
have stopped posing, being nearer the attainment of poise.42  
“Beneath the watch and guard of statistics,” Locke explored the “New 
Negro’s” newfound poise and self-expressiveness, as it appeared artwork, in 
(the quite extraordinary number of) essays he wrote about black artwork 
during the Harlem Renaissance movement.    We might say that for Locke, 
though racial violence and political exclusion continued, modern 
developments such as mass migration and urbanization were significant 
because they conditioned a form of black autonomy, defined by black people 
thinking of themselves and their lives in new and different ways, even if these 
developments and new modes of thinking failed to bring about full social and 
political inclusion.     
Locke is quite clear that the early 1900s marked the true beginnings of 
modernity for black people, who by migrating to the cities, made “a deliberate 
flight not only from countryside to city, but from medieval America to 
modern.”43  Artwork, far from merely serving the purpose of procuring 
‘cultural’ recognition for black people as an advance strategy for political 
inclusion, was significant to Locke because it evinced the arrival and potential 
of the modern moment.  For Locke, the Harlem Renaissance was a significant 
product and symbol of this moment.  Before I turn to describing in detail how 
I take up the arguments that I have sketched in this introductory chapter in 
the rest of the dissertation, I shall turn below to Harlem and Harlem 
Renaissance, which serve as the backdrop to Locke’s thinking. 
 
                                                           
42 Alain Locke, “Negro Youth Speaks,” in The New Negro: an Interpretation (New York: Albert 
and Charles Boni, 1925), 47 - 56, p. 49 
43 Locke, “Enter the New Negro,” 10 
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III. Harlem and the Harlem Renaissance   
The Harlem Renaissance and its “New Negroes” arrived, perhaps not entirely 
unexpected,44 on the coattails of the Great Migration, a massive movement of 
some 1,000,000 blacks from the agricultural south to the industrial centers of 
the North, which was itself precipitated by increased labor demand and 
southern drought.45  Arriving en masse in the large cities of the North—
Detroit, Pittsburgh, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia–- black workers took 
jobs vacated by whites off to fight in the Great War.  If they successfully 
escaped persecution, Jim Crow laws and lynching in the South, they found 
themselves dropped rather unceremoniously into the labor wars of the 
North.46  As we will see, for Locke, the gathering of so many different 
“elements of Negro life” in the cities of the North was an opportunity for 
intra-cultural contact and self-representation, but for the masses of migrant 
blacks, it was no panacea. By 1920, some 64,000 blacks were squeezed into the 
area between 130th and 145th streets and Fifth and Eighth Avenue.  By 1930, 
Harlem had expanded by ten blocks and its population had grown two and 
half times.47 Most were slum dwellers, under-employed and packed, family on 
top of family, into tenement buildings.  In 1940, Claude McKay described the 
situation thus, 
  
                                                           
44 Indeed, calling the Negro new was old hat.  Booker T. Washington wrote a series of essay 
entitled A New Negro for a New Century: His Political, Civil and Mental Status, and Related Essays 
in 1900.  Further, William Pickens published a book called The New Negro in 1916.  
45 For a full account of the Great Migration, see Henry Florette, Black Migration: Movement 
North 1900 – 1920 (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1975)  
46 For an account of the “red summer of 1919,” see William M. Tuttle, Race Riot: Chicago in the 
Red Summer of 1919 (New York: Atheneum, 1970).   For an account of the 1917 race riots in St. 
Louis, see  Elliot M. Rudwick, Race Riot at East St Louis, July 2, 1017 (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1982). 
47 For a full account of Harlem’s massive expansion, see  Cary Wintz, “Harlem,” in Harlem 
Speaks:A Living History of the harlem Renaissance (Naperfille, IL: Sourcebooks Media Fusion, 
2007).   
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Excepting the privileged few, the majority of families up there in 
sweet Sugar hill are packed together like sardines.  The 
prohibitive rent makes the unit of private family life the rarest 
thing.  Almost all families take in lodgers. All available space 
must be occupied.  Rooms, rooms, and more rooms to let.  
Adequate clothing and even vital food must be sacrificed to meet 
the high cost of housing.  That exclusive Sugar Hill society of the 
white writer’s imagination is simply a café society.48 
 
Harlem’s famous cabarets were, for the most part, white-owned. As 
Beverly Smith wrote in The New York Herald Tribune, “90 per cent of the 
night-clubs in Harlem are owned by white people.  Nearly 92 per cent of the 
speakeasies are operated by white racketeers downtown… nine-tenths of the 
work that white folks do is closed to Negroes.  If the chief trades open they are 
taken on only after the supply of white labour is exhausted… Men who 
employed both races tended to fire the Negro worker first.”49   Indeed, most of 
the Harlem Renaissance authors themselves were under-employed.  Between 
manuscripts and magazine proposals, Wallace Thurman and Langston 
Hughes worked on and off as “indoor aviators,” the witty nickname given to 
elevator boys.  
To be sure, Manhattan had been home to blacks since 1626, when the 
Dutch founded “New Amsterdam.”  Among the settler population were 
eleven black indentured servants.   When the Dutch surrendered New 
Amsterdam to the English in 1664, the character of black servitude changed 
and the slave population grew explosively so that by 1790 there were 21, 324 
slaves (and 4,654 freemen), many of whom lived in New York City.50   In 1827, 
slavery was abolished in the state of New York, and a free, politically active 
                                                           
48  Claude McKay, Harlem: Negro Metropolis (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1968)   
49 Qtd in Leonore van Notten, Wallace Thurman's Harlem Renaissance (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
1994)., p. 25 
50  James Weldon Johnson, Black Manhattan (New York: Knopf, 1940),   pp. 3 – 12.   
 
 
23 
and educated black population began to grow.51   In the late 1800s through the 
early 20th century most blacks lived in “Sullivan, Bleeker, Thompson, Carmine, 
and Grove streets, Minetta Lane, and adjacent streets.”52  At that time, Harlem, 
with its beautiful single-family homes and elegant apartment houses, as well 
as stately department stores and large churches, was home to the wealthy 
classes.   But by the early 1900s, Harlem could no longer afford to be so 
exclusive. 
By 1905, Harlem’s boom turned into a bust.  Excessive 
speculation and overbuilding resulted in empty apartments and 
houses that had to be leased out to renters or subdivided into 
multifamily units.  Desperate white developers began to sell or 
rent to African Americans, often at greatly discounted prices, 
while black real estate firms like the Afro-American Realty 
Company provided the customers.  At this time 60,000 blacks 
who lived in New York were scattered through the five 
boroughs, including a small community in Harlem.  The largest 
concentration inhabited the overcrowded and congested 
Tenderloin and San Juan Hill sections of the west side of 
Manhattan.  When New York’s black population swelled in the 
twentieth century as newcomers from the South moved north 
and as redevelopment destroyed existing black neighborhoods, 
pressure for additional… housing pushed blacks northward up 
the west side of Manhattan into Harlem.53  
 And Harlem became the Negro metropolis. Alongside the over-
populated and under-served tenements and the famed nightclubs, various 
black social and political organizations set up shop.  The NAACP, the 
National Urban League and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters each 
established national offices in Harlem.   The 135th Street Branch of the New 
York Public Library became an important cultural center, at which a number 
of Harlem Renaissance artists had workspaces and performed.   Though 
                                                           
51 Johnson offers an account of many of these institutions, including anti-slavery 
organizations, the African Free School, the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, the 
Negro Dutch Reformed Church, as well as the beginnings of the black press, pp. 20 – 39.   
52 Ibid. 59 
53  Wintz, Harlem Speaks, 32  
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horrors are apparent in any sociological account of early 20s Harlem, Harlem 
was in vogue and everyone knew it.  Nearly all accounts remark on the 
vibrant, kinetic energy of Harlem’s streets and its people.  Claude McKay’s 
Harlem: Negro Metropolis, is populated by incense peddling mediums, religious 
exhorters on street-side platforms, “stinking fried fish joints,” speakeasies, 
labor union organizers, numbers runners, bohemian white hangers-on and the 
“Negro respectability.”  In Harlem, boisterousness masked the dream-
deferred, and its streets, lined with shabby tenements, were clamorous with 
parade and protest.  When the Harlem Hell Fighters (the United States 369th 
Infantry Regiment) returned from the Great War their success and the 
welcome they received made national news.   And who can forget Pan-
Africanist Marcus Garvey, representing his United Negro Improvement 
Association, with its hundreds of thousands of members, marching in full 
raiment down Harlem’s packed streets?  Amidst the noise and spectacle, 
writers and artists, playwrights and trumpet players, poets and painters, 
trickled in.   
Retrospective accounts of what came to be known as the Harlem 
Renaissance point out that it was too concerned with the color of culture (or, 
perhaps, the culture of color) to have express “political” ends.  Elitist in 
orientation, it did nothing to improve the poor living conditions affecting the 
vast majority of blacks living in Harlem at the time.  For a movement, it didn’t 
move much.  No political platform was advanced.  No demands were made.  
It was merely Greenwich Village bohemianism, some said, painted black.  
Accounts of the Harlem Renaissance generally begin with the caveat that its 
beginnings are impossible to define, that it was more a “spirit than a 
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movement,” or that generalizations will invariably fail to capture its essence54.  
Still others call it a kind of psychology.55  Even the various names given the 
series of events, personages, literature and artwork that have come to be 
known as the Harlem Renaissance highlight these difficulties, for during the 
20s and 30s, it was called the Negro Renaissance, New Negro Movement or 
the Black Renaissance.  Zora Neale Hurston jokingly called its younger 
participants the “Niggerati,” while dismissing the old Negro guard as 
“Negrotarian.”56   
The Harlem Renaissance is, at least, a convenient title to give to the 
unprecedented and explosive flowering of black American (and diasporan) 
social thought and cultural production, centered in Harlem, beginning in the 
late teens or early 1920s.    Artists arrived in Harlem—elated and inquisitive—
like everyone else.    Or perhaps they were a bit more buoyant, for, after all, 
these new Negroes were, if not wealthier than, then certainly more educated—
indeed, more exceptional—than the black migrant masses.  Both Countee 
                                                           
54 “The Harlem Renaissance was more a spirit than a movement, and because a spirit is 
ephemeral, generalizations about the Harlem Renaissance are either too hard or too easy. 
They have come easily enough to a whole generation of analysts, but the pity summaries 
seldom reflect the wide divisions between blacks and whites, the black intelligentsia and the 
black masses, black artists and their bourgeois readers, that diversified the era.  Indeed, when 
one studies the phenomenon of what was then called the Negro Renaissance or the New 
Negro Renaissance, and what is now called the Harlem Renaissance, he comes away with a  
bewildering complex of notions, statements, affirmations and manifestos.” Robert 
Hemenway, Zora Neale Hurston: A Literary Biography (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
1977), p. 35    
55  “The Harlem Renaissance was basically a psychology—a state of mind or an attitude 
shared by a number of black writers and intellectuals who centered their activities around 
Harlem in the late 1920s and 1930s.   Cary Wintz, Black Culture and the Harlem Renaissance 
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1996). 2 But in the Series Introduction to 
The Harlem Renaissance, 1920 – 1940,  Wintz writes, “…the Harlem Renaissance may best be 
conceptualized as a group of black writers and poets, orbiting erratically around a group of 
black intellectuals positioned in the N.A.A.C.P., The Urban League and other African 
American political and educational institutions.  These older intellectuals supported the 
movement, criticized it, attempted with varying success to define it and served as liaison 
between the writers and the white publishers, patrons and critics who dominated the business 
of literature in the United States in the 1920s.”  Cary Wintz, The Harlem Renaissance 1920 - 1940: 
Remembering the Harlem Renaissance (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1996). p. viii 
56  Hemenway, Zora Neale Hurston: A Literary Biography, p. 43  
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Cullen and Langston Hughes published their first poems as high school 
students.   In The Harlem Renaissance Remembered, Arna Bontemps remarks that 
he can recall the dates of these early publications in 1921—Hughes for “The 
Negro Speaks of Rivers” and Cullen for “I Have a Rendezvous with Life (with 
apologies to Alan Seeger)”—because 
 
…1921 was the year where, half-hidden near the back of a large 
freshman English class at a small college in northern California, I 
peeped over the shoulder of the students in front of me and saw 
an approving smile on the face of the teacher as he read a paper I 
had submitted in response to the current assignment.  I was 
more embarrassed than flattered by the attention it drew, but the 
teacher’s smile lingered, and I came to regard that expression as 
the semaphore that flagged me toward New York City three 
years later.57   
New York City also called Zora Neale Hurston, who had already attended 
high school college preparatory classes at Morgan Academy in Baltimore, and 
college at Howard University, where she was a member of the campus literary 
club, Stylus, which was facilitated by Alain Locke.   After earning an 
Associates degree from Howard, Hurston was admitted to Barnard College 
(the women’s division at Columbia University), where she studied 
anthropology under the tutelage of Franz Boas.   Within a year of arriving in 
Harlem, Hurston had published two short stories, “Drenched in Light,” and 
“Spunk,” as well as a play, “Color Struck” for which she won two literary 
awards.  She had clearly followed her late mother’s command to “jump at de 
sun.”58  Wallace Thurman— author of the satirical novel Infants in the Spring 
and chief agitator of the young bohemians, who longed to take the reigns of 
the Harlem Renaissance— was “proprietor” of what he would call the 
                                                           
57Arna Bontempts, The Harlem Renaissance Remembered (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1972).  
p. 4   
58 “Jump at de sun,” her mother was reported to have said in Hurston’s autobiography Dust 
Tracks on a Road, “We might not land on the sun, but at least we would get off the ground.”     
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“Niggerati Manor,” where he and Bruce Nugent lived, giving prodigious 
parties and a place to sleep to various artists and hangers-on—arrived in 
Harlem from his hometown of Salt Lake City, via journalism training at the 
University of Southern California.    Jessie Redmon Fausset, a graduate of 
Cornell University and the first of Cornell’s black students to graduate Phi 
Beta Kappa, was literary editor of the NAACP organ Crisis, from 1919 – 1926.     
New Negro artists arrived in Harlem and in print. And so, plays, short 
stories and poems were produced, en masse.  New magazines were founded, 
including the famous but short-lived Fire by Wallace Thurman, Zora Hurston 
and Langston Hughes and Harlem by Wallace Thurman. The most prestigious 
black journals—Opportunity, The Crisis, Negro World, the Crusader, the 
Emancipator, the Voice of the Negro and the Chicago Defender —published more 
literature and offered awards.   Novels, short stories and poetry collections 
were published—Cane by Jean Toomer, Flight by Walter White, The Weary 
Blues and Fine Clothes to the Jew by Langston Hughes, Passing and Quicksand by 
Nella Larsen, Color, Copper Sun, and The Ballad of the Brown Girl by Countee 
Cullen, Dark Princess by W.E.B. Du Bois, Home to Harlem by Claude McKay, 
There is Confusion and Plum Bun: A Novel without a Moral, among many, many 
others. 
These are just a few—less than a representative sample— of the gifted 
writers and artists who would create and, only briefly, sustain what we now 
know as the Harlem Renaissance.    This account, even of the lives of the very 
artists I mention leaves many important details un-reported, of course.  
Because the Harlem Renaissance defies easy explanation, I only hope to 
suggest it, to create, if you will, a Romare Bearden style pastiche, in which rat 
infested tenements, street preachers, fruit kiosk operators and rent parties 
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occupy the same conceptual—and more important, urban— space.  This 
collage ought not be too romantic because the contrast between the persons 
and lives of the Harlem Renaissance literati and their black migrant 
counterparts, living atop each other in the tenements of Harlem ought to be 
clear even from the short summary I offered above.  
Harlem’s Renaissance leapt beyond the bounds of Harlem because its 
audience was not limited to New York.   The “new” Harlem Renaissance 
publications, such as Fire, Harlem, and Harlem: Mecca of the New Negro did not 
have an enormous audience but were disseminated widely even— and this is 
important— internationally. Its artist “participants” not only came to Harlem 
from places far and wide but also traveled, in person and through the 
exchange and translation of their writings.  
 
IV. Chapter Breakdown 
 The central and general claim that I see this dissertation defending 
exceeds its subject.59  I think of Alain Locke’s project, and the writings and as 
pursuing democratic ends.  It works toward the realization of democratic 
principles by examining the ways in which ‘race’ in theory and practice 
prevent the possibility of true democracy.  It examines the effects of ‘race’ on 
our thinking and refuses to allow the black political imaginary to be fully 
captured by the devastating effects of the history of slavery and the practice of 
‘race’ and racism.  This is why I argue against interpreting Alain Locke’s work 
through the lens of ‘identity,’ multiculturalism or the “politics of recognition.”   
Each approach, in my opinion, sees renovated black identities and/or the 
appreciation of black culture as the primary political objective of Locke’s 
                                                           
59 My thinking on the subject in black political thought in general owes much to several 
conversations on the topic with Desmond Jagmohan.  
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thought.  Locke was a subtle thinker who understood why and how easily 
black thought and culture could itself by captivated by ‘race’ and ‘race 
thinking’ and insisted that there was more to the black imaginary than the 
continued ‘problem’ of race.   
Consider Locke’s 1944 commencement address at Hampton Institute.60 
It expresses Locke’s keen insight into the effects of ‘race’ on social relations 
and democracy and his adamant defense against the temptations of “racial 
chauvinism.”  Locke warned the “persecuted minority” against “…the acute 
and sometimes morbid social consciousness.”61  Though it was natural to 
develop such a consciousness, the ‘Negro’ ought not to be tempted either by 
“reactionary, subservient inter-racialism of the traditional sort [or] by narrow 
chauvinistic racialism.”62  It was instead, “…high time…to stretch our social 
minds and achieve thereby a new dynamic as well as new alliances in the 
common fight for human justice and freedom of which our minority cause is a 
vital but nonetheless only a fractional part.”63   By “inter-racialism of the 
traditional sort,” Locke meant the very Hampton/Tuskegee model the older 
members of his audience advanced. Those treated the ‘Negro’ only as a 
problem, rooted as they were in the “…philosophy of racial work and race 
relations.” Ever sensitive to the real effects of ‘race’ on the political and social 
imaginary, Locke saw “militant and chauvinistic racialism” as the “inevitable 
sequel and antidote” to this traditional form of inter-racialism.  He 
                                                           
60 Hampton Institute was founded in 1868 as Hampton Normal and Agriculture Institute, was 
“one of the first colleges for African Americans and a pioneer in educating Native 
Americans.”  Booker T. Washington was an alumnus.  “The original mandate of the Hampton 
Institute was to “…educate African Americans in moral virtues and in crafts and trades that 
would assure them gainful employment.” Alain Locke, “Stretching Our Social Mind,” ed. 
Christopher Buck and Betty J. Fisher, World Order 38, no. 3 (2008): 28 - 32.p. 28  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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nevertheless insisted that “chauvinistic racialism” was a “…dangerous 
limitation on a sound and progressive social outlook.”   
 
Eventually, however, just as world-mindedness must dominate 
and remould [sic] nation-mindedness, so we must transform 
eventually race-mindedness into human mindedness.  Today it 
is possible and necessary for Negroes to conceive their special 
disabilities as flaws in the general democratic structure.  The 
intelligent and effective righting of our racial wrongs and 
handicaps involves pleading and righting the cause to any and 
all oppressed minorities.  In making common cause with all such 
broader issues, we shall find that we strengthen, both morally 
and practically, our own.  Indeed, we must learn and use this 
new strategy and further regard such new motivations as a 
contribution we have it in our power to make to the general 
welfare and social democracy at large.64     
 
Remarkably, given its interracial makeup, Locke considers even the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People as racially chauvinist.  He 
argues, in fact, that as “vital and useful it had been as a militant Negro defense 
organization,” the NAACP should shift its objectives and change its name to 
the “National Association for the Advancement of American Democracy.” He 
insists that the work of the NAACP be “taken up into the substance of a 
general program and struggle for common human advance.”65  Locke’s advice 
to the NAACP is neither pragmatic nor strategic.  He does not mean that to 
most effectively pursue the ‘Negro’ cause, the NAACP should join up with 
other movements.  I would argue that, as he had so often done before, Locke 
identifies in the particular context a new transformative potentiality, in which 
old modes of collective action and political imagination informed by an-up-to-
this-point authoritative model of ‘race thinking’ could be traded for new ones.  
We must be ever attentive to ‘race thinking’ but inspired by a broadened 
                                                           
64 Ibid. 
65 Locke, “Stretching Our Social Mind,” 32 
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social mind. We must always be engaged in rethinking our collective 
purposes.  “This includes all minority problems and situations, the religious 
and cultural as well as the strictly racial; and it will be the basis in the near 
future of most of the efforts of progressive educators to teach understanding, 
tolerance and cultural democracy.”66 I suspect that Locke, had he the chance to 
read Charles Taylor and other defenders of identity and recognition politics, 
would have argued that such approaches belonged to a particular time—one 
past or passing.     
 The dissertation takes shape as a series of inter-related essays exploring 
Locke’s writings about ‘race,’ culture, modernity and artwork, which feature 
staged encounters between Locke and number of thinkers, whose primary 
interests, as often as not, differ from Locke’s.  In Chapter Two, “All that’s 
solid: Difference, Race, and ‘the Political,’ I attend to Locke’s careful 
theorization of ‘race’ as political practice and as theory.  In this chapter, I 
interpret Locke’s 1916 lectures on ‘race’ and interracial relations (published in 
1992 as Race Contacts and Interracial Relations67).  I argue that for Locke, 
difference (among groups) is a defining characteristic of life, which takes on 
political significance when identifiably different groups confront each other.  
Faced with unassimilable difference, some groups will subjugate others 
thereby becoming “political groups” and more important, producing 
historical accounts, discourses and even social sciences committed to 
demonstrating and shoring up their superiority and resulting in ‘race’ as we 
have come to know it.  Such ‘race practice’ is politics for Locke and it results in 
                                                           
66 Ibid.  
67 Alain Locke and Jeffrey Stewart, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, (Washington, DC: 
Howard University Press, 1992) 
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a body of thought (race theory) and in racialized identities, characterized by 
their inferiority or superiority.   
A number of contemporary democratic theorists, who like me worry 
about the effects of identity and identity thinking on democracy, have drawn 
our attention to the ways in which identities depend upon accounts of 
difference and see theoretical attempts to ‘recognize’ or protect them as 
sharply limiting the inherently conflictual practice of democracy.  Though 
Locke was not concerned to see democratic conflict rescued from the 
democracy-reducing tendencies of proceduralism and deliberative democracy, 
I argue that he does share with these thinkers a concern for the conditions that 
best facilitate democracy, and an intuition—that like ‘race thinking,’ identity 
thinking may foreclose democratic practice.  Indeed, for Locke, ‘race thinking’ 
is the primary and most damaging form of identity-thinking.  In this chapter, 
after characterizing Locke’s ‘race’ lectures, I stage a conversation between him 
and a rather unlikely partner, Carl Schmitt.  I suggest that Locke’s thinking 
about ‘the political,’ like Schmitt’s, derives from a ‘friend-enemy distinction’ of 
his own.    
As I argue in Chapter Two, Locke offers an historical account of the 
development of ‘race thinking’ and practice and proposes that in the modern 
period (early 20th century) one ‘new’ articulation of race would be in the form 
of “secondary race consciousness” that would forge new group solidarities.  
Nevertheless, this was not to be the end stage of the development of ‘race 
thinking and practice,’ nor Locke’s last word on the subject.  In Chapter Three,  
“Culture and the Poetry of ‘Negro’ Life,” I argue that Locke offers at least two 
accounts of ‘culture:’ the first, ‘social race,’ derived and departed in crucial 
ways from the older and most pernicious form.  From the perspectives of 
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anthropology and sociology, Locke argued that there were durable cultural 
traits worthy of study, but only if that study that could identify—and then 
refuse—the dangerous temptations of biological ‘race thinking.’  At the same 
time ‘culture’ was a cosmopolitan realm of varied cultural objects, which 
would serve the self-cultivation of all comers.  I examine these accounts of 
culture by pursuing continuities and discontinuities between his thought and 
that of German philosopher and social theorist, Georg Simmel, with whom 
Locke studied at University of Berlin.  I close the chapter by ‘reading’ the 1926 
essay, “The Negro Poets in the United States,” in which Locke describes the 
modern transformation of black poetry to a body of work defined by the racial 
status of its authors to artwork(s) that “objectified ‘Negro’ life,” thereby 
introducing black life in all its vitality into the realm of culture and the “pure 
plane of art,” where it could become a source of self-cultivation for all.   
This development was a particularly ‘modern’ event for Locke.  It was 
conditioned by what Locke characterized as modernity’s “reverent 
vandalism” of the past and the ‘cosmopolitan’ style (and potential) of modern 
poetry.  Literary theorist Brent Hayes Edwards argues that Locke is one of 
many ‘internationalist’ black actors who sought together to articulate the ‘fact’ 
of blackness.  I agree with Edwards that Locke was an ‘internationalist.’  But I 
suggest in Chapter Four, “Modern (Negro) Poetry,” that ‘internationalism’ 
does not fully capture his critical enterprise.  Instead, drawing on a little 
known essay about the Belgian modernist poet Emile Verhaeren, which Locke 
wrote in 1917, I argue that Locke expected from New Negro poets precisely 
what he celebrated in Verhaeren, a cosmopolitan style cohering from 
engagement with particular subjects.  This, I argue in the chapter, is apparent 
from the multiple frames he requires to address the New Negro and his 
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artwork (no less than twenty-two essays ‘introducing’ black artwork and 
social development in The New Negro: an Interpretation) and the similarities 
between Locke’s critical appreciation of Verhaeren and his demands of New 
Negro artists.   
I pursue this argument further by exploring how Locke characterized 
the ‘function’ of artwork.  Following philosopher and Alain Locke scholar 
Leonard Harris,68 in Chapter Five, “[We] are not a race problem.” I examine 
Locke’s debate with W.E.B. Du Bois over the functions of artwork.   While I 
agree with Harris that it is remarkable that both authors have attributed to 
artistic expression great salience for the project of emancipation,  I disagree 
with how he assesses the way in which the two authors engage art for politics. 
Emphasis on superficial similarities between Du Bois and Locke   conceals 
where the two part ways: Du Bois' take on art is instrumental; he suggested 
that black artistic production matters only as propaganda. For Locke, art had 
no function except to “express” ‘Negro life.”  I suggest further that some of 
Locke’s essays, most particularly those that attend to ‘Negro’ drama begin to 
push ‘Negro’ artwork out of the bounds of ‘representation’ itself toward the 
potential of ‘performativity.’  
In the admittedly (and perhaps dangerously) experimental Chapter Six, 
“To Usward” I leave Locke’s art criticism behind to examine a poem, “To 
Usward,” by the Harlem Renaissance poet Gwendolyn Bennett.  I ‘read’ this 
poem as ‘performing’ the difficult transformation from identification to ‘self-
expressiveness,’ which I argue Locke saw as part and parcel of the modern 
moment for black people. I stage an encounter between my own Lockean 
interpretation of Bennett’s poem (which is itself drawn from Locke’s approach 
                                                           
68 Leonard Harris (Philosophia Africana: Vol. 7, Issue 1, March 2004) 15 - 39 
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to art criticism) as ‘performing’ black autonomy in its constitutive moment 
and Jacques Derrida’s theorization of the Declaration of Independence.  
Though the different genres of these texts— poem and public document— 
would seem to defy comparison, by my reading Locke interpreted black 
poetry and artwork of the period as claiming independence from the identity 
(as problem) previously ascribed to black people. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven, the Conclusion, I close by reflecting on 
Locke, difference and identity and suggest future directions for the project.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ALL THAT’S SOLID: DIFFERENCE, RACE AND ‘THE POLITICAL’ 
 Historian David Levering Lewis has pointed out that W.E.B. Du Bois 
pursued “virtually every possible solution to the problem of twentieth-
century racism.”  In his scholarship, fiction, essays and autobiography, and in 
his political activism in the NAACP and later as a separatist and Marxist, 
W.E.B. Du Bois was dedicated to the eradication of “the problem of the color 
line.”  In his biography of Du Bois,  Lewis describes a confident life lived in 
service of black people and of American democracy; a life lived in pursuit 
every available possible fix to the problem of racism: political, social and 
cultural. Du Bois worked hard on behalf of black people and in pursuit of 
equality.  But the need for this work and the experience of living his life as a 
problem had profound effects, both on Du Bois’s own consciousness and that 
of black people in general. Du Bois wrote in the opening chapter of the Souls of 
Black Folk. 
 
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked 
question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by 
others through the difficulty of rightly framing it…How does it 
feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word… And yet, being a 
problem is a strange experience—peculiar for one who has never 
been anything else…It dawned upon me with a certain 
suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap 
in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a 
vast veil…After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, 
the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, 
born with a veil and gifted with second sight in this American 
world, --a world that yields him no true self-consciousness but 
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other 
world.  It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this 
sense of always looking at one’s self thought the eyes of 
others…One ever feels his two-ness, --an American, a Negro; 
two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two 
 
 
40 
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone 
keeps it from being torn asunder.1 
 
Du Bois moves deftly back and forth between his own experience of 
being recognized as a problem (“They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of 
way…asking How does it feel to be a problem” “…I was different…shut out 
by a veil”) and that of the ‘Negro’ (“a sort of seventh son, born with a veil”), 
who is afforded “no true self-consciousness” because he “ever feels his two-
ness.”   In Du Bois’s telling, Black people strive to “be…co-worker[s] in the 
kingdom of culture”2  but find their talents nevertheless “…strangely wasted, 
dispersed, or forgotten.”3 Blacks find their “strengths” misrecognized as 
weakness, “to seem like absence of power.”  Thus, the “black artisan,” “Negro 
minister or doctor,” and “black savant” confronts “double aims.” The black 
artisan must escape “white contempt” while at the same time, “…plough[ing] 
and nail[ing] and dig[ging] for a poverty stricken horde.”4  The black artist 
faces a particularly impossible challenge: 
 
The innate love of harmony and beauty that set the ruder souls 
of his people a-dancing and a-singing raised but confusion and 
doubt in the soul of the black artist; for the beauty revealed to 
him was the soul-beauty of a race which his larger audience 
despised, and he could not articulate the message of another 
people.5   
 
Like the “Negro doctor or minister,” who is pushed by the “criticism of the 
other world…toward ideals that made him ashamed of his lowly tasks,” the 
black artist cannot represent the ‘soul beauty of race,’ its “singing and its 
                                                           
1 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Souls of Black Folk,” in Du Bois: Writings, ed. Nathan Huggins (New York, 
NY: The Library of America, 1986), 357 - 548. 
2 Ibid. 365 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 366 
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dancing” because he must ever concern himself with the problem of 
misrecognition by the white audience.  Under these conditions, to borrow 
Alain Locke’s language, the black artist cannot be “self-expressive.”  Ever 
pursuing “double aims,” the black artist cannot articulate the plurality and 
vitality of black life.  “Race,” what Du Bois famously in “The Forethought” of 
Souls, called the “problem of the Twentieth Century,”6 results in 
misrecognition, thereby necessitating “double aims” that foreclose the 
possibility of “self-expressiveness.”  What was the black artist to do?  I will 
argue in Chapter Five that for Du Bois, in contrast to Locke, the black artist 
had a duty to propagate truths about ‘the race’ to counter white 
misrepresentations.  In this chapter, I pursue one source of their disagreement: 
their thinking about ‘race’ as a body of ideas and practice.      
 As political scientist Joel Olson7 has rightly pointed out, Du Bois’s 
thinking about what he called the ‘race concept’ evolved over the course of his 
long life.  His early work in Souls and the essay, “The Conservation of Races,” 
treats race as a “scientific and world historical category.” Later, Du Bois 
explains ‘race’ by invoking culture and geography.8 In his later life, Du Bois 
abandoned culture and geography as sources for ‘race,’ arguing instead that 
‘race’ is an historical and political category, a result Olson argues, of the 
“social heritage of slavery.” According to Olson, a number of historical events 
shaped the evolution of Du Bois’s thinking.  Olson argues, nevertheless, that 
Du Bois was a “propagandist and a scientist in that order.”9 Thus, Du Bois’s is 
best considered a “scholar and activist.”   
                                                           
6 Ibid. 359 
7 Joel Olson, “W.E.B. Du Bois and the Race Concept,” Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, 
Culture, and Society 7, no. 3 - 4 (Summer 2005): 118 - 129. 
8 Olson cites Du Bois’s 1915 The Negro as representative of this thinking.   
9 Ibid. 118 
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 One way to think about the differences between Locke’s and Du Bois’s 
thinking about ‘race’ is that Locke was not an activist in the manner of Du 
Bois.  That is, it is not clear that Locke saw “objective research [serving] a 
normative function”10 in the manner that Olson convincingly argues that Du 
Bois did.  In this regard, Locke’s approach to ‘race’ as a category worthy of 
study is similar to his approach to artwork. As I argue in Chapter Five, to 
Locke, artwork did not serve a normative function.  Its only function was to be 
‘expressive.’ Furthermore, I would argue that though Du Bois’s thinking about 
the ‘race concept’ evolved over the course of his life, his thinking about the 
political purposes of artwork remained tied to repairing the damage done to 
black people by misrecognition/misrepresentation, in a way that it did not for 
Locke.     
 Locke agreed with Du Bois that ‘race’ was the “problem of the 
Twentieth Century.”  But for Locke, ‘race’ not only affected the misrecognition 
of black people and other despised groups, thereby curtailing their 
participation in the kingdom of culture, it had a deep history of its own as 
political practice.  What I mean by this is that though—as Olson convincingly 
argues—it is best to think of Du Bois’s activist-social scientific approach to the 
‘race concept’ as having evolved from biological/world historical category to 
one resulting from historical and political occurrences, for Locke, ‘race’ as a 
center of meaning, was always (and forever remained) a “world historical 
concept,” which resulted from the political (what Locke called the 
subjugating) practice of ‘race.’  By this I mean to highlight less an academic 
debate Du Bois and Locke might have engaged in over the sources of ‘race’ in 
theory, practice and politics but rather that Locke, who claimed no “double 
                                                           
10 Ibid. 118 
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consciousness” conditioned by “double aims,” refused to abandon the notion 
of ‘race’ as a ‘world historical concept,’ thereby allowing himself to “live in the 
key of paradox” and to publicize and celebrate black people for doing so.  We 
might say that the stages of Du Bois’s life-long exploration of ‘race’ and its 
sources were for Locke world-historical stages in the development of ‘race’ as 
theory and practice.     
We can see this difference in a lengthy quotation from Du Bois’s 1940 
autobiography Dust of Dawn, which Olson cites to characterize Du Bois’s 
“final, mature, conception of race.”11  Du Bois asks “What is it between us 
[himself and Africa] that constitutes a tie which I can feel better than I can 
explain?”  In raising this question, Du Bois acknowledges that neither 
biological/world historical nor social constructivist accounts can adequately 
grasp his personal experience of connectedness to Africa, its people and other 
despised ‘races.’  
 
But one thing is sure and that is the fact that since the fifteenth 
century these ancestors of mine and their other descendents 
have had a common history; have suffered a common disaster 
and have one long memory.  The actual ties of heritage between 
the individuals of this group vary with the ancestors that they 
have in common and many others: Europeans and Semites, 
perhaps Mongolians, certainly American Indians.  But the 
physical bond is less and the badge of color relatively 
unimportant save as a badge; the real essence of this kinship is 
its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and 
this heritage binds us together not simply the children of Africa, 
but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas.  It is 
this unity that draws me to Africa.12 
According to Olson, this indicates Du Bois’s mature understanding of race as 
“socially constructed,” since Du Bois dismisses ties of heritage, biology and 
                                                           
11 Ibid. 121 - 122 
12 Qtd. in Ibid.  from W.E.B. Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race 
Concept (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995).  p. 67 
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‘color,’ and identifies instead the shared experience of “slavery, discrimination 
and insult” as the foundation for his deep connection to Africa.  To me, it also 
demonstrates a profoundly personal sense of kinship, defined by the common 
experience of political exclusion.  The subtitle, “An Essay Toward an 
Autobiography of a Race Concept,” illuminates the deeply personal nature of 
‘race’ to Du Bois: though race was a ‘concept,’ whose source Du Bois 
accounted for in different ways over the course of his life, even as a ‘concept’ it 
exerted profound enough effects over Du Bois’s own autobiography that his 
report of his life could not be divorced from it.  I hasten to add that Locke 
(who never published an autobiography) also suffered profoundly from the 
effects of exclusion.13   I do not wish to compare Du Bois’s and Locke’s 
“suffering,” of course.  But I do want to suggest that for Locke, ‘race’ had to be 
understood first and foremost in the abstract and not (only) as a life 
experience: ‘race’ was a meaning-producing concept and practice with an ever 
changing history.  This understanding freed Locke up to attend (in his 
accounts of black artwork) to the plurality of black life. 
Nevertheless, in this chapter though I do not offer a sustained 
comparison between Du Bois’s evolving conceptualization of ‘race’ and 
Locke’s ‘world historical’ one, differences between them will become clear.  
For Locke, ‘race’ arose “naturally” from perceived differences among people 
                                                           
13 As his biographers Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth point out, Locke was hurt by 
his exclusion from social events during his time at Oxford.  They record a letter from Horace 
Kallen (one of Locke’s teachers) in which Kallen wrote, “I had a Negro student named Alain 
Locke, a very remarkable young man—very sensitive, very easily hurt—who insisted that he 
was a human being and that his color ought not to make any difference…Two years later 
when I went to Oxford on a fellowship he was there as a Rhodes scholar, and we had a race 
problem because the Rhodes scholars from the South were bastards.  So they had a 
Thanksgiving dinner which I refused to attend because they refused to have Locke.  And he 
said, “I am a human being,” just as I had said it earlier.  What difference does difference 
make?  We are all alike Americans.” Qtd in Harris and Molesworth, Alain L. Locke: The 
Biography of a Philosopher., 69 
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and became political when one group was subjugated to another. ‘Race 
theory’ was ultimately false and ‘race practice’ often odious.  ‘Race’ was, in 
fact, a corrupted (and political) version of and response to ‘difference,’ which 
Locke considered a ‘fact’ of human life.  Because it defined the history of social 
thought and practice, ‘race’ could not be easily abandoned, even by sustained 
analysis and critique.  But the early 20th century moment was significant to 
Locke; though ‘race’ continued to influence social relations, modern processes 
(most particularly assimilation) would shape (and deform) its development 
and effects.  Black people could take advantage of these new developments 
and achieve what he called “secondary race consciousness.”  But this new 
form of ‘consciousness’ was the result of broader sociological development 
and not an effect of demanding (and receiving) ‘recognition’ of ‘true’ black 
culture.   
In this chapter, I take up Locke’s theorization of ‘race,’ as he delivered it 
in the 1916 lecture series, published in 1992 as Race Contacts and Interracial 
Relations.  I first offer a general overview of the Race Contacts lectures, paying 
particular attention to Locke’s political theorization of ‘race’ as difference-
corrupted and its continued pernicious influences.  Second, I examine in closer 
detail, what I will call Locke’s theorization of ‘the political,’ by 
comparing/contrasting it to that of Carl Schmitt since both thinkers, at least 
initially define ‘the political’ in terms of an originary “friend-enemy” 
distinction.  Third, I suggest that Locke’s Race Contacts lectures can be 
fruitfully understood to both identify the political uses to which ‘race’ can and 
has been put by “superior” races and attends to the fundamental role that 
difference plays in shaping our social world.  
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I. Race Contacts and Interracial Relations 
 By 1916, Locke had been teaching at Howard University for four years 
as an assistant professor in the Teacher’s College, responsible for courses in 
Philosophy and English among other topics.  In 1914, he proposed to offer a 
series of lectures on the “question of race.” After some struggle with 
Howard’s University’s administration,14 who thought the topic too 
controversial, he was permitted to offer the five lectures over the course of five 
weeks at Howard University.  Inspired in part by the 1911 First Universal 
Races Congress,15 Locke gave the lectures in 1916, sponsored by the Howard 
chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
the Teachers and Commercial College, and the Social Science Club.16 
 The lectures reflect Locke’s grasp of sociology and anthropology, as 
well as a commitment to uncovering the signs in social thought that the 
influence of biological race thinking was on the wane.  They also reveal the 
influence of German social theorist and philosopher Georg Simmel on Locke’s 
characterization of ‘race’ as a social form. In retrospect, Locke’s lectures are 
bold in scope and not just because the topic was controversial.  Locke did not 
                                                           
14 For a full account of Locke’s struggle to offer these lectures, see Harris and Leonard, Alain 
Locke: Biography of a Philosopher, 119 - 127 
15 The Universal Race Congress of 1911 was a truly remarkable event. It brought together the 
very best minds from the physical and social sciences, with important contributions from the 
fields of anthropology and sociology.  The purpose of the Congress was to “…discuss, in light 
of science and modern conscience, the general relations subsisting between the peoples of the 
West and those of the East, between so-called white and so-called coloured peoples, with a 
view to encouraging between them a fuller understanding, the most friendly feelings, and a 
heartier co-operation.” In attendance were, among others, Franz Boas, Max Weber, Werner 
Sombert, Ferdinand Toennies, Emile Durkheim, Jane Adams, Georg Simmel, Gustav Spiller, 
Felix von Luschan, W.E.B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, anti-imperialist Duse Mohammed Ali and 
feminist Charlotte Despard.  Generally agreeing on the “biological unity and racial 
intermixture of mankind,” scholars presented papers describing the meaning of ‘race’ from an 
anthropological and sociological standpoint, theorized differences among racial groups, 
described the governments and peoples of non-Western nations, and commanded the 
possibility of “peaceful contact between civilizations” to the work of private associations, and 
characterized the “modern conscience in relation to the Negro and American Indians.”   
16 Harris and Molesworth, Alain Locke: Biography of a Philosopher, 123 
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defend his dissertation thesis until two years later in 1918.  The Race Contacts 
lectures reveal a young scholar first articulating a concern— contact among 
the ‘races’—that was to become in his life’s work. The lectures are thus 
difficult to characterize!  Locke turned to sociology because it was, in his view, 
the only field adequate to the task at hand.  Sometimes, the lectures read as a 
program: here is how we ought to study ‘race,’ if we are to study it all.  
Otherwise, the text offers an historical account of race.  But in the last lecture 
in particular, it reads as a series of speculations about future developments. 
 Lost for decades in Howard University’s Locke archive until 1992 when 
historian Jeffrey Stewart edited Locke’s notes and published them as Race 
Contacts and Interracial Relations, the text remains relatively unknown, 
especially compared to Locke’s Harlem Renaissance art criticism.  This makes 
for the greatest challenge to the political theorist open to its possibilities: Race 
Contacts is a little-known text that ought to be familiar already so that it can be 
deconstructed for its productive subtleties. 
 Because Locke insists that ‘race’ in all of its variety is ultimately a 
‘social form,’ he tends to universalize the concept, applying it not only in all 
historical eras and to groups that might, in anthropological terms, be thought 
of as ‘ethnicities’ or ‘cultures,’ but also to all forms of social distinction, even to 
groups that are more typically thought of as classes.  Locke’s argument is 
further complicated by his insistence that though it is a universally useful 
concept for understanding group relationships, it is ultimately ‘arbitrary.’ 
Locke does not mean that ‘races’ mark random characteristics or 
categorizations.  Rather, ‘race’ is arbitrary in the sense that it is not biologically 
heritable but is instead attributed to particular human groupings by 
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circumstance.  I offer here an overview of the five lectures, treating them in 
totality and not in the precise order that they were given.17 
 Locke argues that the social sciences ought to understand ‘race’ as a 
“center of meaning,” and not merely to consider it as a “dynamical entity,” as 
had earlier race theorists, who believed that ‘race’ was best understood as a 
marker of permanent characteristics, passed along through evolutionary 
processes.  Locke contends that the science (theory) of race from de Gobineau18 
to the modern period was based on a fallacy.  Race science conflated the 
descriptive enterprises of anthropology with the normative project of 
classifying races in terms of superiority and inferiority.  Though many second-
generation anthropologists abandoned the white superiority project, 
substituting the more scientifically defensible idea of ‘race difference’ for ‘race 
superiority,’ they did so only in defense of the discipline and did not go far 
enough. 
…there has been an extraordinary reaction in purely scientific 
circles for purely scientific reasons…[the] French and German 
anthropologists have protested against any carrying of the 
descriptive classifications into classes of humanity, into concepts 
of race superiority and inferiority.  Through the anthropological 
and ethnological research, they have tried to illustrate the limits 
of anthropological observation in order to protect their scientific 
method.19 
                                                           
17 The lectures were delivered in the following order: First, in the “Theoretical and Scientific 
Conceptions of Race,” Locke argues that ‘race’ does not refer to heritable characteristics and 
suggests that it should thus be studied as a center of meaning.  Second, in “The Political and 
practical Conceptions of Race,” he ‘traces the history of the practices of race,’ describing how 
‘difference’ conditions political conflict and produces ‘race’ as a body of ideas, beliefs and 
practices. Third, in “The Phenomenon and Law of Race Contacts,” Locke examines ‘race’ as a 
social phenomenon, examining the effects of ‘contact’ among distinct (either racially, 
ethnically or socio-economically) groups of people.  Fourth, in “Modern Race Creeds and 
Their Fallacies,” he “surveys contemporary problems and situations in matters of race…[to] 
explain and condemn the false practices of race that are so prevalent.” Fifth, in “Racial Progres 
and Race Adjustment,” Locke examines how ‘race’ will change in the modern era through the 
development and practice of ‘better’ modes of ‘difference’ in society.   
18 Refers to Arthur Comte de Gobineau, a French aristocrat and amateur scientist who 
developed the theory of Aryan supremacy in the 1853 essay An Essay on the Inequality of the 
Human Races. 
19 Locke and Stewart, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 5 
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 Locke defends a shift that was to remove ‘race’ from the universe of 
physical biology and ethnic anthropology and integrate it into that of 
sociology.  For a sociological study of ‘race’ would, instead of continuing in 
the ultimately useless exercises in comparing head forms, gaits, and the 
diameter of pelvises, investigate the uses to which ‘race’ is put in the world of 
political and social practice.  Locke indicates the necessarily narrower margins 
within which scientific anthropology had to contain itself when it abandoned 
its normative ambitions encouraged “more enlightened scholars” to turn to 
ethno-psychology.  But that science too was limited by the notion of ‘race’ 
already monopolizing the interests of anthropologists.  Only the social 
sciences could answer the most important questions: what is race?  (How) is it 
still useful?   
 Locke interrogates ‘race’ from social and political perspectives, 
examining its meaning by characterizing its practices and effects.  Locke 
argues that the practice of race was “world old” and that it was only the 
theory that was distinctly modern.  “The world very often begins to practice a 
thing long before it begins to speculate about it, and the world as been at work 
in terms of race long before it has ever come to anything like a conception of 
race in the scientific sense.”20  By this, Locke means that before ‘race’ became 
scientifically authoritative and political useful, it was ‘practiced.’ It seems 
strange to think of a “practice of race.” Locke refers to the processes of 
distinction/assimilation that he claims constitute all groups.  Those practices, 
as we will see, only become political in certain contexts.  But the biological 
notion of ‘race’ (i.e.: that racial groups are made up of members who share 
                                                           
20 Ibid. 20 
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heritable physical and psychological characteristics) can only result from 
political practice.   
 To clarify this point, Locke speculates that in ancient times, most 
groups (what he calls tribes) defined themselves by a collective sense of 
kinship, which bound each tribe to itself and set it apart from other tribes.  
When confronted with recognizable ‘others,’ a tribe could either adopt new 
members (through marriage or elaborate rituals to establish blood relations) 
or, if that were impossible, it could attempt to subjugate them.  Crucially, 
according to Locke, relations among tribes took on a political cast when 
domination was chosen over incorporation.   
 
So dominance then, is the other side of the coin…So that really 
the history of successful contacts not only breeds what we might 
call ‘dominant’ races, but the ‘dominant’ race becomes the 
‘political’ race, the politically powerful people who can mold 
contacts their way.  Whereas the people who are lacking in this 
sense will not only be lacking in the capacities of this kind of 
racial or political dominance, but they will come under the more 
forceful control of what are political or dominant groups. Now 
the conception of ‘inferior’ races or ‘backward’ races and of 
‘advanced’ races or ‘superior races largely comes from the 
political fortunes and political capacity of peoples.21 
 
 Importantly, for Locke, politics is subjugation.  If a tribe chooses to 
subjugate another group instead of incorporating it, it has selected a political 
solution to the ‘problem’ of difference.  As Locke sees it, 
assimilation/differentiation are natural processes that produce groups.  What 
is important is the form this process takes.  Group relations only become 
political when the form of contact is subjugating.  Politics is the only form of 
contact that objectifies peoples as ‘races,’ ‘nations’ bound together neither by 
                                                           
21 Ibid. 22 
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ethnic (nor civic) foundations but instead by relations of 
superordination/subordination with dominant groups.   
 Not surprisingly, Locke has the early 20th century United States in mind 
when he characterizes politics in terms of domination.  Locke argues that the 
U.S. is a bi-racial nation,22 organized to keep ‘superior’ and ‘subject’ races 
separate.  ‘Race thinking’ results in a view of racial hierarchy that has itself 
achieved such authority in the U.S. American context, that it has become the 
very “code of practical modern statesmanship.” 
 
The fallacy of race ascendancy is the most practical fallacy of 
all… The most significant manifestation of it is the feeling in 
modern society that society ought to be reorganized on a bi-
racial system and that a race group should duplicate the social 
organization within itself and keep to itself, maintaining its 
solidarity with the rest of society only through the merest sort of 
economic cooperation which seems necessary for the functioning 
of society.  Now this is the code of practical modern 
statesmanship, realizing that we are acquainted with it as it has 
been practiced, for example, by advocates of white supremacy in 
this country.23 
 
The U.S. is a bi-racial nation whose bi-racial status is maintained by its 
members, who “keep to themselves,” thereby further shoring up the nation’s 
bi-raciality. Locke implies, furthermore, that though white and black 
Americans are ‘American,’ the relations between white and black are closer to 
those between imperial powers and their subject nations than those between 
‘citizens’ of a single nation.  But this modern form of (imperial) relations is 
nothing like the ancient sort on two counts. First, to describe modern imperial 
power, Locke differentiates between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ forms, arguing 
                                                           
22The bi-racial organization of the U.S. results from a ‘race fallacy,’ that of assuming because 
there ‘are’ ascendant races, society ‘should’ be organized (bi)racially.  Ibid. 76 – 78 
23 Ibid. 76 
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that ancient empires allowed subject groups to remain ‘alien’ and whole, in 
the sense that though subjugated, they were permitted to practice their 
particular customs.  In the early 20th century U.S., black people’s ties to African 
cultures had been destroyed by slavery, meaning that the question of 
‘allowance’ to custom was not an issue in the sense that Locke means.  Thus, 
black and white alike “keep to themselves,” retaining only economic relations.   
‘International’ relations between subject ‘races’ and imperial powers are 
similar to that Locke describes in the U.S. American setting.  Locke argues 
(perhaps naively) that ‘modern’ empire is fundamentally different from the 
‘ancient’ sort since ‘ancient’ empires allowed subjects to remain ‘alien’ in the 
sense that they continued to practice their particular customs.  In the modern 
period, empire is fundamentally transformed.  Modern empires “…attempt 
quite the opposite thing.  There is the belief that there could only be one 
civilization, instead of the ancient belief that there could only be one 
empire.”24   Locke argues that modern empires see the people they subjugate 
not only as inferior but also (merely) as consumers and not as citizens.  “The 
fundamental reason why Great Britain wants India to adopt English 
institutions is because they want Indians to adopt Birmingham cloth and 
London woolen goods…”25 The modern practice of empire is pernicious to 
Locke because it results in the complete political, social, economic and cultural 
subjugation of so-called inferior groups.  It does that, in part, by relying on 
‘race’ as a legitimating body of thought and practice.    In the American case, 
the results of imperial practice are clear to Locke: bi-racial organization shores 
up ‘race’ categories, fully defining political relations in the U.S.  ‘Race thinking 
and practice’ thus represent not just scientific error but also limits to 
                                                           
24 Ibid. 25 
25 Ibid.  
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democracy.  ‘Race thinking’ can only envision political groupings, even within 
one nation, constituted in racial terms.   
Yet, though Locke argues modern group relations results from and is 
defined by ‘race thinking,’ itself a result of the most pernicious political 
practices, the pre-political state to which I referred above was quite significant 
to Locke.  Subjugation originates in ‘conflict’ over difference.  What if the ‘fact’ 
of difference did not result in ‘conflict’ and ‘subjugation?’ Locke does not 
explore this possibility in the ‘race lectures.’ I want to suggest the significance 
of Locke’s discussion of the pre-political state, whose defining characteristic 
was the presence of ‘difference’ among groups.   Further, I argue that this pre-
political condition—in which difference is a fact of life—is precisely what 
Locke hopes to see restored, once ‘race thinking’ is on the wane.  This, I 
suggest, is what animates his attention to modern, ‘Negro’ art.   I take this 
claim up in a later chapter. 
 In any case, while ‘race’ and ‘race thinking’ are results of subjugation, 
as the quote above makes clear, groups “duplicate” race practice, on the 
ground, as it were, as everyday practice.  Moreover, for Locke, ‘race’ also 
denotes ‘kinship sense,’ the perception of one’s membership in one group and 
non-membership in others.  Locke is thus not content only to theorize the 
imperial sources of ‘race,’ for he also understands groups to result from 
‘kinship sense.’  
 
In passing to the phenomena and laws of race contacts, we pass 
to that phase of the subject which confronts us with conditions 
as they are.  In this lecture, we shall now endeavor to turn our 
attention to those conditions which are now working today, 
even though they may be centuries old.  We want to try to record 
those forces that are invariable phenomena of racial contacts and 
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we want also to see if it in investigating these phenomena, we 
can catch their drift or tendency.26  
 
   This is why, to Locke, sociology offers the best methods by which to 
understand ‘race’ both as an autonomous structure, whose political sources 
and uses I have already described, and as it arises and reconstitutes itself in 
everyday practice.   
 
The history of race contacts is history, and we should never 
confuse history as an account of social reactions, with that more 
scientific approach to it, which we have today in the so-called 
economic and sociological sciences.  We wish to study race 
relations so that we may know how it is that one group in 
society reacts in a certain way toward another group.27 
 
Upon closer observation, it becomes clear that every social grouping, from the 
perspective of a larger whole, has “contradictory elements,’ themselves either 
a result of or condition for differentiating/assimilative practices 
 
…[We] can see what we would call group feeling prevailing, and 
within groups—even within societies—that from the point of 
view of government, from the point of view of culture, from the 
point of view really of all the essential larger structures, the 
society was one.  So that we see no social unit so small that it 
hasn’t itself subdivisions, that it hasn’t its classes, that it hasn’t 
its groups, that it hasn’t within itself some more or less 
contradictory elements.28   
 
‘Race’ is both an everyday practice of “contradictory elements” and in its most 
pernicious form is a useful concept that legitimates subjugation by positing 
inferior and superior races.   
 
…wherever we find groups amalgamating in society, we must 
expect to find groups differentiating and separating out.  It is 
                                                           
26 Ibid. 41 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 45 
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really, after all, one side of the same tendency; and I think the 
thing which separates people into groups is functionally, in 
human society, the same thing which brings them together in 
groups.  If the consciousness of kind unites, the consciousness of 
kind must separate.  There is a sort of logic to human society.  
There is sociological logic…which seems to necessitate this 
action and reaction, this thesis and antithesis, this contrary result 
of the same principle or tendency.29 
 
Differentiation and assimilation are fundamental social processes, without 
which social organization could not exist.  Political subjugation, we might say, 
is one form that differentiation can take; it is pernicious because it forecloses 
the full logic of social groupings by attempting to prevent assimilative 
tendencies.  The political form of distinction generates biological ‘race’ as we 
know it in the modern age, which itself legitimates further subjugation.  It is 
nevertheless clear that for Locke, ‘differentiation’ itself is innocent.  “The 
distinctions are not harmful in themselves, but harmful only as they are 
unjustly perpetuated or irrationally practiced.”30  The problem with the 
political form of distinction is that it prevents more robust forms of collectivity 
by attempting to exercise complete control over particulars, thereby 
corrupting the ‘natural’ processes of distinction/assimilation Locke holds as 
crucial to society.   
 Why classify all manifestations of distinction as varieties of ‘race’ 
whether theory, practice or sensibility?  One reason, I suspect, is that he was 
influenced by Georg Simmel’s articulation of social ‘form’ as distinct from 
‘content.’ For Simmel, social content was human behavior.   
 
Social forms gain autonomy from the momentary impulses and 
pressing demands of the life process in two ways.  They become 
combined and hypostasized into larger, institutional structures, 
                                                           
29 Ibid. 45 
30 Ibid. 47 
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military organizations, communities… The other mode by which 
social forms become autonomous corresponds precisely to the 
transformation of accumulated protoculture into the pure forms 
of objective culture…That is, there emerge certain forms of 
interaction that are realized not for some practical purpose but 
for the sake of the forms themselves.31   
 
‘Race’ for Locke is both protoform of interaction (differentiation/assimilation) 
and a fully autonomous body of ideas (the theory of biological race), which 
although a science, assumes what it sets out to prove: that there is a hierarchy 
of races—resulting from political practice.  Thus, it is possible that as 
protoform, ‘race’ might not generate problems.  
 
Race problems…constitute themselves largely out of the 
groupings, the larger social groupings, which seem caused by 
racial differences or what we would say is the ethnic sense of 
one group as contrasted with the ethnic sense of another group.  
We somehow regard race feeling and the kind of group 
relationship and feeling which we call ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ as 
different in kind from the same kind of group feeling which 
prevails in what we know as social classes. I fancy that this is the 
fundamental mistake, because however extreme they may be…, 
race feelings (group sense that moves along racial lines) is only 
different in degree…and not in kind from class sense and class 
feeling.32 
 
Locke attempts here to carefully distinguish the pernicious results of 
‘race’ thinking (race problems) from group feeling.  Both are ‘natural.’  This 
passage makes clear that while ‘race thinking’ results from subjugation, what 
we might call “everyday” race problems have a different source: “group 
feeling.”   
   Locke distinguishes between the social and the political here in an 
interesting fashion. Difference is a ‘natural’ force/process—both creative 
                                                           
31 Donald N. Levine, “Introduction,” in George Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms, The 
Heritage of Sociology (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), ix - lxv. 
xxvviii 
32 Ibid. 44 
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(assimilative) and destructive (dissimilative) –that conditions social coherence. 
Some ‘race problems’—say discriminatory and exclusionary behavior on the 
part of the members of one group against another—result from it.  At the same 
time, ‘difference’ conditions the very possibility of politics. By characterizing 
each of these manifestations of and responses to difference ‘race,’ Locke  
complicates the possibility of political ‘solutions’ the problem of ‘race.’ 
‘Difference’ is the constitutive element of group unity, and ‘race,’ in its most 
autonomous, politicized form, is understood as a concomitant of the practice 
of subjugation.  
   Race problems take a variety of forms, the most damaging of which is 
‘race’ as creed, a system of beliefs that reduces the dynamic, productive forms 
of human interaction to mere behavior and further solidifies the ‘meaning’ of 
one’s membership in a particular ‘race.’  
 
The emergence of creed in race is one of the most difficult 
elements.  It has not always been connected with the practice of 
race.  Although there can be no very definite decision, I fancy 
that the older practices of race were different from our modern 
practices on this very point—that they weren’t reinforced by a 
doctrine of race at all.  They were merely instinctive practices 
and not the rather iniquitous kind of reinforcement of irrational 
positions that we confront when we confront anything like a 
modern race creed.33 
 
 By attending to the multiple connotations of the word ‘practice,’ 
Locke’s intuition can best be grasped.  The practice of race means the ‘exercise’ 
of distinction.  What Locke called group sense was a result of a spontaneous 
response to difference.  Social institutions both just and unjust emerge from 
those responses.   Under modern political conditions, as Locke indicates with 
                                                           
33 Ibid. 63 
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reference to U.S. America’s bi-raciality, the exercise of distinction can no 
longer be spontaneous; it is instead a habit, which converts what had been 
‘arbitrary’ distinctions into ‘creeds,’ fallacious beliefs that thoroughly shaped 
how people understand and act in the world.       
These ‘creeds’ are not the same as theoretical conceptions of race: they 
are less scientific ideas about race than ‘articles of faith’ about particular races.    
Those ‘faiths’ are expressed both in scholarship (as Locke argues in the first 
lecture) and in the form of particular “race prejudices.”  According to Locke, 
the source of race theory as ‘doctrine’ is 19th century German thought.    
 
This is a doctrine which is a peculiar blight of the nineteenth-
century’s thought and scholarship.  The root of it, I am sorry to 
say, is the root of some of the most fruitful scholarship of the 
whole era.  About the middle of the nineteenth century… a great 
discovery was made in Germany which at the time was invented 
for the purpose of explaining a new interpretation of history…. 
It sprang up in connection with the language studies of certain 
German scholars, particularly Grimm… And it was Grimm who 
invented the fiction of the Indo-Germanic peoples… [and also] 
translated the notion of Aryan languages into the notion of the 
Aryan peoples—a broad classification of Caucasian groups, 
which had never been thought of before…34 
 
This scholarly move, which conflates shared language with shared blood, has 
pernicious results, particularly when its political usefulness was uncovered.  
“Good science [biology and anthropology] [simply] …came to the rescue and 
support of bad…theory.”  “...[Practically], there is an imaginary line running 
around the globe dividing politically and socially, the darker, or the non-
Aryan, from the so-called Aryan peoples.”35    
                                                           
34 Ibid. 73 
35 Ibid.  
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Five “fallacies” define the ‘creed’ that there existed a ‘natural’ divide 
between Aryan and non-Aryan people.  Those are 1) the biological fallacy that 
“… predicates a physical race for every practical social grouping that it finds 
necessary...;”  2) the fallacy of the masses, which takes the measure of 
‘peoples’ in terms of aggregates;36  3) the fallacy of permanency of race types;37  
4) the fallacy of race ascendancy, which is “…the feeling in modern society 
that society ought to be reorganized on a bi-racial system and that a race 
group should duplicate the social organization within itself and keep to itself, 
maintaining its solidarity with the rest of society only through the merest sort 
of economic cooperation…”38 and 5) the fallacy of automatic adjustment.   This 
fallacy assumes that ‘race’ relations are automatic and not “subject to remedial 
measures.”    In toto, these fallacies have real effects on behavior both 
institutional and practical, ensuring continued segregation, 
‘misunderstanding’ and much worse.  
 
II.  Race and Modernity  
‘Race’ and ‘race thinking’ prove so damaging, it thus seems perplexing that 
Locke insists that ‘race’ be redeemed.   Having tracked the functions of the 
                                                           
36 This fallacy fails to recognize what the ‘real’ measure of a particular group, the distribution 
of characteristics among that group.   Locke writes,  “Consequently, for example, historians 
will describe a brilliant group in the age of Pericles whose achievements will make the Greeks 
the glory of civilization, without reference, perhaps to how many or how few Greeks were 
actually included within the narrow scope of that social culture.”  p. 75 
37 Here Locke does not speak to biological race but rather to the “permanency” or lack thereof 
of a particular ‘race’s’ cultural practices and their ‘relative success’ as members of a particular 
society.  The point is that although a ‘race’ may be named inferior, no ‘race’ is ever actually 
inferior in the aggregate forever.  “The way, for example, in which under pressure certain 
classes of Jews and certain classes of the Negro have quickly qualified for a certain standard of 
living as well as a certain standard of civilization type, really the social culture of modern 
America, proves that race types change under environmental adaptation.  But social privileges 
are still bestowed absolutely based on the lower standard of the group aggregate and are not 
representing it themselves proves that there is no such thing even as permanency of a cardinal 
race type.” p. 76 
38 Ibid.  
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different modes of ‘race--’ the ultimately false (biological) or potentially 
pernicious (political), as a phenomenon of interracial contact, Locke 
nevertheless predicts positive developments in modernity.  On the one hand, 
Locke insists that “race as a unit of social thought is of permanent 
significance,”39  and on the other, that modern society is nevertheless defined 
by its profound capacity for assimilation.  If modern societies are profoundly 
assimilative (suggesting that racial and ethnic difference will disappear), why 
does Locke insist that ‘race’ remains significant?  What ‘form’ will ‘race’ take 
under modern conditions? 
 Locke insists that one form of ‘race’ is on the wane: scholarly 
understandings of ‘race’ as biological category.   Race can now only be studied 
as a unit of social thought and as a center of meaning.   We also know that 
‘race’ as an ‘on the ground phenomenon’ has two sources: political 
subjugation, on the one hand, and a ‘natural’ sense of kinship/difference, 
which Locke argues, causes groups to cohere.  Modern societies, we will see, 
are so profoundly assimilative that these old processes are destabilized.  
Nevertheless, Locke insists that group unity in any age requires the 
assimilation/differentiation.    Locke argues that in modern societies, ‘race 
theory’ is in decline and assimilation on the rise.  Contact among the ‘races’ is 
ever increasing and results as often as not in ‘racial antagonism.’   Though 
modern societies are profoundly assimilative, ‘race’ does not disappear.  
Rather, the ‘modern system’ itself is re-imagined as a ‘civilization type,’ with 
common “standards of living.”  Thus, what ought to defeat ‘race’ in thinking 
and in practice produces ‘race’ in a new form: ‘race’ as non-conformity to the 
modern civilization type.  Just as important, because modern societies are 
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profoundly assimilative—even without the problem of ‘race’—modern 
societies are in danger of falling apart because they are too assimilative.  ‘Race’ 
thus remains significant in yet another way, as what Locke calls “secondary 
race consciousness.”  For my purposes, “secondary race consciousness” is the 
most important form of modern ‘race.’ For as I will argue in Chapter Three, 
“secondary race consciousness” (as well as Locke’s work on behalf of black 
artists) can be easily mistaken either for a ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ form of race or 
as the source of a ‘new’ group identity, worthy of recognition.   
Locke argues that in the contemporary period, a new civilization type 
would rise, to replace the old social order that invested so much in ‘arbitrary’ 
distinctions.  This would result, in part, from developments in the “modern 
industrial and economic order.”   
 
As long as we have an industrial order which is competitive (an 
order which seems to be spreading over the face of the globe), 
we shall be able to regard caste as something which will be 
economically contradicted because, as you can see, a competitive 
industrial order means that one generation rarely occupies the 
same social position as the generation immediately before or 
after.  In which case there must be not only change but there 
must be a constant process of transition in society, by which, 
according to a man’s success, he promotes or demotes himself 
from one class to another.  Since that process is vitally necessary 
to [modern] society, such a society is only going to maintain the 
caste spirit to the extent that such a system does not actually 
contradict the successful functioning of the society.40 
 
Under modern economic conditions, the practice of distinction/assimilation, 
which as I have argued constitutes social groupings of every sort, would 
develop in new directions.    All distinctions are necessarily slippery under 
conditions of “constant transition,” in which people can more easily move 
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from one ‘class’ to another.  Locke suggests that where ancient groupings 
valorized a particular set of cultural practices, modern societies do not, in part 
because people can so easily move from one social system or class to another.  
Instead, modern societies value the ‘common.’ Under conditions of constant 
change and assimilation/differentiation, ‘commonality’ seems less an 
imposition than a shared project.    Yet, the ‘common’ does not mean that the 
assimilative/dissimilative processes that fundamentally structure societies are 
no longer necessary.  Those processes simply appear in new forms, in part 
since, although all people attempt to conform to the modern civilization type, 
the group that can most identify itself culturally with the modern civilization  
type will nevertheless react negatively when other members of modern 
societies try. 
 
…the conformity which, it seems, modern society must exact is 
… conformity of civilization type.  There are very few 
shibboleths for this conformity other than those of race… Go into 
any American community as an immigrant group…and 
challenge what they call the ‘standard of living’ and see what 
happens…. There would be an explosion, the same kind of an 
explosion that happened in medieval society when men of other 
faiths either invaded or cropped out to spoil the homogeneity of 
the orthodox religion…41 
 
The point Locke makes here is somewhat difficult to grasp.  All ancient 
cultures require conformity. Modern societies, characterized as they are by 
constant change and social mobility would seem to weaken this demand.  Yet, 
modern society bears the marks of ‘race,’ which becomes a catchphrase 
(‘catchpractice?’) offering ‘membership’ in contemporary ‘civilization’ to some 
‘races’ and not others. In this context, the ‘standard of living,’ which by right 
                                                           
41 Ibid. 92 
 
 
63 
ought to simply refer to modern lifestyles, marks a particular way of living, a 
measure some groups cannot meet.  
Still, Locke evinces a great deal of faith in the distinctive conditions of 
modernity.  Modern societies are profoundly assimilative, implying that that 
groups heretofore identified and segregated as inferior races could expect, 
eventually, to be included.   Yet, as Locke’s remarks about the “shibboleth of 
race” indicate, it is clear that the constant flux of modernity does not result in 
the dissipation of corrupted forms of social cohesion. Moreover, Locke argues 
that even ‘positive’ forms of cohesion require difference.   
What form will/should ‘difference’ take in an increasingly assimilative 
age?  Locke tells us that …[S]ocial assimilation in progress [requires] some 
counter-theory or rather, some counter doctrine. This counter-doctrine one 
finds in racial solidarity and culture.  The stimulation of a secondary race 
consciousness within a group does seem necessary.”42     In modern societies, 
because one part of the process (assimilation/differentiation) that allows 
groups of any type to cohere is amplified.  On the other hand, though modern 
societies allow for greater social mobility, while we might expect that the 
‘common’ would necessarily be shared (or at least imagined as always-in-
production), and ‘differences’ (ethnic, racial or otherwise) expunged, Locke 
suggests that modern society still imposes ‘arbitrary’ standards over its 
members.    
…You call America the melting pot.  You ought to call America 
the baking oven, where your molten material is taken and 
absolutely baked into the most arbitrary forms….[In the] back of 
the modern type of assimilation was a certain arbitrary 
conformity to type and that America, for example, for all its 
boasted absorption of type, absorbs the only to re-make them or 
re-cast them into a national mold; and the essential basis of 
America’s adoption is the re-working of the material into the 
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type of American citizen…. To live in modern society means 
such an orthodoxy of living, as well as such an orthodoxy of 
social belief, that it seems, to threaten the freedom, the mental 
and moral freedom of people.  
 
First and foremost, “secondary race consciousness” will result in the refusal of 
assimilation into a “national mold” or “orthodox” forms of living, thereby 
producing national unity through ‘difference.’  Second, for this generation 
(early 20th century) of black people,  
 
secondary race consciousness…will be a counter-doctrine [of] 
racial solidarity and culture…necessary [because]…the group 
needs…to get a right conception of itself… Yet…the very 
stimulation to collective activity which race pride or racial self-
respect may give will issue into the qualification test and the aim 
to meet that qualification test, which of course must be in terms 
of the common standard.  So that through a doctrine of race 
solidarity and culture, you really accelerate and stimulate the 
alien group to a rather more rapid assimilation of the social 
culture, the general social culture, than would be otherwise 
possible.43 
‘Secondary race consciousness’ will produce “racial self respect” and new 
forms of unity.  Such ‘race consciousness’ is also not the ultimate objective, it 
is an historical stage through which black people must travel and will result in 
“more rapid assimilation.”44  
Importantly social assimilation produces positive results other than 
‘race consciousness.’  It introduces a “disposition to share our race problems 
and make them the common problems of society.”45 That is, the ‘race problem’ 
becomes a common burden. 
 
There used to be talk of the ‘white man’s burden,’ and now there 
is considerable talk of the black man’s burden.  I fancy... a few 
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years will see a readjustment of that position—it is a common 
burden, a burden so common that perhaps only in a shifting of 
the issues can there by any really progressive adjustment.  The 
concerns which the dominant groups have undertaken are 
concerns which they may…cede to the…submerged groups or 
the minority groups; and the attempts which we are trying to 
solve are not our problems at all but the projected problem of the 
troubled social issues and the social distinctions of the dominant 
group.46  
 
When “submerged groups” address ‘race problems,’ they must no longer do 
so from the perspective of ‘being a problem,’ but rather as people who realize 
that ‘race problems’ result from the behavior of the dominant group.   
Ultimately, however, ‘race problems’ must become a common burden.  For 
this to occur, Locke argues that black people need to restore themselves to a 
sense of kinship that is different from that inspired by being conscious of 
oneself only as problem.   
I have emphasized the complexity of Locke’s theorization of ‘race’ as a 
social form that results from and then (re)conditions interactions among 
human beings in my reading of the Race Contacts lectures.  Difference has been 
the focal point of my interpretation because I want to suggest that it is 
‘difference,’ and not identity, which Locke sees both as the principle social 
‘fact’ that conditions the development of all social forms as well as the 
possibilities afforded by the cultivation of ‘selves,’ the topic which Locke took 
up in his later Harlem Renaissance cultural criticism.  There, as I will argue in 
the next chapter, Locke sees “Negro life” freed from the ‘racial identity’ that 
had been forced on black people through the processes, practices and 
idealizations of race.   Below, I examine the political form of race, suggesting 
that for Locke, ‘race thinking,’ its creeds and practices, reduces human 
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interaction among all groups to one possibility, that defined by 
superordination/subordination.    
 
III.  “The Racial” as “The Political” 
 In this section, I turn again to Locke’s political theorization of ‘race’ as a 
response to difference.  I argue that Locke’s political theorization of ‘race’ 
describes more than the process by which ‘races’ come to be considered 
‘races,’ with innate, heritable characteristics that mark them as inferior or 
superior.  That is, Locke theorizes ‘race’ as more than an empirical effect of 
real political practices.  ‘Race’ has its own abstract logic; that is to say, ‘race’ is 
more than its effects on our participation in what Du Bois called “the kingdom 
of culture;” it exceeds our attempts to justify or explain our membership in 
certain communities.  
In what follows, I stage an encounter between Alain Locke’s political 
theorization of what we might helpfully call ‘the racial’ and German social 
theorist Carl Schmitt’s theorization of ‘the political’ in The Concept of the 
Political.  This is, I grant, an unexpected pairing particularly since, as I have 
characterized him, Locke attended so carefully to the social sources and effects 
of race and not ‘the political,’ as such.   Moreover, Schmitt and Locke do not 
have the same objectives.  In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt criticizes 
liberalism’s basis in individual right, which is certainly not Locke’s concern.  
As Tracy Strong points out in the Foreward,  
 
The intense and renewed attention to the work of Carl Schmitt…is due 
to the fact that he sits at the intersection of three central questions 
which any contemporary political theorist must consider.  The first is 
the relationship between liberalism and democracy.  The second is the 
relation between politics and ethics.  The third is the importance of 
what Schmitt called “enemies” for state legitimation and the 
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implication of that importance for the relation between domestic and 
international politics.47 
 
My own limited interest in Schmitt hews most closely to the third 
reason for Schmitt’s renewed importance.  I treat Locke’s political theorization 
of ‘race’ as something like Schmitt’s treatment of “enemies” as a “source for 
legitimation” since ‘race theory’ according to Locke, legitimates the 
subjugation of so-called “inferior” races. Yet, as I stated above, Locke also 
offers a political theorization of ‘race’ that can be read as a ‘stand-alone’ 
political theory, which reveals not just the odious effects of ‘race’ but also his 
account of the fundamental nature of politics.  The encounter reveals that 
Schmitt and Locke largely agree about the essence of politics.  For Schmitt and 
Locke, at its heart, ‘the political’ cannot be fully characterized as 
institutionalized practice. Schmitt, for example, opposes the political to the 
state.48  The political, he insists, is unlike and not comparable to any other 
domain (whether moral, religious, aesthetic or economic).  For Schmitt, ‘the 
political’ is specific form of distinction, reducible to that which inheres 
between friend and enemy.  It “…denotes an utmost degree of intensity of a 
union or separation, of an association or dissociation.  It can exist theoretically 
and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, 
aesthetic, economic or other distinctions.”49 And though Locke argues that 
‘race theory’ and ‘race creed’ can serve imperial ends, justifying colonialism 
and slavery for example, ultimately, ‘the political’ (what Locke calls 
                                                           
47 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007).  xiii 
48 “In one way or another, “the political” is generally juxtaposed to the “state” or at least is 
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subjugation) is an existential response to ‘Others.’   A key difference between 
Locke and Schmitt (other than their objectives, of course) is that for Locke, 
what is most significant and requires continued attention is that, once realized, 
“the political” influences all other domains in the form of ‘race’ as theory, 
practice and creed.   
In the second Race Contacts lecture, “The Political and Practical 
Conceptions of Race,” Locke asserts that 
 
The sense of race really almost antedates anything in its 
name, in the etymology of it, because just as long as you 
have groups of people knit together by kinship feeling 
and who realize that different practices operate in their 
society from those which operate in other societies and 
therefore determine their treatment of other groups, then 
you really have what is the germ of race sense.50 
 
‘Race’ here identifies a sense of kinship, which because ‘ethnic tribes’ to Locke 
are also necessarily fictional,51  depends upon the recognition of ‘difference’ of 
Others.  This sense of kinship/race is not itself evil and is necessary for the 
coherence of tribes, just as it is for every other social formation.   
 
The race sense, as you see, is something which is not 
vicious in itself but which may become so if invidious 
social practices are based upon it… We find in the earliest 
race sense where people feel that there is something in 
kinship relations which makes a great difference and 
makes one code prevail among them and another code 
prevail among their neighbors—or those who really in a 
sense are not yet their neighbors, because the concept of 
neighbor is a relatively advanced concept and to be 
outside of the group in primitive terms means itself to be 
an enemy.52 
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At this stage in Locke’s logic, the distinction between one group and the next 
serves to shore up the group’s ‘sense of itself.’ Recognition of difference is not 
itself evil, though pernicious social practices may arise from it.  Nor is the 
mere recognition of difference yet political in the sense that Schmitt would 
recognize.  But “…in the era of tribal warfare puts a premium upon blood 
kinship because any set of people who come into touch with the primitive 
tribe without gaining a blood kinship with it must come into their territory at 
peril of extinction subordination.”53  The absolutely political form of 
distinction takes shape as an intensification of the recognition of difference to 
conflict.   
It happens that, as long as groups are in a position to annex 
other peoples, they do so under the idea that either the peoples 
must come into relationship with them through blood kinship or 
else they must remain alien…Whether they are a part of a nation 
is largely determined whether or not they qualify under this 
fundamental instinct and social requirement of blood 
relationship.  They are happily adopt it if they can claim it and 
substantiate it, and they are dominated and made slaves if they 
cannot…54 
 
Locke argues here that the primitive tribe must make something of its 
difference from an encroaching Other.  Through intermarriage or other 
ceremonies, relations of blood can mitigate difference.  If not, the difference 
loses its innocence and intensifies into political distinction.  The political takes 
shape as “forceful subjugation,” resulting in the “molding of contact” not vis-
à-vis blood contact but instead via “dominance” and “forceful control.” The 
political form of distinction results in identity: “the dominant race becomes 
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the political race… [and the] conception of ‘inferior’ races or ‘backward’ races 
comes from the political fortunes of” those involved in political conflict.   
 In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt differentiates between the political 
form of distinction and others, such as the moral form of distinction between 
good and evil or the aesthetic form of distinction between beauty and 
turpitude. He points out that any similarity between the distinctions that 
constitute these domains (political, moral, aesthetic) is purely correlative.  
“Insofar as it is not derived from other criteria, the antithesis of friend and 
enemy corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other antitheses… 
In any event, it is independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, but 
in that it can neither be based on any one antithesis or any combination of 
other antitheses, nor can it be traced to these.”55  This deduction leads Schmitt 
to conclude that the “political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically 
ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor...[but] he is, nevertheless, 
the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in an 
especially intense way, existentially something different and alien…”56 
Though the enemy is ‘real’ and present, he is considered an enemy not 
because of a judgment about his moral or aesthetic qualities, he is considered 
alien because he is an existential threat.  “Only the actual participants can 
correctly recognize, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the 
extreme case of conflict.  Each participant is in a position to judge whether the 
adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be 
repulsed or fought…”57 The “concrete situation,” and not the moral or 
aesthetic status of the Other, calls for judging.  Is the ‘Other’ so alien, so 
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distinct, that he places ‘us’ in risk of our ‘way of life?’ If so, he is not merely an 
‘Other,’ he is an enemy.  The intense (existential) threat of conflict gives 
priority to the friend/enemy distinction, so that difference between groups 
becomes an antagonism.   
Importantly, (at least for the encounter I stage here between Schmitt 
and Locke), for Schmitt, antagonism between the parties does not depend 
upon recognition of the ‘Other’ as lacking in some specific sense.  “The 
political is the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete 
antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the 
extreme point, that of the friend-enemy distinction.”58  For Schmitt, the 
extreme threat of conflict prioritizes the friend-enemy distinction above all 
others.  For Locke, on the other hand, extreme forms of ‘Other-ness’ as a 
quality of competitor tribes mobilizes political action—subjugation—and 
results in the fixing of identities:  though the original conflict has ended, its 
parties are now identifiable—the defeated become the ‘backward races’ and 
the winners, ‘the advanced, political races.’  
Locke contends that recognition of ‘Otherness’ is a necessary pre-
condition of political subjugation.  But “the racial” inheres not in the 
recognition of the other’s absolute ‘alien-ness;’ it arises instead from the 
political response to Otherness. Thus for Locke, the decision to adopt an 
‘Other’ and to welcome him into tribal membership cannot be an instance of 
‘the political.’ For Locke, as is apparent in his characterization of ancient and 
modern empires, ‘the political’ is always a kind of subjugating practice, which 
results in the simultaneous creation of a inequality between groups and the 
deprivation of defeated groups of positive identities.  On the other hand, 
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assimilation, as we have seen for Locke, is always a social process that itself 
produced new inequalities and new forms of distinction. As Locke described 
them, interracial contact and conditions ‘on the ground’ in the early 20th 
century had deep political sources (i.e.: colonialism, imperialism, slavery) but 
as a matter of lived experience were explicitly social phenomena. Locke mined 
modern social developments for new forms of distinction, which would not 
see difference in the originary political terms that had produced false and 
mythical identities. This does not, of course, mean that Locke did hope for or 
see his work as serving the purposes of political inclusion.  Far from it.  But for 
this to occur—that is for intellectual and political democracy to ensue, 
difference required rescue from the foul practice and theory of ‘race.’ This 
rescue, I will argue, would not come in the form of ‘recognition’ of the true 
value of black people and black culture, but rather vis-à-vis the cosmopolitan 
social relations provided in the domain of culture. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CULTURE AND THE POETRY OF NEGRO LIFE 
 
…to be cultivated becomes a task of infinite dimensions, 
since the number of objects a subject can makes it own is 
inexhaustible.1  
In 1928, twelve years after he delivered the Race Contacts lectures and 
three years after the publication of The New Negro: An Interpretation, the 
collection of poems, dramatic works, sketches and essays that christened the 
Harlem Renaissance movement, Locke took critics to task for “…confounding 
the artistic quality which Negro life is contributing with the Negro artists…” 
The critics, he argued, had missed the true meaning of the Renaissance: 
“Negro artists are just by-products of the Negro Renaissance; its main 
accomplishment will be to infuse a new essence into the general stream of 
culture.”2  The purpose of the Renaissance was not to see black artists or 
culture recognized anew.  The Renaissance should not be understood, 
therefore, as the proving ground for black artist’s talents or the worth of black 
culture.  The Negro Renaissance, he insisted, must be seen as an “integral 
phase of contemporary American art and literature,” and de-linked from 
“propaganda and politics.”  Critics who were anxious to determine the quality 
of ‘Negro’ artwork had therefore reduced the Renaissance’s great potential to 
the merit of its artists.  “According to that [standard], the Grand Renaissance 
should have stopped at the Alps and ought to have effected [sic] the 
unification of Italy instead of the revival of Humanism.”3  In a few deft lines, 
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2 Alain Locke, “Our Little Renaissance,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection of His 
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3 Ibid.  
75  
 
Locke elucidated the objectives of the Harlem Renaissance: it ought to aspire 
to more than artistic perfection, seeking instead to animate culture-in-general 
with its artwork; it ought to free ‘Negro’ artwork and its artists from the limits 
imposed by politics; it ought not consolidate a ‘Negro nation’ of artists, 
artworks or otherwise but instead revivify—indeed, put in to practice—the 
exaltation of all people.   These were high aspirations.  Yet, Locke saw in the 
appropriation of  ‘Negro material’ by white artists the telltale signs of the 
Renaissance’s success. 
 
To claim the material that Negro life and idiom have contributed 
to American art through the medium of the white artist may 
seem at first unfair and ungracious; may even be open to the 
imputation of trying to bolster up with reinforcements a 
‘wavering thin line of talent.’ But what is the issue—sociology or 
art—a quality of spirit or complexions?4 
 
Black life had been freed even from the bounds of ‘Negro’ subjectivity, 
opening itself up for elevation to “the plane of pure art.”  What was at stake 
was not the quality of the artist – and certainly not his membership in a 
particular race (‘sociology or art’)—but was instead the ‘representativeness’ of 
his artwork.  Whether the artist was black or white, did his artwork capture 
‘Negro life and idiom?’  To produce exceptional art drawn from the ‘material 
of Negro life,’ even black artists had to become “less rhetorical” and to take 
“race [instead] instinctively for granted” in their artwork.   ‘Race’—and here I 
interpret Locke to use ‘race’ as difference/kinship sense, just as he had in the 
Race Contacts lectures—could be articulated from any subject position (even 
through the ‘medium of the white artist’). Moreover, persuasion need no 
longer be the only ‘mood’ with which black life was expressed.    
                                                           
4 Ibid. 
76  
 
Locke brought to the concept of culture the same insight he brought to 
modern artwork.  Just as ‘Negro life, idiom and materials,’ did not belong 
solely to black artists, even the continued negative effects of ‘race thinking’ 
and practice did not imply that blacks retained a proprietary relationship with 
‘their’ culture.  Black culture, like all culture, was open to all comers.  That 
said, Locke did not deny that ‘race’ bore some relationship to culture.  Indeed, 
as I argued in Chapter Two, Locke suggested in the Race Contacts lectures that 
“submerged groups” cultivate cultures to nourish “race pride.”  Yet, as I will 
argue in this chapter, just as sociologists and anthropologists had to refuse the 
explanatory temptations of ‘biological race’ when they attempted to explain 
durable features of extant cultures, “submerged groups” could not appeal to 
essentialist accounts of culture when attempting to inspire “race pride.” 
Modern developments made this move impossible for Locke.  As I will argue 
in this chapter, Locke’s theorization of culture and his insights into the 
development of modern black art were influence by one of his instructors at 
University of Berlin, the German philosopher and social theorist, Georg 
Simmel. In fact, Jürgen Habermas’s thoughtful characterization of Simmel’s 
culture essays might just as easily be applied to Locke’s: 
 
Simmel's [thinking about culture] was characterized by a 
sensitive awareness of the attractions typical of his times; of 
aesthetic innovations; of spiritual shifts of disposition and 
changes of orientation in the metropolitan attitudes to life; and 
of subpolitical transformations of inclination and barely tangible, 
diffuse, but treacherous phenomena of the everyday. In short, 
for Simmel the membranes of the spirit of the age were wide 
open.5 
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Essays” (Critical Inquiry, Vol. 22, No. 3, Spring 1996), 403 – 414, p. 405 
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Locke’s attention to “aesthetic innovations…spiritual shifts…and 
changes in orientation in the metropolitan attitudes of life” tend to weaken the 
claims of contemporary theorists who insist that Locke was an essentialist, a 
multiculturalist or an early defender of cultural recognition as a political 
demand.  Instead, Locke offered a complex account of culture as both a 
marker of durable characteristics and traditions and the source of ‘self-
cultivation.’   
In this chapter, I first characterize three recent accounts of how Locke 
thought about culture.  The first, Leonard Harris’s “Identity: Alain Locke’s 
Atavism,”6 suggests that Locke is best understood to offer a weakly atavistic 
account of identity and sees African and black American culture as a source 
for reconstituted identity.  The second, Everett Akam’s Transnational America: 
Cultural Pluralist Thought in the Twentieth Century,7  sees Locke as one of a 
number of cultural pluralist who “foreshadowed Charles Taylor’s insights 
into the relationship between identity and culture,” treating Locke as an early 
advocate of multiculturalism and cultural recognition.  The third, Nancy 
Fraser’s “Another Pragmatism: Alain Locke, Critical ‘Race’ Theory and the 
Politics of Culture,” sees Locke as a strategic essentialist who, in lieu of 
pursuing expressly political solutions to the problems of oppression and 
seclusion, saw in cultural production potential sources of “white respect” and 
“race pride.”   I disagree with these readings. Ultimately, each sees Locke as 
either an early practitioner of identity politics or cultural recognition, 
suggesting that Locke sought forms of cultural recognition that would 
constitute and shore up a new form of authentic black identity.  I contrast 
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these interpretations from my own by drawing on two of Locke’s essays about 
culture and ‘reading’ them alongside two of Simmel’s culture essays.   Like 
Simmel, Locke was a “philosophical diagnostician of the times with a social-
scientific bent” whose art and literary criticism revealed just as much attention 
to “the times” as to the durable content of black culture.   Locke, like Simmel, 
differentiated between culture as the source of ‘self-cultivation’ and culture as 
a realm of durable objects, produced by modern life processes.  Finally, I 
suggest that Locke recognized the advent of black modernity in black artwork 
since, freed from the responsibilities of representing the race, they could turn 
to producing what he took to be ‘modern’ in all modern art: the objectification 
of life.  
 
I.  Locke, Identity and Recognition 
Some have argued that by critiquing and publicizing these new 
representations of black life, Locke sought ‘recognition’ of ‘true’ black culture 
and black identity.  I argue in this that though Locke sometimes did refer to 
the ‘spirit’ of the race and to ‘folk consciousness,’ as sources for artwork, he 
did not seek ‘recognition’ to of ‘folk consciousness’ to shore up black identity 
or, for that matter see what we now call ‘recognition’ as the purpose of 
artwork. That is, Locke did not suggest that artwork should serve the political 
function of securing recognition of black identity or culture.   To clarify, I will 
take up three different versions of this line of thought here.    
In “Identity: Alain Locke’s Atavism,” philosopher Leonard Harris 
argues that Locke was, in effect, a polemicist on behalf of a renovated black 
culture.  He argues that, 
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[Locke] held a weak or naturalistic atavistic view, namely, that  
historically given habits and always changing social 
interchanges between races are explainable and should be 
recognized for the role they play in shaping our sense of self 
identity and self respect.  The family of traits that were… 
representative of a culture or race were definitive of its essence.8 
 
Because black identity had been misrepresented and debased, Harris argues 
that Locke and “Lockeans of the New Negro movement” drew upon cultural 
“carryovers” from Africa to construct a racial identity that would serve as the 
“basic framework of resistance to racial domination,”9 a position made 
possible by Locke’s atavism.   But since Locke never insisted that there was 
quintessential black subject born of an essential black culture, unbroken by 
internal difference, Harris argues that only a weak form of atavism can 
account for the “complexities, discontinuities and possibilities of new vistas 
[Locke] anticipated within the world of black expression”10 as well as the 
necessary work of identifying “…the rise of black cultural characteristics 
warranting merit…”11  
I take issue with Harris’s argument for two reasons:  First, while Locke 
does argue that from the perspective of anthropology and sociology, culture 
captures and articulates durable traits, he also insists that from the perspective 
of modern persons, ‘culture’ is a cosmopolitan realm of contact that would 
condition self-cultivation.   Thus, though Locke did understand “interchanges 
between the races” and “historically given habits” as “explainable,” and 
understood that these “interchanges” affected self identity,  Locke did not 
indicate that black artwork should serve to better these interchanges for the 
purpose of producing better identities.  Though Locke thought African art was 
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useful source material for modern black art, the use of this source material 
informed a new and distinctly modern and experimental form of self-
expressiveness, whereby black and non-black artists alike translated black life 
into new forms of expression.      
In Transnational America: Cultural Pluralist Thought in the 20th Century,  
Everett Akam proposes that Locke was one of several early 20th century 
cultural pluralists. According to Akam,  
 
…Alain Locke achieved a brilliant synthesis between the claims 
of the particular and the universal. His cosmopolitanism offered 
hope for a merger without fusion on the ground of democratic 
culture….[Culture] formed the playground in which each of 
American’s ethnic and racial groups could simultaneously 
develop its unique character and traditions as well as join with 
others in the creation of a pluralistic America.12  
By this account, for Locke “culture, combining both subjective and 
objective dimensions, simultaneously separated and united all.”13  Locke 
sought a foundation for a common ground, “premised on shared values,” but 
welcoming to and dependent upon recognition of diverse cultures.  Properly 
valued, these cultures could then serve “the creation of democratic culture 
devoted to social justice.”14  Harlem Renaissance artwork then created a 
‘rooted’ black culture through “artistic particularism” that would “lead to the 
discovery of a universality premised on shared oppression.”15  This 
particularism was necessitated by “the need for roots upon which selfhood 
depended” and “found expression in the unique cultural forms of the African 
                                                           
12 Everett Helmut Akam, Transnational America: Cultural Pluralist Thought in the Twentieth 
Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002)., p. 139 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 195 
15 Ibid. 148 
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American folk.”16  Culture captured and provided these ‘roots,’ which in turn 
helped to provide the “power…of identity.”   
Akam’s characterization of Locke is a helpful corrective to what he calls 
the “tireless misrepresentations of [Nathan] Huggins, David Levering Lewis” 
and others who have seen the Harlem Renaissance to “[belie] a slavish 
devotion to white forms and standards” because it correctly identifies in 
Locke’s art criticism attention to the ‘transfiguring imagination’ of black 
expression. Moreover, Akam rightly argues that Locke sought “...a democratic 
culture based on cosmopolitanism.”17  Yet, Akam argues that in Locke’s 1923 
speech to freshman at Howard University, he was “crippled” by a “genteel 
notion of culture,” consisting “essentially in being cultured.”  This thinking, to 
Akam, is flawed because it did not tend to “…the interplay between notions of 
the good and techniques of achieving the possible.”18  This, I think, is a 
misreading not just of that speech but also of the potential of self-cultivation 
as Locke characterized it for as I will argue below, ‘self-cultivation’ preceded  
artwork by producing the best audiences for it.   Moreover, I disagree with 
Akam’s characterization of Locke as a “cosmopolitan pluralist.”   In my view, 
Locke’s insistence that ‘Negro life’ be lifted to the “plane of pure art” allowed 
‘Negro life’ as artwork to become the source of cultivation for all people, 
regardless of their races.  Akam argues instead that Locke’s insistence that art 
not be propaganda (an argument I take up in detail in Chapter Five) meant 
that Locke saw “culture, both folk and formal… as a medium of mutual 
recognition by moral agents newly aware of their dignity and agency.”19  My 
disagreement with Akam is largely one of emphasis: I suggest that Locke is 
                                                           
16 Ibid. 149 
17 Ibid. 153 
18 Ibid. 146 
19 Ibid. 148 
82  
 
open to an interpretation that emphasizes the plurality of black subjects over 
‘identity,’ and culture as the medium and indicator of plural, self-
expressiveness over rooted, self-contained cultures and culture. 
 Just as convinced of Locke’s atavism (and the centricity of ‘identity’ to 
any account of Locke’s art criticism and culture work) as Leonard Harris, 
political theorist Nancy Fraser argues that Locke thought artwork could 
generate a new ‘race consciousness’ among black people to mitigate the effects 
of ‘race thinking’ and practice.20  According to Fraser, Locke sought a new 
‘race consciousness’ that would “forge solidarity” among black people and 
“win respect” from white Americans.   Fraser argues that while Locke knew 
that there was no essential black subject, his attempt to secure ‘respect’ for and 
‘solidarity’ among black people through artistic means because at the time, 
“…prospects were dim for Negro Civil Rights…”21 Denied the possibility of 
pursuing political solutions to the problems of exclusion and inequality, Locke 
is best considered a “strategic essentialist,” who pursued cultural recognition 
for black people.  She suggests that Locke proposed a “cultural remedy” for a 
political problem because he believed that cultural recognition would usher in 
an era of political inclusion. That said, while Fraser’s argument is not 
unconvincing, I do not think it captures the full, political theoretical potential 
of Locke’s arguments.  I disagree first and foremost that the political value of 
artwork and ‘culture’ (as Locke understands it) subsists in its capacity to 
produce cultural identity as “a weapon of struggle against oppression.”22  I 
                                                           
20 Nancy Fraser, “Another Pragmatism: Alain Locke, Critical 'Race' Theory, and the Politics of 
Culture,” in The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, 
Community, Culture, Race and Education, ed. Leonard Harris (Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc.), 3 - 20. 
21 Ibid. 16 
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want to suggest instead that Locke was attentive to difference as a fact of life 
and saw ‘self-expressiveness’ as a marker of modern black autonomy.    
 Harris, Akam and Fraser treat Locke chiefly as a thinker for whom 
‘black identity’ and/or ‘cultural recognition’ is the legitimate end of artwork 
and cultural production because each sees reconstituted identity as a 
necessary step along the path to full participation in American democracy.  
While these arguments are defensible, I suggest their emphasis is misplaced. I 
agree with Harris, Fraser and Akam that Locke sought in his work to see the 
full possibilities of democracy realized. But I disagree with their thinking 
about how he did this. Attentive to and critical of ‘race theory’ and its political 
practice in his social theory, in his art criticism, Locke envisioned autonomy 
(for the black imagination) in and through artwork.  That is, I want to suggest 
that for Locke, black autonomy did not depend upon ‘identity’ (strategic or 
otherwise) and self-contained cultures but instead on modernity’s receptivity 
to difference and its expression.   Locke refused a ‘political’ (propagandistic) 
function for artwork precisely because he associated propagandistic artwork 
with an earlier historical moment, in which black artists, misidentified as a 
single ‘people’ under what he called the ‘Old Negro’ sign, had no choice but to 
pursue political and/or moral objectives –to be representative of the ‘race’— 
through their artwork and culture, instead of expressing themselves.   Locke’s 
refusal of politics in artwork,23 furthermore, is precisely what makes his 
writing on artwork compelling to the political theorist.   I interpret Locke’s 
                                                           
23 That said, I do think Akam gets Locke’s refusal of propaganda partially right when he 
argues, “Locke attacked the subordination of art to the demands of a foreign political theory 
heavily influenced by positivism… For generations black poetry had ‘pivoted on a painfully 
negative and melodramatic sense of race.’ Conditioned by the power of racism, ‘self-pity and 
its corrective of rhetorical bombast’ subsequently failed to develop an affirmative sense of 
identity.” Ibid. 153 I want that Locke ought not to be read to seek an affirmative identity since 
one of the effects of race thinking that so concerned him was its tendency to ascribe identities.   
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insistence that artwork be autonomous—that it be freed of its service to 
particular causes—and that artists be self-expressive—that they not be 
required to act as spokespersons on behalf of ‘the race’— as a repudiation, both 
of the Old Negro identity that demanded spokesmanship and of the 
contemporary politics with which Locke has been associated—that of identity 
and ‘recognition.’ I argue that Locke is open to an interpretation that 
recognizes the dangers of identity, even of an affirmative sort.   I would argue 
further that ‘recognition’ cannot adequately apprehend or nourish the 
plurality of (black) life, which was for Locke a significant barometer of (black) 
autonomy.      
 
II. Social Culture/Cultivation 
 In June 1924, nine months before the ‘Harlem’ issue of Survey Graphic 
magazine, which was to become the basis for The New Negro: An Interpretation, 
was published, Locke wrote “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social 
Culture, for the Howard Review.     In it, Locke argues that while both ‘race’ and 
‘social culture’ have highly variable meanings,” the sciences conspired to 
settle their meanings by fixing the relationship between the two “organically” 
such that they are understood to be causally connected.  Locke does not “deny 
that race stands for significant social characters and culture-traits or represents 
in given historical contexts characteristic differentiations of culture-type.”24    
He anticipates, in fact, “continued…if restricted use of these terms” in the 
sciences, thinking them necessary.  He nevertheless sets out, in the essay, “to 
[safe-guard their] continued use so as not to give further currency to 
invalidated assumptions concerning them.”25   The source of the easy linkage 
                                                           
24 Locke, “Concept of Race,” 188 
25 Ibid. 189 
85  
 
of race to culture was to be found in classical social evolutionism. De 
Gobineau had argued that race was “the determining factor of culture.”  Once 
articulated, that position had then been justified “with doctrines of the strictly 
evolutionary interpretation of culture.”   Locke points out that a few theorists 
saw in this discrepancy the grounds to dismiss any connection between race 
and culture.    This dismissal, he argues, was not yet justifiable since it left “an 
open question as to the association of certain ethnic groups with definite 
culture-traits and culture types under circumstances where there is evidently a 
greater persistence of certain strains and characteristics in their culture than of 
other factors….”26 How could theory account for the endurance of certain 
features among particular groups of people while maintaining that biological 
race was not its source?  How does Locke’s argument in “The Concept of Race 
as Applied to Social Culture” affect Locke’s art criticism? 
Locke calls for  “a reversal of emphasis… instead of [biological] race 
explaining the cultural condition, the cultural conditions must explain the race 
traits…, [thus] the newer scientific approach demands that we deal with 
concrete cultural types which as often as not are composite [biological] racially 
speaking, and have only an artificial ethnic unity of historical derivation and 
manufacture.”27  The much-vaunted stability of some cultural traits is 
‘artificial’ because it results, not from biological heredity, but from 
circumstance. The persistence of these traits is, nevertheless, of interest.  
Further, while one might be tempted to “substitute for the term race the term 
culture group,” 
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…what has become absolutely disqualified for the explanation of 
culture groups taken as totalities becomes in a much more 
scientific and verifiable way a main factor of explanation of its 
various cultural components.  Race accounts for a great many of 
the specific elements of the cultural heredity, and the sense of 
race may itself be regarded as one of the operative factors in 
culture since it determines the stressed values which become the 
conscious symbols and tradition of the culture.28  
 
Here, Locke (re)introduces the conceptualization of originary ‘race’ as 
‘difference from’ he provided in the Race Contacts lectures: ‘race’ is not only an 
indicator of stable characteristics, it is also a readily available term for a 
group’s sense of itself, as ‘different’ from other groups.  The origins of a ‘race 
type’ were “accidental or fortuitous combinations of historical circumstances,” 
but the “sense of race as perhaps the most intense of the feelings of 
commonality… is self-perpetuating…”29  ‘Race’ could thus, from an 
ethnological perspective at least, be described in functionalist terms.  “Race 
operates as tradition…[and] seems to lie in that peculiar selective preference 
for certain culture-traits and resistance to certain others which is characteristic 
of all types and levels of social organization...” Contact among ‘race types’ 
results in the “accentuation of racial stresses” such that  “…even when a 
fusion [between competing types] eventuates, it takes place under conditions 
determined by the resistance developed and the relative strength of several of 
the cultural components.”30     
Yet, Locke points out that “…cultures [are] highly composite… [And] 
in a large majority of cases the culture is only to be explained as the result of 
the meeting and reciprocal cultural strains, several ethnic contributions.”  
From this, Locke draws the conclusion that one cannot “…[interpret] culture 
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in terms of the intrinsic rather than the fusion values of its various constituent 
elements…,” indicating that while an identifiable group shares at least some 
relatively ‘long-lived’ traits, its ‘culture’ is not derived from the [biological] 
‘race’ of its members. Nor is it a set of unchanging characteristics.    
 I am interested here in the political theoretical significance of Locke’s 
full turn to culture and, just as in important, in his insistent and continued use 
of the term ‘race.’  Locke argues that  
 
…this newer view insists upon the disassociation of the claims of 
political dominance and cultural productivity, and combat the 
traditional view that all or even the best elements of culture are 
the contribution of the ethnic group which in a mixed culture 
has political dominance and is in dynastic control. Already a 
number of such politically proprietary claims have been 
disallowed and disestablished by the more intensive and 
objectively comparative study of culture-traits.31 
 
Importantly, Locke points again to the problem of ‘political dominance’ and 
insists that ‘the best of culture’ does not belong to politically dominant groups.  
On the one hand, we might interpret this statement to open up the possibility 
that members of all ethnic groups can produce ‘the best of culture,’ and see the 
Harlem Renaissance as attempting to see the best of black culture produced 
and made public.  But it is important to note that Locke “disallows” politically 
proprietary claims over culture in general, in line with his insistence, I 
suggest, that art not serve propagandistic ends.  
Moreover, Locke’s attention to culture is part and parcel of the next 
‘historical’ stage in the development of ‘race’ as an idea.   Enough research had 
been done on the topic to debunk the ‘biological’ sources of ‘race’ that the 
possibility of a more objective social science had been established. Yet that 
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science—the comparison of apparently stable characteristics of one cultural 
grouping to the other—is itself at risk: it might remain linked to biological 
race, if it failed to sufficiently explain the stability of traits that had heretofore 
been linked to heredity.    
Theorists of Locke’s work on behalf of the Harlem Renaissance have 
often argues that Locke simply replaces ‘race’ with ‘culture,’ seeing all black 
people, whatever their national or ethnic backgrounds as members of the 
same tribe.32   Nevertheless, such a reading cannot account for Locke’s 
insistence in “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture” that 
proprietary culture was a proven impossibility nor, as I argued at the 
beginning of this chapter, that “Negro life” is available to all artists.  
Moreover, African art is not readily available to all black artists.  One could, 
for example, only “hope” that “African art” might “exert upon the artistic 
development of the American Negro the influence that it has already had 
upon modern European artists.”33   While there was an historical connection 
between American blacks and African people, just as American blacks could 
not rely on their ‘Negro identity’ to access ‘Negro life’ for their artworks, 
“African art”34 is only as available to American blacks as it is to the early 20th 
                                                           
32 See, for example, Leonard Harris, “Identity: Alain Locke’s Atavism,” Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 24, Issue 1, 1988. Rightly critical of those scholars who accuse 
Locke of relying on a strongly atavistic account of self-formation which sees “specific racial or 
national identities [playing] some role in the progression of universal consciousness,” Harris 
argues that, in fact, had a “weak or naturalistic atavistic view, namely that historically given 
habits and always changing social interchanges between races are explainable and should be 
recognized for the role they play in shaping our sense of self identity and self respect.  The 
family of traits that were, or could arguably be representative of a culture or race were 
definitive of its essence.  On this view, races and cultures play different roles in the formation 
and progression of civilization…,” p. 67  Because of this, Locke’s Harlem Renaissance Era 
work is therefore best understood as “polemicism” on behalf of “New Negro” culture.  
33 Alain Locke, “The Art of the Ancestors,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection of 
His Essays on Art and Culture, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart, vol. 8, Critical Studies on Black Life and 
Culture (New York and London, 1986), 15 - 16, p. 15 
34 A more defensible claim re: Locke’s perceived ‘essentialism’ and African art is that Locke 
advanced “aesthetic essentialist” claims about African art and its availability to European and 
‘Negro’ artists.  Jane Duran and Earl Stewart argue, “Locke’s work is important because of 
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century European artists who had found in it the inspiration for modernist art.     
While there are stable elements to be found in African art,35 which could serve 
as inspiration to any artist, culture is more than sum of its most persistent 
parts.  Peoples and cultures do not fully correspond, suggesting that culture is 
just as much mode as category.   ‘Sense of difference’ resulted in the durability 
of cultures but, as we will see below, culture was much more than staying 
power.  The effects of culture are ostensible not only as enduring 
characteristics of identifiable groups but also as singular attributes of 
individual persons.   And yet, one’s membership in a particular ‘social culture’ 
does not designate individual culture.  
In 1923, Locke gave a speech to the entering freshman class of Howard 
University, later published as the “Ethics of Culture” in the Howard University 
Record.  Locke argued that  
 
…to be sure of culture, the average student should elect some of 
the cultural studies; and, more important still, in his outside 
diversions, should cultivate a steady and active interest in one of 
the arts, aiming thereby to bring his mind under the quickening 
influence of cultural ideas and values… [and] cultivate an 
intelligent appreciation of at least one of the great human arts, 
literature, painting, sculpture, music or what not.”36    
 
                                                           
what we might term his aesthetic essentialism.  The use of the term ‘essentialism’ in the 
present context pertains to his claim that properties of the artistic works of a given 
cultural…group are essentially, or universally, related to members of that group. Locke claims 
in particular that Blacks possess, as a group, decided artistic strengths, and the ‘Negro 
Spirituals’ essay goes on to make the claim that many of these strengths are musical.” Jane 
Duran and Earl L. Stewart, “Alain Locke, Essentialism, and the Notion of a Black Aesthetic,” 
in The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, Community, 
Culture, Race and Education (New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
1999), 111 - 126, p. 111  Locke’s aesthetic essentialism, I suggest, is best explained by his 
recognition of ‘durable’ traits and traditions that define particular ‘social cultures.’   
35 Abstractness in African plastic arts was, to Locke, a case in point.  
36 Alain Locke, “The Ethics of Culture,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: The Harlem Renaissance 
and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 176 - 185, p. 176 
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As Akam would have it, this speech appeals to an Arnoldian notion of culture 
that is ultimately useless, since it a “rival elite of cultured ‘aliens.’37 Such self-
cultivation generates effects beyond the individual, Locke said.  “…[In] any 
community, in any nation, in any group, the level of cultural productiveness 
cannot rise much higher than the level of cultural consumption, cannot much 
outdistance the prevalent limits of taste…,”38  suggesting that one positive 
effect of self-cultivation would be a better body of ‘Negro’ artwork.  Not only 
is personal culture independent of one’s ‘social culture,’ one does not cultivate 
oneself out of a sense of duty to one’s tribe.  Indeed, to Locke, the only duty 
implied by cultivation is to oneself: an obligation to avoid the ‘pull of the 
crowd.” “Cultural productiveness” is, furthermore, only a secondary effect of 
self-cultivation.     And while cultivation was the defining aspect and mark of 
education, to be achieved (in part) through an appreciation of the arts, Locke 
insists that the arts-in-general—all cultural products and not just those of one’s 
‘social culture’—is the experiential substance and (self) productive realm of 
culture. 
  Locke told the students that the “highest intellectual duty [was] the 
duty to be cultured.”    But the duty to be cultured is a peculiar one, for unlike 
a typical obligation, it is not imposed by any outside authority.    
 
There is, or ought to be, a story of a lad to whom some rather 
abstract duty was being interpreted who is said to have said, ‘If I 
only owe it to myself, why then I really don’t owe it at all.’  Not 
only do I admit that culture is a duty of this sort, but I claim that 
this is its chief appeal and justification.39  
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Culture is an obligation one experiences as a duty to oneself but which, 
although it is a benchmark established by oneself for oneself, requires more 
than individual achievement. Most important, while the cultivation of the self 
is necessarily self-referential, it is also, crucially, worldly:   
 
Culture has been variously and beautifully defined.  But I cannot 
accept for the purpose I have in view even that famous 
definition of Matthew Arnold’s. ‘Culture is the best that has been 
thought and known in the world,’ since it emphasizes the 
external rather than the internal factors of culture.  Rather, it is 
the capacity for understanding the best and most representative 
forms of human expression, and of expressing oneself, if not in 
similar creativeness, at least in appreciative reactions and in 
progressively responsive refinement of tastes and interests.  
Culture proceeds from personality to personality…. It is that, and 
only that, which can be inwardly assimilated… [Like] wisdom it 
is that which cannot be taught, but can only be learned.40 [my 
emphasis] 
 
Cultivating oneself requires external reference.   But even an already-existing 
body of superlative cultural products cannot, in itself, cultivate a self.   Rather, 
cultivation results in and arises from seeking out representative others and 
‘expressing oneself’ to and along side those others.   Cultivation affects (one’s) 
point of view by linking one to others and “[safeguarding the educative 
process]” at the level of experience. 
     Not merely a matter of refined taste, the impulse to culture is a 
constitutive element of the self, more important even than “the mind.”  
 
[Without] a refinement of the channels through which our 
experience reaches us, the mind cannot reach its highest 
development.  We too often expect our senses to serve us and 
render nothing back to them in exchange. As a result, they do 
not serve us half so well as they might: course channels make for 
sluggish response, hampered impetus, wastage of effort… The 
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stamp of culture is… no conventional pattern, and has no stock 
value: it is the mold and die of a refined and completely 
developed personality. It is the art medallion and not the 
common coin.41     
 
To be cultured ultimately indicates that one is worldly and has become 
so through contact with others (“personality to personality”) and with objects 
of culture.    Culture is, at the individual level, unsubstantial, indicating 
instead both refined tastes and a ‘cosmopolitan’ sensibility.  (On the other 
hand, at the level of society, culture is perdurable enough that ethnologists 
and anthropologists could study it.    Culture is both immaterial and long 
lasting.)  
 That Locke so carefully set individual culture/cultivation apart from 
‘race’/‘social culture’ by insisting that cultivation is inherently worldly leads 
me to disagree about Akam’s interpretation of Locke’s Harlem Renaissance 
project: that this early speech represents a failure because it merely results in 
the production of new elites who “…are intent on parodying the white 
amateur arts of self-expression.” As Akam would have it, Locke later becomes 
a cosmopolitan because he becomes a cultural pluralist.  On this view, Locke 
endorses a conception of culture as ‘rooted,’ drawn on local traditions, which 
produces a reconstituted self that is then enabled to pursue “liberation and 
social justice.” His cosmopolitanism is displaced to the realm of “participatory 
democracy,” which ‘now’ constituted by selves rooted in various cultures, is 
itself cosmopolitan.  I suggest instead that Locke retains the insight of the 1923 
speech, that culture is itself cosmopolitan, the space for contact from 
“personality to personality” and I would add from ‘personality to artwork,’ 
confirming his argument that in the modern period, ‘race’s’ influence over 
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both the study and the actual formation of cultures as well as the ‘practice’ of inter-
group/personal contact would wane.   One source of this insight, I suggest, is 
Georg Simmel, with whom Locke studied during his year at University of 
Berlin. 
 
III.  Simmel and Locke:  Synthesis and the Poetry of ‘Negro’ Life 
 Georg Simmel was an early 20th century German philosopher and social 
theorist.  One the of the founders of modern sociology, “he charted a new field 
for the discovery…[through] such distinctive conceptions of contemporary 
sociology as social distance, marginality, urbanism as a way of life, role 
playing, social behavior as exchange, conflict as a integrating process, dyadic 
encounter, circular interaction, reference groups as perspectives, and 
sociological ambivalence.”42   Simmel was most interested in the effects of the 
Industrial Revolution, its technological development and its ‘culture’ on the 
individual, a topic he explored most famously in his 1900 treatise on economic 
exchange, The Philosophy of Money.   Born in 1858, he grew up in and studied in 
Berlin, completing a dissertation on Kant in 1881.  He took a Privatdozent 
position at the University of Berlin after the publication of his dissertation and 
remained there until 1914.  A gifted lecturer, Simmel was among the most 
popular instructors at the University of Berlin in the early 20th century.  He 
finally received a full professorship at the University of Strasbourg, where he 
remained until his death in 1918.    
Simmel’s influence on Locke has been noted in Harris and 
Molesworth’s recent biography, Alain Locke: Biography of a Philosopher.43  Harris 
and Molesworth point out that during his (1910-1911) at the University of 
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Berlin, Locke “enrolled for two courses—one each semester—with George 
Simmel, who was then in the process of redefining modern sociology.”44    
Actually, Locke took at least three courses with Simmel, Analysen des 
Gruendbegriff der Wissenschaften, Probleme der moderne Kultur, and 
Philosophie des lezten Jahrhunderts.45  In any case, Harris and Molesworth 
note that “[some] important aspects of Simmel’s thought are reflected in 
Locke’s …work.  Perhaps chief among these is Simmel’s claim that social 
formations had abstract structures that could be separated from the content of 
social interaction and independently studied.”46  I explore these influences in 
this chapter and argue that by tracing Simmel’s influence on Locke, we attend 
to a key difference that scholars who insist that Locke was an atavist or early 
defender of recognition politics miss: that between identity and synthesis.   
When Locke wrote in “Our Little Renaissance” that the chief effect of 
the Harlem Renaissance was not new Negro artists (or I might add, ‘new 
Negroes’) but rather the infusing of “Negro life” into the “general stream of 
culture,” he alluded to the synthesizing force of culture.  By analogizing the 
Harlem Renaissance to the “Grand Renaissance,” Locke predicted that the 
Harlem Renaissance would become much more than its elements—‘Negro 
life,’ artists, poetry, music, drama and the plastic arts—; it would reach out to 
all subjects and objects to reshape the world of relations.    
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I will begin by briefly sketching what was most significant in Simmel’s 
general theory of culture:  it arises from and results in a dialectic tension 
between vital, dynamic life and the fixed forms that life produces.  For Locke, 
culture’s capacity for objectifying life is ultimately tragic. I then characterize 
what may have been appealing to Locke about Simmel’s account.   I turn to 
Locke’s 1926 essay, “The Negro Poets of the United States,” to suggest how 
Locke may have creatively appropriated Simmelian theory.  
From the late 19th century until his death in 1918, Georg Simmel 
articulated a systematic theory of culture while assessing the effects of 
modernity on ‘subjective life,’ examining “…the tensions and contradictions 
that become increasingly apparent in the culture of industrial civilization…”47 
Although Simmel was motivated by “…the intention of illustrating the modern 
subject’s inner response to the external, humanly created world of material 
culture, [my emphasis]”48 he offered a general theory of culture which saw 
culture arising from the dualism (conflict) between “subjective life, which is 
restless but finite in time, and its contents, which, once they are created, are 
fixed but timelessly valid.”49  Culture is the “path of the soul to itself” and 
more.  Subjective life, pursuing the path of the soul to itself, “engendered 
innumerable structures which keep on existing with peculiar autonomy 
                                                           
47 Lawrence Scaff, “Georg Simmel's Theory of Culture,” in Georg Simmel and Contemporary 
Sociology, ed. Michael Kaern, Bernard Phillips, and Robert Cohen, vol. 119, Boston Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1990), 283 - 296, p. 284.  Scaff points out that Simmel’s account of culture and his assessment of 
modernity are fundamentally linked, suggesting that Simmel’s assessment “…consists of a 
connected series of analyses of alternative types of responses to culture—especially modern 
‘objective’ culture—and a demarcation of Simmel’s own intellectual bearing with respect to 
the problems posed by culture as a whole.”  Scaff finds the fullest articulation of these effects 
in Simmel’s very famous work, The Philosophy of Money, which considers money’s ‘effects 
upon the inner world…of the vitality of individuals.”  This is far outside the bounds of my 
interests.  Here, I will focus on two shorter essays, “On the Concept and the Tragedy of 
Culture” and “The Conflict in Modern Culture.”  
48 Scaff, Georg Simmel’s Theory of Culture, 284 
49 Simmel, “On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture,” 27 
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independent of the soul that has created them, as well as of any other that 
accepts or rejects them…” If conceptually, culture can be understood to 
mediate between subjective life and its objects, while providing the path of 
soul from “folded unity…to unfolded multiplicity… to unfolded unity…,”50 
producing (we might say in Lockean terms) ‘self-expressiveness,’ its great 
tragedy is that the ‘unfolded multiplicity’ through which the soul traveled to 
its perfected self, leaves a remainder of ‘objective spirits.’  Man thus finds 
himself confronting those multiple, but autonomous forms—“...art as well as 
law, religion as well as technology, science as well as custom---“51 as alien.   
 
Once certain themes…[of culture] have been created—even if 
they have been created by the most individual and innermost 
spontaneity—we cannot control the direction in which they will 
develop…They must follow the guidelines of their own inner 
necessity, which is no more concerned with our individuality 
than are physical forces and their laws.”52     
 
The result is that the subject finds itself unexpectedly dominated by the 
“innumerable structures” the spirit creates but “which keep on existing.”  The 
spirit—subjective life—cannot escape the processes of objectification.  Indeed, 
that is precisely the tragedy of culture:  though “life itself is formless, [it] 
incessantly generates forms for itself.”53   Culture inhabits the caesura between 
‘life’ and ‘form,’ not with substantive content (for such content— work, art, 
law, morality, religion becomes form) but instead through synthesis.  The 
“decisive factors in life are united in culture.”54 But this ‘unity’ is of a peculiar 
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sort, permanent but always newly produced. “Culture as we have 
demonstrated is always a synthesis.”55   
For Locke, an ‘extant’ culture is just such a synthesis.  This is what he 
means when he argues that all cultures are “composites.”  Yet, in his criticism 
of cultural objects, most particularly of ‘Negro’ poetry, it is clear that Locke 
has in view less synthesis at a standstill—“social culture”—than the  
transvaluative process of synthesis itself.     If for Simmel, culture-as-synthesis 
results in objectification and ‘tragedy’ for the subject, Locke finds in culture’s 
synthesizing powers an opportunity, not for the (‘Negro’) subject but rather for 
“Negro life” itself.  “Negro life” can be reckoned with anew, as poetry.  “Negro 
life” can be poetized, objectified in culture.    
Where for Simmel, modern culture is essentially tragic, for Locke, it 
was rife with potential.  This is because Locke saw in modern culture hints 
that black life was being ‘poetized,’ turned into cultural objects for the self-
cultivation of all people.  I turn to Locke’s 1926 essay “The Negro Poets of the 
United States” to outline what Locke meant by the ‘poetization’ of black life.  I 
imagine here an encounter between Locke and Simmel, which takes its cue 
from Locke’s faith in culture’s potential instead of from Simmel’s pessimism 
about its modern form(s).   The primary appeal of Simmel’s theorization of 
culture to Locke is precisely what generates tragic effects to Simmel: 
objectification.  That ‘Negro life’ might be “objectified” in poetic form 
indicates a new freedom for ‘Negro’ artists and subjects: their artwork would 
no longer be wedded to a ‘Negro identity’ dictated thoroughly by external 
circumstance.56   
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introductory essay of Survey Graphic 53, no. 11, “…the Old Negro…was a creature of moral 
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As Simmel defines it, culture is not peripheral to the subject.  Instead, it 
is “lodged in the middle of the dualism… between subjective life…and its 
contents.”57  As concept,  “ [it is] based on a situation which in its totality can 
only be expressed opaquely, though an analogy, as the path of the soul to 
itself.”58  Culture takes this path via “spiritual movements like will, duty, 
hope, the calling [which represent] the psychic expressions of the fundamental 
destiny of life: to contain its future in its present in a special form which exists 
only in the life process.”59   Locke sees in the ‘Negro’ poetry of the period the 
“…discarding [of] dialect and the hectic rhetorical assertion of race,”60 which 
he associated with earlier ‘Negro’ poets who, by circumstance, produced work 
that appealed on behalf of the ‘Negro’ cause or was merely “hortatory.”  
Locke discerns this exciting development not because ‘Negro’ poetry had 
adopted new content but rather because its ‘mood’ had changed.   ‘Negro’ 
poetry’s new temper is doubly significant:  the relationship between ‘Negro’ 
poetry and its material (life) had developed in new directions, so that ‘Negro 
life’ need no longer submit itself to appropriation on behalf of ‘Negro’ causes; 
moreover, although the “poetry of protest and social analysis still continued… 
contemporary Negro poetry… achieved the dignity of self-esteem and the 
poise of self-confidence… [so that] Negro poets… [find] joy and inspiration 
not in the escape from handicaps, but in the mastery of experience.”61   ‘Negro’ 
                                                           
fiction partly in innocent sentimentalism, partly in deliberate reactionism.  The Negro himself 
has contributed his share to this through a sort of protective social mimicry forced upon him 
by the adverse circumstances of dependence.  So for generations in the mind of America, the 
Negro has been more of a formal than a human being—a something to be argued about, 
condemned or defended, to be ‘kept down,’ or ‘in his place,’ or ‘helped up,’ to be worried 
with or worried over, harassed or patronized, a social bogey or a social burden.” Locke, 
“Enter the New Negro.” 7 
57 Simmel, “On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture,” 27 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Locke, “The Negro Poets of the United States.” 44 
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poetry in its variety could attend to ‘Negro life’ and not (merely) the external 
handicaps that had, in the past, resulted in the poet’s neglect of ‘life,’ to his 
giving voice instead to the ‘Negro cause,’ via the propagandistic or hortatory 
voice.  We might say that, by virtue of the variety of its modes, this new 
‘Negro’ poetry “contained its future in its present in a special [new] form,” 
that of poly-vocality, thereby constituting a new ‘path’ for the (black) poet.   
Simmel writes further that “[the] personality as a whole and a unit 
carried within itself an image, traced as if with invisible lines.  The image is its 
potentiality, to free the image in it would be to attain its full actuality.”62   
Here, Simmel envisions the subject/soul as a potentiality, characterizing a 
function for culture that would seem quite appealing to Locke.  But for 
Locke—and this is a central difference between Simmel’s theory of culture and 
Locke’s appropriation of it— ‘Negro poetry,’ itself what Simmel would call a 
‘form,’ is emancipated from its earlier purposes (as propaganda or 
exhortation), freeing not an ‘image’ of self but instead the multivalent 
character of ‘Negro life.’    
Simmel argues that ‘culture’ involves more than individual self-
perfection.  Cultivation fulfills a “…transcendent promise that should be 
fulfilled [such that] all individual expressions should appear only as a 
multitude of ways by which the spiritual life comes to itself…”63  I want to 
suggest that for Locke, cultivation fulfills just such a promise and furthermore 
that ‘Negro’ poetry would become one of the ways by which “the spiritual life 
comes to itself.  
For Locke, the poetic treatment of ‘Negro’ life indicates that culture 
now references it.  The ‘Negro’ subject remains as yet fully embedded in ‘life.’ 
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‘Negro’ life’s new availability to culture as potential cultural object in the 
modern context means something different for Locke than the seemingly 
unfortunate availability of ‘life’ to modern culture as Simmel portrays it.  
Lawrence Scaff’s account of Simmel’s general theory of culture is instructive 
here.  Scaff points out that for Simmel, ‘life’s’ centricity to culture is a 
relatively recent development. I will quote Scaff at length here.  
 
[In] Simmel’s view,…a brief history of cultural development will 
show that at the center of culture, from antiquity to modernity, 
has been a movement of assumed ‘unity of being’ (Greek 
philosophy), to ‘god’ (Christianity), ‘nature’ (the Renaissance), 
the ‘self’ (the Enlightenment), ‘society’ (the nineteenth century), 
and finally ‘life’ (modernity)…. Simmel’s modern culture has 
surrendered the delusion of unitary meaning.  For Western 
thought to move from Kant to Nietzsche has meant precisely to 
replace the universal individuality of a transcendental ego, 
situated in a single and generalizable world of mechanistic 
properties, with the unique individuality of a determinate 
subject, dispersed into multiple and particularizing worlds of 
qualitative variation.64 
 
No longer ‘generalizable,’ life is dispersed into “multiple and particularizing 
worlds.” For Locke, ‘Negro life,’ hidden as it was under the (dis)guise of old 
Negro identity, had heretofore not been revealed in its “unique individuality’ 
as ‘life.’ (We might say that “Negro life” was only particular by virtue of the 
modifier ‘Negro,’ and not because of the capacity for modern culture to 
produce “multiple and particularizing worlds of qualitative variation.”) In the 
Simmelian view,  modern culture is “tragic” precisely because the promise of 
“unique individuality” as a result of “dispersal into multiple and 
particularizing worlds” is denied by the cultural forms (work, art, religion, 
law, morality) that the “soul” begets on its way to itself.  For Locke, the 
                                                           
64 Scaff, “Simmel’s Theory of Culture,” 291 
101  
 
poetization of “Negro life,” one indication of the ‘work’ of modern culture, is 
promising expressly because it indicates that “Negro life” has been elevated to 
the “pure plane of art,” where it would become part and parcel of every 
“soul’s path to itself.”   
According to Locke, “Negro life” only began to be represented in 
‘Negro’ poetry with the advent of the Harlem Renaissance.   Thus, in “The 
Negro Poets of the United States,” Locke traces the historical development of 
“Negro” poetry, beginning with the “Negro” poet, who has little access to 
‘life.’ 
Negro poets and Negro poetry are two quite different things. Of 
the one, since Phyllis Wheatley, we have had a century and a 
half; of the other, since Dunbar, scarcely a generation.  But the 
significance of the work of Negro poets will more and more be 
seen and valued retrospectively as the medium through which a 
poetry of Negro life and experience has gradually become 
possible…  Therefore, I maintain that the work of Negro poets in 
the past has its chief significance in what it has led up to; 
through work of admittedly minor and secondary significance 
and power a folk-consciousness has slowly come into being and 
a folk-tradition has been started on the way to independent 
expression and development…65   
 
The arrival ‘Negro’ poetry represents a break from the past. Still 
through the work of earlier poets a “folk consciousness and a folk tradition” 
was substantiated.  This “consciousness” is akin to Simmelian “spirit.”  
“Spirit” according to Simmel, results from man’s “tearing himself loose…from 
the naturally given order of the world.”  “From this first great dualism springs 
the never-ending contest between subject and object, which finds its second 
round within the realm of spirit itself.”66   In the “Negro Poets” essay, Locke 
traces, in the progressive development of “Negro poetry,” the tearing loose of 
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‘spirit’ (‘folk consciousness’), not from ‘nature,’ but instead from the peculiar 
circumstances that had identified ‘Negro’ poets as mere advocates for a cause, 
isolating them in effect from ‘life,’ their best material. Phillis Wheatley’s 
poetry, in effect, had little ‘life’ content.   She was merely a “controversial 
prodigy,” an imitator.  
 
She was race-conscious but not race minded.  And later when for 
two generations or more Negro poets rhymed out their ‘moral 
numbers’ and pleaded for freedom, sometimes in creditable, 
sometimes in puerile quatrains that echoed Whittier and Mrs. 
Hemans, although the acceptance of race as passionate, it was 
abstract and rhetorical.  Theirs was the opposite excess of being 
so race-minded that they were race-bound.67 
 
The next generations advanced but were, nevertheless, still “preoccupied with 
the topics of freedom and the notes of sentimental appeal and moral 
protest.”68 They represented,  “[t]he second step up Parnassus [which] had 
simply been from the foothold by Negroes to the half-way lodging of a poetry 
about the Negro cause and question.”69  Even the political freedom afforded 
by the Emancipation Proclamation to this “half-way” generation failed to 
produce the conditions conducive to the “poetry of Negro life.”     Before late 
19th century poet Paul Laurence Dunbar, whose work represented a significant 
development, the ‘Negro’ poetic style is almost entirely dominated by 
“rhetoric,” which Locke associates with “moralism” and persuasive appeals 
on behalf of the race.  Dunbar’s significance, according to Locke, is threefold,  
 
The first was to have brought the work of a Negro in poetry to 
general public attention and acceptance; and thus to have 
emancipated the Negro artist from his special reading clientele 
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of pet friends and sympathizers.  His second was to have 
established the idea of folk expression; a priceless boon even at 
the great cost of having shackled Negro poets… to the 
limitations and handicaps of dialect.  The third accomplishment 
was to give fresh impetus of lyric singing.70 
 
How could “Negro” poets be both “emancipated” and “shackled” by dialect? 
Extracting spirit from circumstance was no easy task.   Freed first from 
imitation and then from clientelism, through dialect the ‘Negro’ poet had 
drawn closer to the poet’s best object—life.  But just as dialect enacted ‘folk 
consciousness,’ it ghettoized, cultivating ‘Negro life’ but preventing its ‘fusion’ 
with the “general stream of culture.”   Worse, ‘dialect’ could not affect the 
prevailing ‘mood’ of ‘Negro poets.’  “They were as handicapped as their 
predecessors, though in a different way.  They plead in dialect; the peasant 
becomes a moral stalking-horse for their generation just as for the previous 
generation.”71    Put another way, turning to dialect is, for Locke, a beginning 
that is immediately forestalled.  The poet remains a Negro poet, a tester of 
moral concepts or a representative, writing ever on behalf of causes.  The 
‘Negro’ poet stays petitioner, who, always beseeching, is cut off from the 
expressive possibilities of life and spirit.  Nevertheless, Locke identifies in the 
works produced after this period of renewal/retreat the hallmarks of a 
“universal” Negro poetry.   
 “Universal Negro poetry” seems like a contradiction in terms. Yet for 
Locke, once Negro ‘life’ is disarticulated from propaganda and Negro poets 
freed from the duty to spokesmanship,   ‘Negro’ poetry  
 
…was linked up with the main stream and tradition of English 
poetry, and on an esthetic rather than a moral basis began to 
attain universality and by right to claim general attention… 
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Negro poetry became at one and the same time more universal 
and more racial, finding a strange peace and ease in what had 
given it the most inquietude.  For in becoming less self-
conscious, it became more naively and beautifully expressive, 
like music.72  
 
   “Negro poetry” makes its entrance as dialect and moral argument 
leave the stage, or at least, begin to play bit parts in the history of the 
development of “Negro poetry.”   “Negro poetry” appeals then to a superior 
form of universality, in Locke’s view (aesthetic and not moral) whose source, 
‘Negro life’ is particular, invoking a “beauty that is born of long suffering, 
truth that is derived from mass emotion and founded on collective vision.”73   
Locke finds in the aestheticization of  (‘Negro) life itself, a universalizing form 
of representation that harmonizes ‘Negro life’s’ expression in all its great 
variety.    This did not mean that artists would no longer address social issues, 
just that their work would not be forced into the two modes of address—
exhortation and argument—that had heretofore defined ‘Negro’ artwork, 
opening up a new experience of and response to ‘Negro life’ in artwork for its 
audience.  Locke describes “Negro” poetry as containing “protest and social 
analysis,” but also “the dignity of self esteem and the poise of self-
confidence,” shaped by “varied affiliations with the richly differentiated 
technique of the modern schools of poetry.”74    The critic could locate in the 
writings of one poet multiple themes, moods and techniques.  
    
In place of the persistent and oppressive race consciousness, they 
have in part acquired the dignity of race spokesmanship and in 
part re-achieved the enviable naiveté of the slave singers.  More 
than all else, especially in its promise for the future, they have 
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won that artistic acceptance of life which makes great art 
possible.75      
The ‘Negro’ poet does not, say, “become a race spokesman,” rather he begins 
(“in part”) to gain the standing one might associate with being able to 
represent life and thus, is able to “return,” in an incomplete fashion, 
complicated by the advent of modernity, to the slave singer’s artlessness.    
Note again the language: the Negro poet has “achieved… naivety,” an 
incongruous phrase.   We can contrast poetic “naivety” with the decadent 
modernism that Locke associates with “the coteries,” those modern artistic 
cliques for whom the production of artwork was an end in and of itself, 
instead of the poetic realization of ‘Negro life.’  (I take this theme up in 
Chapter Four). The modern poet does not recover slave singing as if there 
were some essential “Negro” artistic quality that (only) new “Negro” poets 
could access.  In return for seeing ‘Negro life’ freed up for its reception in the 
general stream of culture, ‘Negro poets’ receive a new temper, which Locke 
calls “artistic acceptance of life.”    
 Simmel, it seems, could not imagine the modern subject arriving at an 
“artistic acceptance of life.”  After all, the tragedy of modern culture was that 
the modern subject experienced objective culture and its products as 
simultaneously freeing, alienating and overwhelming.  But the 
correspondences between Locke and Simmel are deeper, more pervasive and 
fruitful than the difference between their dispositions toward modernity—
hopeful and ambivalent—would suggest.   Both Locke and Simmel suggest 
that culture functions as a mediator between subjectivity and objectivity.  As 
cultural structures emerge, they immediately limit the universe of alternative 
ways of behaving and acting practically available to a range narrower than 
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what would be possible logically.  Locke’s exegesis of ‘race’ in the Race 
Contacts lectures attends to how ‘race,’ its creeds and practices structure social 
scientific interpretations of group characteristics and, most important, affect 
‘interracial relations’ as a matter of practice.   In the “Negro Poets” essay, 
Locke attempts to explain how ‘Negro’ poetry—black life objectified and 
poetized—might structure new relations.  As a practitioner of culture (in his 
work as a culture critic on behalf of the Harlem Renaissance movement), we 
might say that Locke applies a notion of culture that is profoundly influenced 
by his understanding of the structuring power of culture and ideas and 
inspired by the possibility of change under the condition of modernity.  He 
locates in the aesthetic realm the best conditions for change in both intra- and 
inter-cultural relations.   
  Locke is, furthermore, aware of the differentiating functions of various 
social ‘forms’ that so concern Simmel, most particularly, the differentiating 
function of the metropolis.76  Where Simmel focuses on 'modern life',' Locke 
attends to 'Negro life.   But the meaning of this disagreement (if it can be 
framed thus) is revealed in how Locke and Simmel theorize ‘value/valuation’ 
in the context of modernity.  For Simmel, the hallmark of modernity is that 
through objectification (most particularly because of the money economy), 
cultural objects are devalued.  For Locke, on the other hand, both because he 
sees one autonomous ‘object’—‘race thinking’ and its creeds—on the wane 
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action.” Alain Locke, “Harlem,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection of His Essays on 
Art and Culture (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983), 5 - 7, p. 6  
107  
 
and because he theorizes valuation as a primarily subjective process, the 
telltale sign of modernity for black people was the exaltation of ‘life’ as such.   
This is an effect of the transvaluation of values that Locke saw as part and 
parcel of modernity.   
    It seems clear from Locke’s life-long commitment to art and literary 
that Locke sees in the realm of aesthetics and art production the greatest 
possibility for change.  But Locke insists in “The Negro Poets of the United 
States,” that “…Negro poetry has achieved the dignity of self-esteem and the 
poise of self-confidence” and argues in the essay “Youth Speaks,” that 
“[Negro poets] have stopped posing, being nearer the attainment of poise,” 
and not merely his affection for artwork and literature that gives the final clue.  
The influence of ‘race thinking’ and its creeds was on the wane, at least in the 
realm of aesthetics.  ‘Negro life’ was being freed of the ‘race thinking’ and 
‘race creeds’ that had trapped the poet and his artwork in a ‘Negro’ shell and 
‘Negro’ poets would find not simple ‘identity’ with an always-already and 
available ‘culture,’ but rather acceptance into the field of culture and through 
the production and expression of their art to all comers.    
 That said, Locke had strong opinions about how the transvaluative 
powers of aesthetics could be harnessed and released, which are revealed in 
the cultural criticism he wrote throughout and after the Harlem Renaissance 
years.  Artists were (merely) a medium for the release of those powers and late 
modernity its backdrop.  In the next chapter, I explore both how Locke 
characterized the work of the modern artist and how Locke conceived of the 
transvaluative powers of modernity by examining one of Locke’s earliest 
forays into the field of modern art, the 1917 essay, “Emile Verhaeren.”  
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CHAPTER 4 
MODERN (‘NEGRO’) POETRY 
Writing some years after the end of the Harlem Renaissance, Alain 
Locke observed “[the] increased and increasing knowledge about human 
cultures which has come to us in modern times has unfortunately not led to 
any very general improvement in the common understanding of the nature of 
civilization, or the nature of culture itself.”1 The problem, according to Locke, 
was that the “…expected enlightened social understanding had and 
intercultural appreciation”2 had yet to occur.   Even the ‘objective’ social 
sciences “reverted frequently to the traditional cultural provincialisms.” 
Indeed, the “…contemporary welter of group rivalries…” that ought to 
necessitate and encourage the social sciences to draw more objective 
conclusions about “…the nature of civilization,” encouraged an “…increased 
resort to theorizing about the nature of culture [vis-à-vis] the mere 
rationalization of the claims and counterclaims of various national and racial 
groups seeking partisan vindication and glory.”3  As late as 1946, the year 
When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts— the edited volume 
within which these observations appeared, Locke was (still) fighting against 
the “cultural propaganda” that the modern age ought to have defeated.  That 
is, since the world historical period of biological race was coming to a close, 
social science and anthropology ought ‘then’ to have been able to “…properly 
[understand] civilization…[as] the setting of world culture…”4 
In When Peoples Meet, Locke’s concern again was theoretical: in the 
                                                           
1Alain Locke and Stern, Bernhard J., ed, When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture 
Contacts  (New York: Hinds, Hayden and Eldredge, Inc., 1946), p. 3  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 4 
4 Ibid. 3 
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domain of ideas, the influence of race thinking continued to be powerful. But 
Locke had initiated the defense against cultural propaganda in the 1930s, 
when he insisted that black artwork serve no ‘political’ function and be left to 
‘express itself.’    As I have argued, one reason Locke avowed that black 
artwork should refuse political function was that ‘modern’ developments 
made cultural or racial propaganda increasingly unnecessary.   ‘Self-
expressiveness’ was a (new) quality of black artwork, revealing the ‘plurality’ 
black life just as (and because) the black artist was ‘freed’ of the responsibility 
to exhort or persuade on behalf of causes in black artwork.   This chapter 
examines what to Locke, in addition to its ‘self-expressive’ quality, was 
‘modern’ about modern, black artwork.  I will suggest that for Locke, black 
modernist style (like what for him was successful modernism in general) 
expressed the artistic subject (whether it was, as we will see, Flemish folk life, 
life in modern cities or “the Negro’s quite matchless folk art”) by allowing the 
best ‘style’ for the subject to suggest itself.   Such ‘artistic mirroring’ could, by 
my reading, then reveal black life in all its multiplicity and reconstitute an 
artist’s relationship to traditional materials.  
By my reading, the ‘new’ in the New Negro Movement and what was 
renascent in black art was both ‘self-expressiveness’ and the variety of 
representations of black life.  In contrast, literary theorist Brent Hayes 
Edward’s has recently focused on another important aspect of ‘novelty’ in the 
early 20th century world of black letters.   He suggests that the Harlem 
Renaissance was a world-wide phenomenon best understood to refer to the 
‘new’ black internationalism the movement articulated.  In what follows, I will 
examine Edward’s argument, paying particular attention to how he 
characterizes modern black plurality as both problem and possibility.  Second, 
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I turn to an unexpected source, Locke’s 1917 essay, “Emile Verhaeren,” in 
which Locke memorializes the now forgotten Belgian poet as a modernist par 
excellence. I uncover in this pre-Renaissance essay, the outline of several 
themes to which Locke returned in his later critiques of ‘Negro’ artwork.  In 
particular, I highlight how Locke understands modernity as a ‘difference’ 
freeing force and characterize Locke’s expectations of artists confronted both 
with modernity’s dynamic character and the temptations of ‘root sources.’  I 
suggest that for Locke, the new Negro artists were just as much defined by 
their modernism as by their ‘Negro-ness.’ 
Like that of Emile Verhaeren, ‘New Negro’ artwork “…incorporates a world-
view and reflects the spirit of its time.”5  Finally, drawing on the three essays 
that Locke wrote first for the March 1924 “Harlem” issue of the Survey Graphic 
and included in The New Negro: an Interpretation,  “The New Negro,” “Negro 
Youth Speaks” and “The Legacy of Ancestral Arts,” I examine how Locke 
portrays ‘Negro’ artwork as “reflecting the spirit of its time” because of the 
mode by which it appropriated ‘Negro life’ and African art. According to 
Locke, the experience of modernity would, in fact, alienate (‘Negro’) artists 
from ‘Negro life’ but re-position them to best see ‘Negro life’ objectified in the 
“pure plane of high art.”  
 
I. Black Modernity: Internationalism and the Practice of Diaspora 
 In The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation and the Rise of Black 
Internationalism, Brent Hayes Edwards suggests 
 
To note that the “New Negro” Movement is at the same time a 
                                                           
5 Alain Locke, “Emile Verhaeren,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection of His Essays 
on Art and Culture, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart, Critical Studies on Black Life and Culture (New York 
and London, 1983), 35 - 38, p. 35 
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“new” black internationalism is to move against the grain of 
much of the scholarship on African American culture in the 
1920s, which has tended to emphasize U.S. bound themes of 
cultural nationalism, civil rights protest, and uplift in the literary 
culture of the “Harlem Renaissance.”  [The Practice of Diaspora] is 
an attempt to come to terms with the reminders of a handful of 
scholars… that ‘the Renaissance was international in scale both 
in terms of where its contributors come from and in terms of its 
being merely the North American component of something 
larger and grander.’6 
 
Edwards examines the correspondence and collaboration among black 
activists, scholars and artists in the 1920s and 1930s, uncovering there the 
stirrings of a new black internationalism.   He argues that black activists 
grappled with black plurality by  "practicing diaspora” and imagining 
blackness "beyond the boundaries of nation and language."  Black 
internationalists took the misrepresentation of black people as a starting point, 
pursuing better, workable articulations of the ‘fact’ of blackness. The 
movement found itself immediately confronted with a problem:  ‘black’ was a 
signifier whose signified refused easy capture.  
Edwards treats blackness as an ever-moving target, which was realized 
through what he calls the “practice of diaspora.”  The plurality of black life, 
articulated by differently-situated black activists was revealed in an 
international print culture.  He “…[unearths and articulates]… 
 
archive, in the sense not so much of a site or mode of 
preservation of a national, institutional or individual past, 
but instead of a "generative system": in other words, a 
discursive system that governs the possibilities, forms, 
appearance, and regularity of particular statements, 
objects, and practices—or on the simplest level that 
determines "what can and cannot be said."7  
 
                                                           
6 Brent Hayes Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black 
Internationalism (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2003) , p. 2 
7 Ibid. 7 
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Edwards reveals black plurality as it was under construction, by examining 
letters, newsletters and the (mis)translated texts written by  black intellectuals 
and artists in New York and in Paris.8  He suggests that these artist-scholar-
activists “practiced” diaspora to uncover a singular, but always coalescent 
“fact of blackness,” from the plurality of black life.   This work was intended 
to counter earlier aesthetic claims about blackness.  Though ‘blackness’ had 
‘already’ been (mis)framed, the internationalist actors attempting to reclaim 
the ‘fact of blackness’ engaged in communicative practices and therefore 
confronted black plurality as both predicament and opportunity.  Differently-
situated black actors were forced to address their differences, in light of a 
common goal: to see blackness reframed.   
Diasporic practice can be read both in the intentions of its articulators 
and, more significant for Edwards, in their failures.  Its practitioners— a 
diverse group of American, African, French and Caribbean activists, scholars 
and artists— did not seek identity so much as birthed a blackness that 
exceeded national settings of its ‘midwives.’ This project, nevertheless, was 
part and parcel  various political struggles, whose particular purposes may 
have been focused on a particular setting, but whose horizons encompassed 
an international black public.  
Though focused on the particular political, social and economic 
problems facing blacks around the world, these actors grappled with the 
question of blackness itself, which refused to be defined in a singular fashion.  
‘Internal’ differences meant that the category ‘black’ was immediately 
unstable.    Nevertheless, characterizing ‘blackness’ achieved the same status 
                                                           
8 Edwards examines, for example, the communications between Alain Locke and French 
novelist René Maran as well as the nascent feminism of French writer Paulette Nardal, Claude 
Mckay’s “Vagabond Bolshevism,” and “Black Marxism” of George Padmore and Tiemeko 
Garan Kouyate.  
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as solving the specifically socio-political problems these activists hoped to 
address, whatever their differences over ‘policy.’  Blackness needed to be 
usefully ‘framed.’ 
  Edwards argues that the concern with blackness is revealed in 
“semantic shifts in [the] bilingual flood of racial appellations and adjectives”9 
and by characterizing the work of prefaces in various anthologies of “Negro” 
writing.    
 
Claiming the term négre, investing it with particular signifying 
content and then deploying it as a link to another context (using 
it to translate Negro, for instance) are clearly practices with 
implications that go beyond the simply linguistic.  In a larger 
sense, these are all framing gestures.  The divergent 
interventions… do not just define the word négre.  They also 
frame it: positioning, delimiting or extending its range of 
application; articulating it in relation to a discursive field, to a 
variety of derived or opposed signifiers; fleshing out its history 
of use; and imagining its scope of application, its uses, its 
“future.10”   
 
Black internationalists claimed the term ‘négre’ and others, attempting to 
capture and define its future uses.  Moreover, the prefaces of various black 
anthologies, like The New Negro: an Interpretation, served as framing gestures 
as well to mark the appearance of a new force—international blackness by 
Edwards’ account— on the scene.  Edwards rightly relates the work of 
articulation to the problematic depiction of blackness in the literary and public 
spheres.  Further, Edwards’ account usefully illuminates the work of these 
scholars, artists and activists as social practice emphasizing the intention and 
agency of international Harlem Renaissance actors, while attending to their 
failures.   The ‘fact’ of blackness required articulation over and against prior 
                                                           
9 Ibid. 20 
10 Ibid. 38 
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misrecognitions and mischaracterizations from black source materials that 
themselves defied easy classification. For Edwards, articulating blackness was 
the central, though not sole, objective of the international Harlem Renaissance. 
The translations of texts from English to French and vice-versa as well as the 
exchange of letters between black activists and artists round the world that 
Edwards divulges that what Locke calls the ‘Negro’s’ “greatest experience”—
the process of “binding together.” Edwards makes clear that just how difficult 
it was to ‘bind together’ such a motley group was.  More improvisation than 
course, objectives were difficult to define and, furthermore, rife with the risk 
of misunderstanding.   
 
A vision of internationalism, perhaps, though not exactly 
‘worldwide black unity’: in these transnational circuits, black 
modern expression takes form not as a single thread, but 
through the often uneasy encounters of peoples of African 
descent with each other.  The cultures of black internationalism 
are formed only within…paradoxes…, with the result that—as 
much as they allow new and unforeseen alliances and 
interventions on a global stage—they are also characterized by 
unavoidable misapprehension and misreadings, persistent 
blindnesses and solipsisms, self defeating and abortive 
collaborations, a failure to translate even a basic grammar of 
blackness.11 
 
In pursuit of black unity, Locke too was guilty of his share of 
misreading.  Edwards carefully reconstructs one particularly unfortunate 
encounter between Locke and the French colonial context.  In “The Black 
Watch on the Rhine,” a short essay in which Locke described his visit to see 
                                                           
11 Edwards, Practice of Diaspora, 5.   As an example, Edwards points out that the comparatively 
positive treatment that many black Americans received from the French meant that they 
misunderstood, or worse, ignored how the French colonial system mistreated its African and 
French African subjects.  
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“French African troops guarding the border with Germany after World War 
I.”12   
 
My title is no misnomer… [the] first troops I saw on entering the 
occupied territory, and the last I saw on leaving, were colored—
and a very impartial observer, let us say the traditional martian 
[sic], would have jotted down in his diary what a polyglot, 
polyracial African nation had in alliance with France conquered 
Germany… [Mere] social miracle it may seem to the Anglo-
Saxon eye, they are not merely French soldiers, they are French 
citizens, comrades not only in arms but in all the basic human 
relationships…  The instinctive social logicality of the French 
mind has made a clean sweep of the whole field [of prejudice], 
and in spite of its handicaps of militarism and colonial 
imperialism, France has here worked out a practical technique of 
human relationships which may very possibly earn for her 
world-mastery….13 
 
Locke went on, Edwards points out, to extrapolate from his observation of 
France’s colonial subject-soldiers “on the Rhine” an account of “French 
civilization” as more egalitarian and accepting of difference than the Anglo-
Saxon.  “Instead of imposing her civilization and culture France super-
imposes them.”  Not surprisingly, Locke’s proclamations about the 
multiethnic glories of “French civilization” did not go without notice.  Rene 
Maran, the French-Guyanese poet, novelist and frequent contributor to Les 
Continents, with whom Locke carried on a lengthy correspondence,  
responded to “Black Watch on the Rhine” in an “Open Letter to Professor 
Alain Leroy Locke,” which was published in Opportunity magazine.  Maran 
remarks that  
 
[the] benevolence of France toward subject races is a matter of 
theory and official pretence. It is little more than a subterfuge… 
You [should] understand that the black, brown and yellow 
                                                           
12 Ibid. 105 
13 Quoted in The Practice of Diaspora, 105 
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soldiers did not come to the French colors as the little children 
come to Jesus… [In] certain of the colonies government officials 
under one pretext or other of recruiting actually engaged in 
seizure and man hunting.”14  
 
But Locke was adamant!  He defended his position by admitting “narrow 
motives,” insisting, “I was not discussing French policy in Africa, but merely 
the French treatment of her Negro soldiers in Europe…I was primarily 
concerned with contrasting this treatment of the man of color in the armies of 
France with that of our own American army.”15  The details here are less 
significant than what can be made of them.  Edwards reports that Maran was 
able to intervene by calling Locke to the carpet for his provincialism and, in 
doing so, reconfigures Locke’s vanguardism, insisting that “…black 
internationalism [is] reciprocity…”  “Reciprocity” he writes,  “is less an 
originating appeal that is answered than the structure of mutual 
answerability: articulation of diaspora in tension and in dissonance, without 
necessary resolution or synthesis.”16  
Edwards treats Locke’s error generously as a part of a reciprocal whole, 
which read retroactively in the archive of communications that Edwards 
constructs, is a moment in the “articulation of diaspora.”  In this chapter, I 
want to suggest that while Locke failed sometimes in his own communications 
to accurately characterize the situation of blacks outside the U.S., he accounts, 
in part, for the modernism of black artwork by suggesting that for it to be 
successful (truly modern), the artist had a responsibility to his subject.  His 
artwork should express black life by allowing its form to emanate from the 
subject.  This, and not the stylistic formalism of the modernist “coteries,” 
                                                           
14 Quoted in The Practice of Diaspora, 106 - 107 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 108 
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indicated its modernism.   As I shall argue below in my ‘reading’ of Locke’s 
“Emile Verhaeren” essay, all good modern artwork (and not only black 
modern artwork) should be animated by this reciprocal relationship between 
artist and his subject. 
 The New Negro: an Interpretation itself contains multiple ‘frames’ (no less 
than twenty two written by different artists, art critics, social scientists and 
interested observers) for its subject.   Locke sought to reveal the ‘spirit of the 
age’ as captured by black artwork.  Moreover, black artists were not the only 
source of the spirit so animating black artwork.  Locke celebrated (and chose 
as the cover illustration for The New Negro: an Interpretation) the sketches and 
paintings of Austrian artist Winold Reiss as fine examples ‘Negro’ art.17  I 
attribute Locke’s attention to Reiss as well as his expectations of black artwork 
in general to his thinking about ‘modernity.’ From this perspective, we can see 
Locke not just as an internationalist collaborator but also as a critic who gave 
voice to the culture of modernity itself by illuminating the differentiating 
(function) that modernity might serve and seeing New Negro artists as its 
medium.  
 
II. “Really Vital Modernism” 
 
Not as a picture merely, but as a constant devotee throughout all the 
other changes in his art, Verhaeren, so lately and lamentably gone, is to 
be accounted the great exponent of modernism in poetry.  In so styling 
him, we rate as the really vital modernism in the art, not the cult of 
sheer modernity of form and mood,--the ultra-modernism in which the 
poetic youth exults, but that more difficult modernity of substance 
which has as its aim to make poetry incorporate a world-view and 
reflect the spirit of its time.18      
                                                           
17 Locke defended his choice in an article that appeared in the Survey Graphic magazine, 
Harlem, along side Reiss’s drawings.  See “Harlem Types,” (Survey Graphic 53, no. 11, March 1, 
1925) 
18 Locke, “Emile Verhaeren,” 35  
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Locke revealed his expectations of modern artistic expression in the 
1917 essay, “Emile Verhaeren,” a remembrance of the now forgotten Belgian 
modernist poet.  Locke celebrates Verhaeren because of his ‘vital’ modernism.  
To Locke, Verhaeren’s modernism was substantive because it captured the 
‘past’ just as it was abandoned in favor of the extraordinary transformation of 
the new age, while refusing the excessive subjectivism that modern experience 
inspired in some artists.  Locke saw in Verhaeren’s work a “reverent 
vandalism,” which remembered the past while setting it aside for the new, the 
modern and the vital.   Like the new ‘Negro’ poet, whose novelty was 
revealed in his refusal of representative responsibilities in favor of a “vital 
Negro poetry,” Verhaeren inhabited a transitional and transformational 
period in the arts, “the doubting period in poetry, when poets were sure of 
nothing but their own inner experiences, and of these, in a morbidly subjective 
way”19 but nevertheless resisted the temptations of ‘subjectivism,’ turning 
instead to the worldliness of the modern city.     
Emile Verhaeren was born May 21, 1855, in Saint Amand lez-Puers, 
Belgium and died in 1916.   Although quite famous in Europe during his 
lifetime, he has since been forgotten.   He wrote some 30 collections of poetry, 
remarkable for variety of subject and his extraordinary formal range.   Critics 
described Verhaeren’s  first book, Les Flammandes [The Flemish] (1883), as 
“strong, vivid, brutal… violent, as course, as full of animal spirits, as the 
pictures of Breugel the Elder, Teniers, or Jan Steen.”20   Concern for social 
problems and the effects of the modern urban environment animated much of 
                                                           
19 Ibid. 35 
20 Amy Lowell, Six French Poets: Studies in Contemporary Literature (New York: Garland 
Publishing Inc., 1967). 
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his later work.    A 1915 New York Times review of Stephan Zweig’s Verhaeren 
put it thus: 
 
…M. Verhaeren is modern in every sense of the abused word.  
What his fellow-countryman, Constantin Meunier, has done in 
clay and bronze, he has achieved in words.  Emile Verhaeren is 
the poet of new and ugly cities, of crowded places of factories, 
steamships, telephones and all the newest wonders of science 
and mechanical skill.  He cannot tarry long in Florence; it is pale, 
old and meagre.  But London, alive and smoky, Flanders, 
rollicking Berlin, Paris—these hold him… he rides up and down 
the streets for hours at a time on the top of the buses, watching 
the crowds and listening to the clamor.  The noise of industry 
becomes the music of his verse…21 
 
For the reviewer, Verhaeren is a medium of the modern, his poetic voice 
captures the cacophony and hullabaloo of the modern city.  Fascinated by 
every experience of modernity, Verhaeren mirrors them in his words.    
The anonymous reviewer of Zweig’s book on Verhaeren is not the first 
to see him as modernity’s voice.  Writing in 1915, the critic Amy Lowell22 
characterizes Verhaeren as a modern “prophet,” who gives voice to modernity 
and revels in it, whatever its chaos, cacophony and ill effects.  Lowell writes,   
“A brooding Northerner, Verhaeren sees the sorrow, the travail, the 
sordidness, going on all about him, and loves the world just the same, and 
wildly believes in a future in which it shall somehow grind itself back to 
beauty.”23   
                                                           
21 Author unknown, “Verhaeren: Stephan Zweig’s Appreciation of Belgium’s Post 
Philosopher,” The New York Times, January 3, 1915.  
22  “(born Feb. 9, 1874, Brookline, Mass., U.S. — died May 12, 1925, Brookline) U.S. critic and 
poet. Born into the prominent Lowell family of Boston, she devoted herself to poetry at age 28 
but published nothing until 1910. Her first volume, A Dome of Many-Coloured Glass (1912), was 
succeeded by Sword Blades and Poppy Seed (1914), which included her first poems in free verse 
and what she called "polyphonic prose." She became a leader of Imagism and was noted for 
her vivid and powerful personality and her scorn of conventional behavior. Her other works 
include Six French Poets (1915), Tendencies in Modern American Poetry (1917), and John Keats, 2 
vol. (1925).”  http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/349816/Amy-Lowell 
23 Lowell, Six French Poets, 38 
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Locke concurs with these critics about Verhaeren’s modernism.   But 
Locke insists that it is not fascinated by the ‘new’ to be neatly divorced from 
the “dead past.” Locke de-emphasizes Verhaeren’s role as a founder of 
Symbolism in modern poetry, taking the substance of Verhaeren’s poetry, 
instead of its formal, Symbolist attributes, as the source of its modernism.  
Locke argues that Verhaeren’s is a “…modernity of substance… [of] getting 
the real world into the microcosm of art without shattering either one or the 
other…,”24 According to Locke, Verhaeren largely achieves this in his first 
book Les Flammandes [The Flemish].  Indeed, “….Verhaeren’s modernism was 
wrested from the fin-de-siécle aestheticism of…decadence…,”25 which Locke 
associates with solipsistic formalism.   
Lowell and other critics suggest that in his second book of poems, Les 
Moines [The Monks], Verhaeren retreats from modernism.  But Locke sees yet 
another expression of it.    Lowell dismisses Les Moines, calling it  “…a sad 
book, a faded book.  The monasteries are here, but bathed in the light of a pale 
sunset… There is nothing in Les Moines to detain us...”26   Nevertheless, 
according to Locke and contra Lowell, Verhaeren’s turn toward the cloister 
did not represent a “recantation of modernism”  I will quote Locke extensively 
here: 
 
A reaction from realism [The Monks] undoubtedly was, but it is 
to Verhaeren’s credit that he never confounded modernity with 
a particular technique or a particular type of subject.  The Monks 
is as modernistic as Les Flammandes.  His familiarity and 
sympathy for what he is dealing with conceals the iconoclasm; 
his is a reverent vandalism.  ‘Dwellers, long before death in a 
                                                           
24 Alain Locke, “Emile Verhaeren,” in Stewart, Jeffrey ed., The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A 
Selection of His Essays on Art and Culture, (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983), 35 – 38, p. 
35 
25 Ibid.  
26 Lowell, Six French Poets, 16 
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mystic and extra human world’ and ‘You who alone still hold, 
upright, your dead God over the modern world’ are written not 
in the mood of retreat, but of recall.  Trailing humanity as ever, 
Verhaeren cathecizes it in the heart of the cloister, and chides it 
there for solving the problems of life in an artificial, selfish and 
futile way.  Having disdained aestheticism, he rejects asceticism 
too.  The place of poetry he says in the splendid apostrophe Aux 
Moines is in its own temple in the midst of life and not with 
   ‘Men of a dead and distant day,-- men 
   Broken but living still,--poets, too. 
   Who cannot bear with us the common lot.’ 
Reverently, Verhaeren shuts the door to the Middle Ages.27   
 
Les Moines represents something of a parting shot from ‘realism,’ against 
which Symbolism was proposed.  Nevertheless, to Locke, the true mark of 
Verhaeren’s modernism is that he refuses to only see it enacted through 
formalism. Further, for Locke, modern poetry need not only give voice to the 
transformative experience of modern, urban life.   Locke argues that in Les 
Moines, Verhaeren refuses to abandon what seems to some critics to be ‘old-
fashioned’ or non-modern content.   Instead, Verhaeren occupies the modern 
moment as a moment of transition whose function is to condition how 
particular content be apprehended and expressed.  Ultra-modernist formalism 
will not do for it confounds “technique” with spirit, itself according to Locke 
(and Georg Simmel) to be uncovered in objectification of ‘life’ in the modern 
world, as I argued in Chapter Three.  And yet, Locke finds in Verhaeren’s 
cloister, in this distinctly pre-modern symbol, in this anachronism, 
‘humanism,’ what he sees as a definitively modern ethic.   Note here the nicely 
rhymed parallel between excessive aestheticism and asceticism.  The ‘cloister’ 
does not befit humanism, which by implication, ought to seek sources beyond 
the self.  Verhaeren “cathecizes” humanism in the cloister, while, at the same 
time, “chiding” it there, suggesting that humanism is “preserved” in the 
                                                           
27 Ibid. 35 - 36 
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cloister, at the same moment it is foresworn by its context, whose ascetic 
setting is too self-referential for the ‘humanism’ that Locke desires.   Thus, 
Locke does not understand Verhaeren to redeem the past (as symbolized by 
the cloister), but to raze it.  And yet Verhaeren’s “vandalism” does not signify 
a complete rejection of the past and its particularity.  “His is a reverent 
vandalism,” implying that Verhaeren has at one and the same time a duty to 
respect the past, especially the humanity in it, while clearing space for a new, 
and as we will see, distinctly modern form of humanism.  
Speculating that Verhaeren may have written Les Moines to “prove to 
the world that he could do things that were not violent,”28 Lowell dismisses 
Les Moines.   Verhaeren may have, as Lowell, writes, “[hurled] along upon 
[modernity] in a whirlwind of extraordinary poetry,”29 but for Locke this is 
only one, and perhaps not the most compelling aspect of his modernism.  
‘Life,’ and the ‘humanism’ it demands cannot properly be attended to 
ascetically (or, as we have seen, through aesthetic formalism).     
 That Locke illustrates this “moment” of suspension in Verhaeren’s 
oeuvre, in which he pauses between eras to take stock, before closing the door 
on the past, is significant.  But transition is more than its moment.  “The trials 
and labors of this course [shutting the door to the Middle Ages], Verhaeren 
seems to have realized, in anticipation; then later in painful actuality.  The 
temple of modern art was to be sought in an immense and towering chaos.  
And being the universe itself, the problem was not to find a place for it, but to 
find a place in it for the poet.”30   Accordingly, in Les Moines can be found just 
an inkling of the thorny work of the poet who straddles the border between 
                                                           
28 Lowell, Six French Poets, 6 
29 Ibid. 44 
30 Locke, “Emile Verhaeren,” 36 
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past and present.  The modern poet, who has “shut the door to the past,” and 
by extension his own materials, must find his place amidst an all-consuming 
and “towering chaos,” while refusing the temptations of ultra-modernism and 
its dangerous subjectivism.    
Locke treats Verhaeren’s next publications, Les Soirs (1887 ) and Les 
Débacles (1888) as records of the “personal struggle” attending this aesthetic 
one.  Verhaeren, unlike other modernists, grapples successfully with the 
“…doubting period in poetry, when poets were sure of nothing but their own 
inner experiences…,”31 ultimately avoiding subjectivism.  I quote Locke at 
length here: 
 
No depth or variety of this experience did Verhaeren leave 
unexplored.— 
 ‘I, too, would have my crown of thorns 
 Each thought a thorn upon the brow.’ 
But while the symbolists reveled in their subjectivity, Verhaeren 
strove mightily against it as the besetting solipsism he must 
escape to reach a vitally modern art… [for] he found no 
satisfaction in a phantom or an exiled beauty of the inner 
world… Groping towards what is real and vital in the world at 
large, he says of himself, ‘I have been a coward and have fled the 
world of futile egoism.’  Out of a polar darkness of this 
experience, like Henley, Verhaeren saw a new vision, not 
Henley’s indomitable self however but the redeeming World.”32 
 
According to Locke, the symbol of this achievement—Verhaeren’s finding of 
himself in the “redeeming World”— is the “place of the City in [his] poetry.”  
Thus, against those critics who would see in Verhaeren’s city mere cacophony 
and chaos to be lifted to poetic language through onomatopoeia and 
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technique,33  Locke insists that Verhaeren’s city is neither an unadulterated 
source for modern form nor of the “indomitable self.”  The city provides 
Verhaeren the perspective with which to engage subjects both the present and 
past.  The city  
 
[symbolizes] modern life… it stands for an attitude and 
treatment of his subject which he carries throughout his art.  The 
light source of his vision, it determines all the values of his art: 
we find it by the shadows it casts even when it is out of the 
picture, as in the depiction of what he not equivocally calls 
Illusory Villages and Ghostly Countrysides,--since they too must 
be keyed to his standard of art,--the real, the throbbingly actual,-
-which first revealed itself to him as an artistic criterion in the 
life of the Tentacular Cities.  It is obviously not the city as such,-- 
indeed Verhaeren never quite escaped his old preoccupation with 
peasant folk and country life in all their Flemish provinciality,--but the 
city as a symbol, as a point of view, behind which we glimpse 
Verhaeren’s real gods, Humanity and Force.34 [my emphasis]  
 
According to Lowell, the city is the wellspring of Verhaeren’s formal 
modernism.  It is a place full of action and energy, steam and vibration, 
sounds Verhaeren records in a language that corresponds to it.  For Locke, the 
city is not place but perspective: it represents an attitude that refuses self-
absorption and provides a frame of reference from which to poetize ‘life,’ in its 
past and present forms.   The city provides not sound as Lowell suggests, but 
shining light: so bright as to cloak the country’s provincialism but stand the 
remainder—“the real, the throbbingly actual”—a standard for modern art and 
conversely the perspective that ordains Verhaeren’s “preoccupation with 
peasant folk”— in sharp relief. The city, furthermore, reveals Verhaeren to 
                                                           
33 I should mention that to Lowell, Verhaeren was a master of such formal devices.  She writes, 
“No matter how onomatopoeic he becomes, no matter how much he alliterates, or whatever 
other devices he makes use of, he never becomes claptrap.” P. 39 Still, what is important to 
Lowell here is Verhaeren’s poetic mastery and is quite different from the achievement Locke 
attributes to him.  
34 Locke, “Emile Verhaeren,” 36 
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Verhaeren as distanced from his subject matter, while nevertheless making 
possible the proximity to this material the poet would require to convert it to 
content for his work.    
  Locke finds the substance and source of Lowell’s observation that 
Verhaeren “[hurled] along upon [modernity] in a whirlwind of extraordinary 
poetry.” Locke characterizes Verhaeren’s ‘pilot’ as ‘Force,’ as the ‘infinite 
energy” of modern life. According to Locke, ‘Force’ is the real ‘hero’ of 
Verhaeren’s poetry: “an infinite energy…carrying life with or without its will 
to destiny: the divinity of the world is its moving energy, and the divinity in 
man the cosmic enthusiasm of it all.” 35 So extraordinary is this modern force 
that all things—“nature and man, city and country, emotion and fact” become 
“manifestations of it.”36  Thus, “realism in fact never attained a completer 
triumph than in these depictions, genre pictures in themselves but set in an 
epical series and moving with an epical force.”  Verhaeren’s realism 
(contrasted against the ultra-modern poetic form) reveals itself in how he 
represents the modernity that actualizes ‘genre pictures’ by vitalizing them—
making them ‘visible’ in new ways.  Locke is quick to point out that if 
Verhaeren romanticizes anything in these poems, “he idealizes the force…but 
never the subject,” suggesting that Verhaeren attends to the subject, the ‘genre 
picture,’ by vivifying their particularity instead reconfiguring them as 
‘symbols’ or ‘concepts.’   
  That Verhaeren pays attention to particularity by refusing the modern 
impulse to symbolize it (from a necessarily super-subjective position) 
constitutes, at least in part, the humanism of his poetry.  “The humanism that 
is the counterpart of this world-view is indeed a rare emotion.  Verhaeren only 
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at times achieves it.  His style records a perilous quest for it.”37 We might note 
here the parallel in Locke’s assessment between Verhaeren’s personal struggle 
to avoid both ultra-modernism and Henleyan super-subjectivity and his life-
long aesthetic endeavor to reveal the particularity of his subjects.  Both are 
made possible in and by modernity.  In each case, the ‘self’ is decentered, 
opening up the possibility of a distinctly modern temper, which understands 
the ‘self’ to be of the “redeeming World” along side other particulars.   
To clarify, returning again to Verhaeren’s rejection of 'ultra-
modernism,’ a poetic fad that so tempted, by Locke’s account, other modernist 
poets.    While other poets “reveled in their subjectivity,” which itself is 
demanded by modernity’s destruction of ‘past’ objects for poetic expression, 
Verhaeren refuses the temptations of high symbolism and sacrifices, at the 
same time, the appealing possibility of Henleyan super-subjectivity.  
 
Out of the…darkness of this experience, like [W.E.] Henley,38 
Verhaeren saw a new vision, not Henley’s indomitable self, 
however, but the redeeming world.  Like Henley’s though, 
Verhaeren’s discovery was made in the heart of the metropolis, 
where the necessity of finding an excuse for life is if anywhere 
imperative.  In life as it showed itself there, most crude and 
common, but most real, Verhaeren grasped a new objective, that 
was not merely the release he desired from subjectivism, but a 
new world for poetry to conquer.39   
Verhaeren’s choice, though manifest in his poetry and taking place with 
modernity as a backdrop, is a result of a real personal struggle.  Verhaeren 
rejects the comforts of the ‘self,’ electing instead to attend to the world, in its 
dynamic variety, in his poetry.  When compared to other critics, particularly 
Lowell, Locke de-emphasizes Verhaeren’s identity as a ‘modern poet,’ 
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drawing the reader’s attention instead to the objects of Verhaeren’s attention: 
the Flemish, “Ghostly Country-Sides,” “Illusory Villages,” the extraordinary 
Force that characterizes and inhabits the modern moment.  Verhaeren the 
poet, like the new ‘Negro’ poets with whom Locke concerns himself later, 
becomes a ‘medium,’ whose instrument—poetry—reveals the ‘fact’ of 
modernity, the effects of its Force and the Humanism it may inspire on ‘life.’  
Still, that Verhaeren the poet struggles personally to articulate a ‘self’ oriented 
to the world reveals that for Locke, Verhaeren is not only a medium whose 
poetry reveals the ‘fact’ of modernity but also a person, like other persons, 
shaped by the dynamic flux of modern life.     Though Locke does not directly 
quote Henley’s well-known poem, Invictus, it does seem that when he 
compares Verhaeren’s struggle to that of Henley, he has Invictus in mind.  
Verhaeren refuses to become the poet who retreats into self from the world:  
“The world itself is most disdained of all, 
And hands that hope to seize the light  
Stretch toward the vague and unattainable.” 
Confronted with the same choice, Locke understands Henley to turn not to the 
temptations of ultra-modern form but instead to the comforts of the self.   
 
“Invictus” 
 
Out of the night that covers me, 
Black as the Pit from pole to pole, 
I think whatever gods may be 
For my unconquerable soul.  
In the fell clutch of circumstance 
I have not winced nor cried aloud. 
Under the bludgeoning of chance 
My head is bloody, but unbowed. 
Beyond this place of wrath and tears 
Looms but the Horror of the shade, 
And yet the menace of the years 
Finds, and shall find, me unafraid. 
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It matters not how strait the gate, 
How charged with punishments the scroll, 
I am the master of my fate: 
I am the captain of my soul.40  
 Verhaeren, unlike Henley, seeks not to shore up his soul; to move “beyond 
this place of wrath and tears” and to achieve captainship over his identity.  
Rather, he reaches out into a “vague and unattainable world.”    
In Locke’s view, Verhaeren must reject the guarantees of the ‘self’ to 
achieve “Humanism.”  There is, if we extrapolate from Locke’s reading of 
Verhaeren, no self-identity to be sought beyond or outside of the world.  
“Humanity” and expressiveness must be achieved in it.   That Locke arrives at 
his portrayal of Verhaeren’s poetic objective by comparing not just style but 
two accounts of self-identity in poetry is suggestive.  Here, I want to suggest, 
we see the makings of what later became the “self-expressiveness” Locke 
attributes to New Negro artists, not self-identity shored up against the 
external forces of misrepresentation and misrecognition but the bringing to 
being of ‘self’ deeply embedded in the modern context.     
Verhaeren articulates modernity and reveals that to Locke, artwork 
attends to ‘life,’ seeing it particularized in the realm of aesthetics, as I argued 
in Chapter Three.    Verhaeren does not always achieve the humanist attention 
to ‘life’ in his poetry that Locke celebrates. “On this score,” Locke argues, “he 
is not to be judged by the style of his earlier or even of his middle period.  In 
the one, he dehumanized man in a cold relentless portraiture…in the other, he 
over animated nature… and seems to have put into inanimate life all he took 
out of the human subject.”41  By associating humanism so strongly with 
Verhaeren’s stylistic choices, Locke indicates that it is an ethic that exceeds 
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one’s individual psychology by taking into consideration the particularity of 
the aesthetic subject. Locke fails to directly clarify—at least in “Emile 
Verhaeren—whether “humanism” in poetry affects “humanism” in the world 
of actual relations.   This is apparent where Locke’s refers to the relationship 
between form and content in Verhaeren’s work. 
 
Style for Verhaeren was…the corollary of his content and 
message.  His periods of style follow his philosophy, and the 
form, determined as Zweig so aptly says by “inner necessity” is 
the genuine idiom of his thought.  Whether traditional or free in 
metre, symbolist or realistic in his imagery, Verhaeren, unlike so 
many modern poets, is never exploiting a technique or form 
merely.  His style is dictated by the idea.42 
 
On the one hand, the poet attends to his subject by letting its content offer up 
the most sensible form.  On the other, Verhaeren has his own “philosophy,” 
and his “idea” dictates the appearance of the subject to the poet.  It is 
nevertheless clear that to Locke, Verhaeren achieves excellence—“really vital 
modernism” by allowing his poetry to “incorporate a world view”  instead of 
simply applying a “vision,” in the form of ‘form,’ to the subjects of his poetry.  
Locke does not describe a fully “reciprocal” relationship between the 
poet and his subjects as, to borrow again from Edwards, “an originating 
appeal that is answered [but instead] the structure of mutual answerability,” 
between the poet and his subjects.    Thus, there is no collaboration between 
the poet and his subjects in this account.  And yet, I suggest that we can find 
here a proposal about the domain of relations among modern poets and their 
subjects.  These relations are “reciprocal” because the successful modern poet 
turns to the subject for its own definition vis-à-vis form.  I argued above that 
Locke associates ultra-modern form—solipsism and self-reference—with self-
                                                           
42 Ibid. 37 
132  
 
identity and “humanism” with an outward-reaching self.  I want to propose 
here preliminarily that we can see in this, one of Locke’s early works of 
literary criticism, the makings of a kind of aesthetic reciprocity or 
cosmopolitanism, in which the poet attends to a subject by articulating its 
particularity and complexity vis-à-vis his application of most referential and 
expressive form.   
Still, in the final section of “Emile Verhaeren,” Locke extrapolates from  
Verhaeren’s aesthetic reciprocity some ‘real world’ objectives, that Verhaeren, 
through not fault of his own, is ultimately unable to achieve.  
  
Practically, as it seems now, Verhaeren has been robbed by 
circumstance of his greatest triumph, the achievement of 
Europeanism.  Coming into French literature, with an essentially 
Teutonic temperament, he mediated much of what was common 
to these two cultures, and to the time and the larger aspects of 
modern life.  There is no hedging the fact that racial difference 
made possible his achievement… Ideally… there has been a 
fusion of notions,--the definition of Force and Change, 
essentially Teutonic, with the humanitarian and cosmic scope so 
typical of the Gallic conception.  Verhaeren was one of the great 
Europeans, who did much to fuse alien cultures in terms of their 
common problems… 
Locke applies here the precursor to his later understanding of culture as 
marking durable traditions (‘Teutonic’ Force and Change, Gallic 
Humanitarianism) and difference as one half of the modern social dialectic 
(differentiation/assimilation).  Here, durable traditions inhere in difference 
that itself makes possible what for Locke is extraordinary about Verhaeren’s 
work: it “fuses” two different ‘traditions’ into a greater whole.  But  because of 
“circumstance,” Verhaeren is unable to see achieved the best potential 
‘result’— Europeanism—of his poetic endeavors.  If we take seriously the idea 
that Locke’s assessment reveals Verhaeren to be a cosmopolitan poet, because 
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of the ‘structure of reciprocity’ that defines his most successful work, we can 
see at least in this early work, Locke attempts to see substantiated in artwork 
the cosmopolitan imperative that all humans be assumed to belong to the 
same community.  Here, Locke seems to suggest that ‘circumstances,’ 
including Verhaeren’s reception by the public,  hypostasizes difference and 
falls short of the fusion that Locke sought.         
In any case, Locke took some critics to task because they “reversed 
Verhaeren’s values, making the laureate of Belgium… greater than Verhaeren, 
apostle of Europeanism,” an argument he echoes later when he chides critics 
of the Harlem Renaissance for focusing too much on the subjectivity of 
‘Negro’ poets instead of the ‘work’ in the “general stream of culture,” he saw 
their artwork performing.    “[Properly] speaking, cosmopolitanism of culture 
goes with the cosmic scope of his philosophy.  Because of its deep 
humanitarianism, [however] his nationalism is as big of his 
cosmopolitanism.”43  Here, Locke seems to argue that Verhaeren’s 
cosmopolitan impulse is suggested, not by ‘worldliness’ but instead by 
Europeanism, thereby seeing some differences toppled—those nation and 
language—and insisting on others (Europeanism against the rest of the 
world). Verhaeren’s humanism is just as much an element of his attention to 
the particular (an expression of a ‘vibrant nationalism’) as it is of the 
cosmopolitan impulse. Verhaeren’s poetry reveals a decidedly humanist 
practice, opening his subject in its particularity up to a broader reception.      
As I argued in Chapters Two and Three, Locke insists that the 
evolution of difference and the social forms it begets is an historical process: 
different ages reveal new articulations of older concepts and practices.  
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Verhaeren’s function, in this modern moment, was to see national particulars 
fused under the banner of Europeanism.  Who could predict, based on this 
argument, what the future might bring?  Thus, at this moment in 1917, critics 
and their publics ought to have recognized Verhaeren as a Europeanist 
because he fused two (national) particulars so that they no longer belong in 
toto to the national cultures that, by Locke’s account, generated them.  
 
 
III. “The Travail and Destiny of an Age:”  
Locke remarks obtusely at the end of “Emile Verhaeren,” that  
 
[modernists] of all stripes could not foresee that the 
‘transvaluation of values’ they were clamoring for was not the 
work of philosophy or art but the travail and destiny of an age. 
Perhaps Verhaeren’s superlative claim is this representativeness 
he has gained by incorporating in his poetry the issues of the 
age; but if it should prove that through war men can attain a 
unity of which they could only dream in peace, then the prophet 
in Verhaeren will contest the poet’s fame.44   
 
Verhaeren is worthy of celebration for a number of reasons.  He “incorporated 
in his poetry” the social issues of the place (Belgium) and articulates the spirit 
of the modern age.  Locke’s objective in the essay is to articulate how 
Verhaeren, a modern poet, ought to be received.  “[As] either, [Verhaeren of 
Tout la Flandre or Verhaeren, apostle of Europeanism], he would be, as he 
says of his countrymen in Ceux de Liege, ‘secure beyond all praise… It is 
[nevertheless] to be pitied that in the last stage war broke the serenity of mood 
in which he could see and say that, ‘life goes on its cyclic way, and though 
man suffers, Nature seems to be carving a new face for her eternity.”45  
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Circumstance reduces the reception and ‘modernist’ meaning of Verhaeren’s 
poetry, encouraging critics to ignore or at least underestimate what, in Locke’s 
view, is the true work of Verhaeren, the modern poet: to express “the spirit of 
the age.”  Verhaeren, we learn from Locke’s remembrance, is the ‘true’ 
modernist, among all others (“modernists of all stripes”) because he is a 
medium of the transformative spirit of the age.    
 “Emile Verhaeren” is a precursor to Locke’s later cultural criticism on 
behalf of the Harlem Renaissance and its “New Negro” artists.  We can see 
here the hallmarks of Locke’s criticism.  Like most critics, Locke elucidates 
how an artist or work of art ought to be received. Locke situates Verhaeren in 
a particular moment—the modern. Verhaeren is a modern poet not because of 
the formal technique of his art but because he occupies the modern as a 
transitional and transformative period that produces new perspectives from 
which and through which to attend to the past as passing as in Les Moines, to 
his various subjects and finally to the modern experience itself as in the later 
collections.  His particular brand of modernism is also ‘humanist’ because by 
refusing the temptations of super-subjectivity, Verhaeren is able instead to 
fully attend to his subjects in all their particularity. Verhaeren thereby 
participates in the ‘work’ of the age: ‘the exaltation of all life’ under 
modernity’s ‘transvaluing of all values.’    
Locke sees the same modernism animating the work of New Negro 
poets in the early 20th century.  To make that case, I turn here to The New 
Negro: an Interpretation, the 1925 anthology for which Locke is best known.  I 
begin by comparing and contrasting “Emile Verhaeren” to  “Negro Youth 
Speaks,” an essay in the The New Negro: an Interpretation,  in which Locke 
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“registers the transformation of the inner and outer life” of the New Negro by 
characterizing the “younger generation” and its artwork.  
Like Verhaeren, the “younger generation” of ‘Negro’ artists also 
occupies a transitional period in artwork, in which black artwork is freed of 
the propagandistic impulse and allowed to emanate instead from black life.  
That they capture “folk life” from their subjects, as did Verhaeren from the 
monks or the Flemish, does not detract from their modernism.  Of Verhaeren, 
Locke writes “[by] welding his figures to their background, like Rodin 
scarcely freeing them from the rock, he gains his essential purpose, which is to 
exhibit in an art free from conventional illusion and sentimental 
overemphasis, the underlying vitalism of the universe.”46  Verhaeren ‘frees’ 
his folk subjects from ‘conventional illusion’—romanticized narration—and 
himself from ultra-modernistic solipsism, and thereby ably portrays “the real, 
the throbbingly actual.” New Negro poets ‘free’ their subjects from 
propagandistic treatment, exhortation and sentimentalism while freeing 
themselves from the duty to “be representative,” to speak on behalf of ‘Negro’ 
causes or portray ‘Negro’ life positively.      
 
Racial expression as a conscious motive, it is true, is 
fading out of our latest art, but as surely the age of truer, 
finer group expression is coming in—for race expression 
does not need to be deliberate to be vital.  Indeed, at best 
it never is.  This was the case with our instinctive and 
quite matchless folk art, and begins to be the same again 
as we approach cultural maturity in a phase of art that 
promises now to be fully representative.  The interval 
between has been an awkward age, where from the 
anxious desire an attempt to be representative much that 
was really unrepresentative has come; we have lately had 
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an art that was stiltedly self-conscious and racially 
rhetorical rather than racially expressive.47 
 
Like Verhaeren, who occupies his own “awkward age”—“the doubting period 
in poetry,” New Negro artists are situated in a transitional period, up to which 
point the possibilities of their poetry have been limited.  Verhaeren rejects 
(ultra) modernist form and Henleyan super-subjectivity for a modernist 
perspective as symbolized by the city, while New Negro artists abandon 
‘false’ self-consciousness and ‘now’ living in and contextualized by the city, 
produce artwork that ‘exalts in Negro life.’   The mature art which is to follow 
the awkward age expresses a “quite matchless folk art” but only because just 
as Locke argues modern (“culturally mature”) art can, “folk art” discloses life 
as it is lived.  
The younger generation has thus achieved an objective attitude 
toward life. Race for them is but an idiom of experience, a sort of 
added enriching adventure and discipline, giving subtler 
overtones to life, making it more beautiful and interesting, even 
if more poignantly so… …[They] have shaken themselves free 
from the minstrel tradition and the following nets of dialect, and 
through acquiring ease and simplicity in serious expression, 
have carried the folk-gift to the altitudes of art.48 
  The “younger generation’s” artwork is artwork precisely because it 
refuses to represent a people by simply rendering ‘dialect’ while at the same 
time refusing to simply entertain. Like Verhaeren, ‘Negro’ artists are of the 
modern moment, Verhaeren “reverently…closes the door to the Middle 
Ages.” New Negro poets, too, “reverently close the door” to the past  recover 
from the past a ‘folk gift.’  
 
Here for the enrichment of American and modern art, among 
our contemporaries, in a people who still have the ancient key, 
are some of the things we thought culture had forever lost.   Art 
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cannot disdain the gift of a natural irony, of a transfiguring 
imagination, of rhapsodic Biblical speech, of dynamic musical 
swing, of cosmic emotion such as only the gifted pagans knew, 
of a return to nature, not by way of the forced and worn 
Romanticism, but through the closeness of an imagination that 
has never broken kinship with nature.49 
 
Locke associate ‘Negro’ life with the ancient past by expounding upon its 
primitivism, much it would seem like non-black artists and hangers-on who 
hoped to recover an ameliorative primitivism (a salve against the demands of 
the modern age) in the so-called “Negro Vogue.” But Locke suggests more 
complex work for New Negro artists.   This passage follows a brief description 
of Harlem Renaissance artists in all their variety.50 Locke pithily elucidates 
how each artist (Miles Fisher, Langston Hughes, Roland Hayes and Countee 
Cullen) informed and inspired by the “emotional endowment” of ‘Negro’ life, 
weaves ‘Negro life’s’ ‘folk art’ bequest with and within ‘other’ artistic forms 
(“the social novel,” “lyric thought,” “satire,” “free verse,” etc.), thereby 
producing a distinctly modern art.  “Natural irony, transfiguring 
imagination…” are not essential characteristics of black people but of black 
life as expressed in ‘folk art,’ which itself is taken up by modern, black artists.  
Locke argues, nevertheless, that modern black artists approach and reveal it 
from a modern perspective. This is what I understand him to mean when in a 
later essay, “Beauty Instead of Ashes,” published in April 18, 1928 issue of The 
Nation, he argues,  
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The modern recoil from the machine has deepened the 
appreciation of hitherto despised qualities in the Negro 
temperament, its hedonism, its nonchalance, its spontaneity; the 
reaction against oversophistication has opened our eyes to the 
values of the primitive…and finally the revolt against 
conventionality, against Puritanism…With this established 
reciprocity, there is every reason for the Negro artist to be more 
of a modernist than, on the average, than he yet is, but with each 
younger artistic generation the alignment with modernism 
becomes closer…The Negro schools have as yet no formulated 
aesthetic, but they will more and more profess, the new realism, 
the new paganism, and the new vitalism of contemporary art.51  
 
Black artists, on this account, are already modern because they appropriate 
black life.  Yet at the same time, black artists modern because they will 
articulate the “new realism, the new paganism, and the new vitalism of 
contemporary art.”  They are modern precisely because they alienate art from 
black life and treat it (increasingly blithely) as though they have it to hand.   
 It would thus seem that unlike Verhaeren, who “reverently” closes the 
door to the past, that New Negro artists refuse to give it up.  But this, it seems 
to me, is not entirely the case.  Like Verhaeren attending to “the monks,” black 
artist do not attempt to recover traditions intact from a glorious past.  Though 
they vitalize ‘Negro life’ and its ‘folk art,’ they do so, as I have argued, from a 
distinctly modern perspective.  
The series of essays that frame ‘Negro’ artwork in The New Negro: an 
Interpretation characterize this modernism from a variety of perspectives.  
Locke’s stated purpose in The New Negro is “…to document the New Negro 
culturally and socially,-- to register the transformation of the inner and outer 
life of the Negro in America…”    Yet, the transformation cannot be fully 
reckoned with in the sociological terms that have been Locke’s bailiwick up to 
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this point.   Black artwork is animated by this transformation, which is so 
extraordinary that its effects are “…beyond the watch and guard of statistics… 
[so that] the three norns [the Sociologist, the Philanthropist, and the Race-
leader] who have traditionally presided over the Negro problem have a 
changeling in their laps.”52  Like the ‘Negro’ poet freed of the ‘duty’ to “be 
representative,” one mark of black modernity is that the “New Negro” is freed 
from the “Old Negro myth” in which he was forced to participate as “…more 
of a formula than a human being—a something to be argued about, 
condemned or defended, to be ‘kept down,’ or ‘in his place’ or ‘helped up,’ to 
be worried with or worried over, harassed or patronized, a social bogey or a 
social burden…”53  Arriving on the“…tide of Negro migration, northward and 
city-ward…”54 the transformation whose full meaning evades sociological 
study, philanthropy and politics, is a “surge of feeling” that is expressed vis-à-
vis artwork. 
No less than twenty-two essays (including Locke’s “Enter the New 
Negro,” “Youth Speaks,” “The Legacy of Ancestral Art,” and “the Negro 
Spirituals”), divided under two headings The Negro Renaissance and The New 
Negro in a New World, frame the comparatively rather short sections of prose, 
poetry, and drama.   The essays not only characterize the “New Negro” by 
differentiating him from his old “mythical” identity,55 they explore his 
situation in a variety of settings,56 while suggesting how these settings 
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Interpetation (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1925). 
56  James Weldon Johnson, “Harlem: The Culture Capital,” in The New Negro: an Interpretation, 
ed. Alain Locke (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1925), 301 - 311., Kelly Miller, “Howard: 
The National Negro University,” in The New Negro: an Interpretation, ed. Alain Locke (New 
York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1925), 312 - 322., Robert R Moton, “Hampton-Tuskegee: 
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condition his relationship to the ‘Negro’ past57 and insisting upon his 
relationship to the “American Tradition.”58   It is not necessary to explore all of 
these essays in detail. I do wish to note, however, the multiplicity of voices 
and perspectives that Locke selected both to contextualize ‘Negro’ art as 
distinctly modern and the ‘Negro’ as peculiarly “new.”    
 Two elements of black modernism stand out in “Enter the New Negro” 
as particularly important to Locke: first, as I mentioned in Chapter One, 
modern processes, such as industrialization and the Great Migration, bring 
differently situated black people (whose variety had previously been 
subsumed in the ‘Old Negro’ myth) together in the North’s urban centers and 
thereby makes immediately tangible that these communities are not 
homogenous, but characterized by diversity and internal differentiation, 
conditioning a kind of ‘intra-racial’ reciprocity and not just of the international 
sort that Edwards sees “practice” in the international setting.    
 
Here in Manhattan is not merely the largest Negro community 
in the world, but the first concentration in history of so many 
diverse elements of Negro life…Each… has come with its own 
separate motives and for its own special ends, but their greatest 
experience has been the finding of one another.  Proscription and 
prejudice have thrown these dissimilar elements into a common 
area of contact and interaction.  Within this area, race sympathy 
and unity have determined a further fusing of sentiment.59”    
 
                                                           
Missioners of the Mass,” in The New Negro: an Interpretation, ed. Alain Locke (New York: 
Albert and Charles Boni, 1925), 323 - 333. 
57  Arthur Schomburg, “The Negro Digs Up His Past,” in The New Negro: an Interpretation, ed. 
Alain Locke (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1925), 231 - 237., Locke, “The Art of the 
Ancestors.” 
58 Melville Herskovitz, “The Negro's Americanism,” in The New Negro: an Interpretation, ed. 
Alain Locke (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1925), 353 - 360., Charles S. Johnson, “The 
New Frontage on American Life,” in The New Negro: an Interpretation, ed. Alain Locke (New 
York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1925), 278 - 300. 
59 Locke, “Enter the New Negro.”  
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The city, just as it was for Verhaeren, is source of an aesthetic “point of view,” 
that of the city as a space of potential for the migrating masses.  Harlem is a 
“common area of contact and interaction” that (should) facilitate a “fusing of 
sentiment.”  The “fusing of sentiment” arises from differentiation a clear 
advantage of modern developments. As I suggested above, this modern 
constellation conditions in black artists a cosmopolitan attention to  black life 
and ‘the folk tradition’ that mirrors Verhaeren’s relationship to the past.     
 There are interesting similarities between what Locke celebrates in 
Verhaern’s poetry—its humanism, refusal of subjectivism, and “reverent 
vandalism of the past”— and his characterization of the work of “Negro” 
poetry—its vitalism, self-expressiveness, and attention to black life.  The 
emerging expressiveness and sturdy vitalism that Locke sees in “Negro” 
poetry, lead Locke to reject a political function for artwork.  In the next 
chapter, I compare Locke’s account of the ‘purpose’ of artwork to that of 
W.E.B. Du Bois.  While Locke refuses to see artwork serve a propagandistic 
function, W.E.B. Du Bois insists that it should, claiming that all black artwork 
should serve a social function—that of directly confronting and disproving 
misrepresentations of black people in the public sphere.  
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CHAPTER 5 
“[WE] ARE NOT A RACE PROBLEM.” 
 
The creative genius possesses such original unity of the 
subjective and objective, which has first to be divided so that it 
can be resuscitated in synthetic form in the process of 
cultivation.  This is why man’s interest in culture does not lie 
on the same level with pure self-development of the subjective 
spirit or with pure dedication to a cause; instead cultural 
interests are attached to a cause, occasionally as something 
secondary, reflex-like, as an abstract generality which reach 
beyond the innermost and immediate value impulses of the 
soul.1  
It has become something of a commonplace that articles about Alain 
Locke open with a reference to the better-known W.E.B. Du Bois.  So it is with 
Ross Posnock’s recent (and excellent) review of Alain Locke: Biography of a 
Philosopher.2 Posnock situates Locke with reference to the central conundrum 
facing the black intellectual in the 20th century, which Du Bois so beautifully 
evokes in The Souls of Black Folk, as “the ‘strange experience’ of “how it feels to 
be a problem.”  Drawing from the single work of fiction in Souls, “Of the 
Coming of John,” “…the most vivid and pained portrait of the ‘problem of 
being a black intellectual,” Posnock writes 
 
…in a displaced, symbolic autobiography, Du Bois meets the 
challenge of representing a newly emergent social type who 
seemed to affront every way of making sense of black identity in 
Jim Crow America.  Attending a provincial college, John Jones 
grows from rowdy frat boy to becoming intoxicated with ‘the 
world of thought.”  To represent, in 1903, a black man thinking 
pushed the perversity of intellection to an extreme.  John’s 
capacity for becoming lost in thought becomes the tale’s motif: 
listening to Lohengrin at the Metropolitan Opera, he is lost in 
aesthetic bliss, and the final scene of Du Bois’s story finds him 
humming Wagner’s music, barely aware of the onrushing 
                                                           
1 Simmel, “On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture.” p. 36 
2 Ross Posnock, “Black is Brillaint,” The New Republic, April 15, 2009, 
http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=e9d5f5c3-16b0-4506-ac08-2911400f4ad4. 
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lynching party that descends upon him… Eerily indifferent to 
his imminent demise, John in his trancelike absorption becomes 
unintelligible, a status that registers the black intellectual’s 
historical reality in that era: stranded in a no-man’s-land, 
seeming neither to know his place or to have a place, hence 
synonymous with enigma.3 
Du Bois, of course, was by no means so absorbed in ‘culture’ and the “world 
of thought” as to be reduced to inertia against the white racism that he 
skillfully depicts in “On the Coming of John.”  There is no need to rehearse Du 
Bois’s extraordinary intellectual, cultural and political achievements here.  
Nevertheless, as Posnock points out, “[for] all his accomplishments, Du Bois 
always believed that white racism… ‘has made me far less rounded as a 
human being than I should like to have been.’”4  In the Souls of Black Folk, Du 
Bois symbolized the experience of restriction by and because of ‘race’ as a 
“veil,” which limited the “spiritual strivings” of black folk, while necessarily 
spurring them to action.  Du Bois was the first to capture the tragic 
dimensions of this “problem” but “…later writers’ incarnations of the black 
intellectual, even when imbued with mordant wit and gallows humor, by and 
large remained garbed in tragedy for much of the century, as if born with a 
birthright of existential anguish.”5  
Against this intellectual backdrop, Locke is a singular figure.  As 
Posnock reminds us, “[he] declined the cloak of tragedy: ‘I am not a race 
problem. [He wrote upon his admission to Oxford University] I am Alain 
Leroy Locke.’”  He therefore “led a life in the key of paradox” occupying 
seemingly contradictory roles, that of ‘race man’ and ‘aesthete.’   But Locke’s 
refusal to be a problem was not merely a matter of his own extraordinary self-
confidence.  Locke’s entire corpus—the political theorization of ‘race,’ the 
                                                           
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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careful examination of the effects of race on culture, the accompanying 
insistence that culture nevertheless consists in apparently durable features and 
traditions that can be disarticulated from ‘race thinking,’ the astonishing 
output of cultural criticism of ‘Negro’ artwork— asserts fearlessly not just that 
“I am not a problem” but also that “we are not a problem.”   This is no stance 
to be taken up on one side of the ‘argument’ about the problem of race as it 
had countless times been articulated.  In light of the extraordinary context in 
which he lived—he was born in 1885 as Reconstruction failed and died in 1954 
before the Civil Rights Movement would gain its footing—the statement can 
best be understood as an act.    I want to suggest that we can uncover 
throughout his oeuvre of philosophical, socio-theoretical and critical texts, the 
performance of this statement as fact in plural form—we are not a problem—if 
we conceive of it as a series of acts,  which enact not just in speech but in 
cosmopolitan practice, “a political culture beyond the color line,” to quote 
Paul Gilroy.    The extraordinariness of Locke’s life-long refusal to play his 
assigned part—‘tortured by exclusion’— in the great tragedy of ‘race,’ of his 
paradoxical inhabitance of a cosmopolitan culture that did not yet exist cannot 
be underestimated, for he enacted this culture at the same time that he 
theorized the political, intellectual, social, and cultural conditions that had 
made it ‘impossible’ in the first place.   As I have argued, Locke reveals 
biological race and ‘race thinking’ as the corruptions of ‘life’ that they are, 
while insisting that ‘science’ and theory remain committed to attending to 
their effects: ‘race thinking’ not only reduced black people to ‘problems,’ it 
conditioned ‘group relations’ and if not defeated, would perennially prevent 
people from achieving “…better channels of group living.”6 In this chapter, to 
                                                           
6 Locke, Race Contacts, 85 
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further crystallize the meaning and impact of Locke’s refusal to see ‘Negro life’ 
objectified only as the “problem of the 20th century,” I examine what Leonard 
Harris has aptly named the “Great Debate” between W.E.B. Du Bois and 
Locke over the purposes of artwork.    Drawing on Harris’s The Great Debate: 
W.E.B. Du Bois vs. Alain Locke on the Aesthetic,”7 I first briefly characterize their 
dispute.  Harris contends that “whether literature can be the source of truth 
and beauty…meant considering simultaneously how it could perform the 
social role for creating respect for a people suffering from humiliation and self 
loathing,”8 I question how Harris characterizes the debate as primarily over 
“aesthetic sensibilities,” which reduces the conflict between Du Bois and 
Locke to a dispute over the function and possibility of ‘Beauty,” thereby 
failing to fully exemplify the cosmopolitan political theoretical potential of 
Locke’s attention to artwork and culture.   Drawing on Hannah Pitkin’s The 
Concept of Representation, I suggest that if we consider how Locke and Du Bois 
treat representativeness/representation, a clearer picture of the differences 
over political culture comes into view.  Second, drawing on “Criteria of Negro 
Art,” “The Propaganda of History,” and Souls of Black Folk, I first characterize 
Du Bois’s approach to artwork and its relationship to politics, then treating 
artwork as representation, I lay out the dispute between Du Bois and Locke as 
a debate about the function of artwork.  Third, I argue that although Du Bois 
and Locke do disagree over the function of artwork, Locke’s theorization of 
artwork is too complex to be captured by the notion of ‘function,’ or for that 
matter, ‘representation.’  Drawing on several of Locke’s essay about ‘Negro’ 
                                                           
7 Leonard Harris, “The Great Debate: W.E.B. Du Bois vs. Alain Locke on the Aesthetic,” 
Philosophia Africana 7, no. 1 (March 2004): 15 - 39. 
8 Ibid. 15 
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drama,  “Max Reinhardt Reads the Negro’s Dramatic Horoscope,” “The Negro 
and the American Stage” and “The Drama of Negro Life.”  
I. The Great Debate 
 W.E.B. Du Bois and Alain Locke engaged in a particularly contentious 
debate over artwork, to which the “younger artists” of the period, like Zora 
Neale Hurston, responded by producing works of art designed to irritate 
them.9   Du Bois insisted,  “…all art is propaganda and ever must be, despite 
the wailing of the purists… I do not care a damn for art that is not 
propaganda,”10 while Locke argued, “[m]y chief objection to propaganda, 
apart from its besetting sin of monotony and disproportion is that it 
perpetuates the position of group inferiority even crying out against it… It is 
too extroverted for balance or poise or inner dignity and self-respect.”11 
Locke’s biographer, Leonard Harris, contends that Du Bois and Locke’s 
disagreement is much more subtle than the above quotes suggest.  He argues 
that they ultimately agreed both about the social and political usefulness of 
artwork and its specific purpose, that it inspire the recognition of black people 
as “as possessing, or capable of possessing, character and moral virtues…” 
Both recognize that as long as black people were nearly always portrayed in 
                                                           
9 Hurston’s biographer Robert Hemenway wrote, “The manner in which these two stories 
[“Cordelia, the Crude,” by Wallace Thurman and “Smoke, Lillies and Jade,” by Bruce Nugent] 
came to be written was a part of the Bohemian impulse informing Fire!!’s proletarian esthetics.  
As Bruce Nugent tells the tale, after all submissions for the magazine were in and selections 
had been made, Thurman announced to the staff that they now had to find something that 
would get the issue banned in Boston—an idea Hurston endorsed.  They began thinking of 
‘what two tings just will not take,” and Thurman decided they would write about a 
streetwalker and a homosexual; after flipping a coin to determine the assignment, the final 
two stories for the magazine were completed.”  Zora Neale Hurston: A Literary Biography, 
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977.   
10 Du Bois, W.E.B.,  “Criteria of Negro Art,” in Huggins, Nathan, ed., Du Bois: Writings, New 
York, NY: Library Classics of the United States, 1986, p. 1000.  
11 Locke, Alain, “Art or Propaganda,” in Stewart, Jeffrey, ed., The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: 
A Selection of His Essays on Art and Culture, New York NY, Garland Publishing Inc., 1986, p. 27.  
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literature as inherently inferior, no individual black person, let alone the 
group, would likely receive honor.”12  
While it is remarkable that both authors contend that artistic expression 
played an important role in the project of emancipation (years before the 
critical theory of Adorno and Marcuse claimed autonomous art as a last resort 
of freedom), I disagree with how the subsequent scholarship assesses the way 
in which the two authors engage art for politics. The emphasis is on similarity: 
both, it is said, draw a connection between beauty and recognition, i.e. that 
persons who are seen as beautiful are also assumed to possess good character 
and moral virtues. But that Locke and Du Bois might concur on this is 
unoriginal and unsurprising; it is simply an application of the well-worn 
topos of aesthetics as an outward representation of inner values.   Emphasis 
on this superficial similarity actually conceals where the two part ways with 
reference to the relationship between the nature of the aesthetic and political 
objectives. 
As Harris would have it, the “debate” between Du Bois and Locke is 
not so great.  They agree, for example, that “an image of the black population 
as beautiful” is required if black people are to “receive honor.” Their primary 
conflict, on this reading, is over how “alternative images should be achieved.” 
The disagreement is thus primarily “aesthetic,” concerned with artistic 
methods and not with outcomes.  “The conflict,” Harris writes, “between The 
Crisis and Opportunity magazines; Du Bois’s criticism of Locke’s literary 
anthology The New Negro; the differences between Du Bois and Locke’s 
attitude toward Claude McKay’s novel, Home to Harlem; and Locke’s noted 
“Art or Propaganda?” response to Du Bois’s view of propaganda, made the 
                                                           
12 Harris, Leonard, “ The Great Debate:” W.E.B. Du Bois vs. Alain Locke on the Aesthetic,” 
Philosophia Africana, Volume 7, Number 1, March 2004, p. 16. 
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conflict between their aesthetic sensibilities visible and explicit.”13   Insisting 
that both Du Bois and Locke treat we might call the “beautification” of black 
people as the function of artwork, Harris confines their conflict to aesthetic 
judgment.  In fact, Harris argues “…Locke has within the corpus of his 
philosophy the resources to reject Du Bois’s criticism,14” thereby describing 
Locke’s objectives in Du Boisian terms.  In effect, both Du Bois and Locke insist 
that art serve the practical ends of “racial upliftment” and “liberation.”  Both 
see “racial upliftment” as a precondition for “liberation.”  Harris nevertheless 
prefers Locke’s approach, seeing it as “more efficacious and beneficial in 
creating a role for literature capable of substantively contributing to the defeat 
of humiliation and self-loathing,”15 which apparently prefigures black 
autonomy.  
Like Du Bois, Locke did expect New Negro artwork to have positive 
effects on how blacks viewed themselves; nevertheless, Harris minimizes their 
conflict over the function of art and exaggerates their differences over the 
nature of Truth.  First, Harris argues that Du Bois is best understood to take a 
realist and not a pragmatist view of truth16 that is revealed in Du Bois’s stance 
on artwork, implying that Du Bois believed that “…there [were] objective and 
                                                           
13 Ibid. 16 
14 “In short,” Harris writes further, “I suggest that Du Bois’s question—“what is the nature of 
the beautiful?” – is answered by Locke.” Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 “It was the ‘first steps toward sociology as the science of human action.’  That first step 
might be read as a step into a realist conception of truth, particularly the view that objectively 
real and discoverable objects exist.  As one historian noted, ‘Du Bois’s career is a 
tremendously inspiring example of how the quest for effective truth has productive 
consequences and leads to social action.’ That search was, however, enlivened by a realist 
conception of truth, not a pragmatist conception.   For James, ‘truth is one species of good and 
not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from the good, and coordinate with it.  The 
true is the nature of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for 
definite, assignable reasons.’ James’s provisional conception of truth was held along with the 
view that science offered a reasoning method of use in the social sciences, but not because it 
would provide truth as realists understand truth: objective and discoverable facts about 
reality.” Ibid. 17 
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aesthetic facts,” that could be revealed in artwork.  Thus, Harris contends, 
“[at] its best, art for Du Bois is based on objectively real essential properties—
properties attached in a fairly direct way to beauty-making properties.  There 
are social realities, for Du Bois, of which art, through beauty making 
properties and methods, is reality revealing.  Arguably, a central, if not the 
most important truth for art to reveal is the humanity of the black.”17  There 
are objectively true ‘social realities’ just as there are objectively beautiful 
artworks.   As propaganda, artwork reveals social truths and ‘objective’ 
qualities of beauty.  I suggest that for Du Bois, propagandistic truth is truth 
produced.  It ‘counters’ already existing accounts of the world and blacks’ role 
in it, implying that Du Bois was more pragmatic about truth than Harris 
suggests.   
  Having asserted Du Bois’s realism, in any case, Harris locates the ‘real’ 
source of the “great debate” between Du Bois and Locke. Essentially, 
according to Harris, Du Bois takes Locke to task for being unrealistic because 
he “ has…been seized with the idea that Beauty rather than Propaganda 
should be the object of Negro literature and art…”18 The more defensible 
argument, I think, is that Du Bois criticizes Locke for not being pragmatic.  In 
any case, Du Bois misunderstands (or at least mischaracterizes) Locke’s view 
of art by conflating “beauty” with “art” and dichotomizing it to propaganda.   
To Locke, ‘art’ does not serve a function as such, as much as it arises from a 
particular context—‘Negro’ life.  As I argued in Chapter Three, Locke 
celebrates both Verhaeren’s poetry and New Negro artwork for attending to 
life in its particularity and capturing the spirit of the age.  Harris concedes too 
much to Du Bois’s criticism here by ‘agreeing’ with Du Bois that Locke ought 
                                                           
17 Ibid. 
18 qtd in Harris, Ibid. 19 
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to take a functionalist view of artwork and then interpreting The New Negro, as 
I describe below, as an instrumentalist (on behalf of “Beauty”) anthology with 
some “subversive” moments.  According to Harris, Du Bois thought artwork 
was beautiful only if it were also propagandistic.  On Harris’s account, the 
primary difference between Locke and Du Bois is that where Du Bois insists 
that beautiful artwork is propagandistic artwork, Locke argues that ‘Beauty’   
could be revealed by all types of artwork, propagandistic or otherwise.  
Herein lies the second problem with Harris’s account: his treatment of Locke 
and Du Bois has at its core an essential ‘Negro’ about whom the ‘real’ social 
and aesthetic truth must be revealed.  Thus, Harris insists that Locke and Du 
Bois simply perceive the beautiful (in the real, essential ‘Negro’) in different 
ways.    
By my reading, Du Bois and Locke debate the function, and the 
attendant duties, of artwork as representation. Their conflict is not merely a 
matter of “aesthetic sensibility.”  It is much more profound.  Du Bois and 
Locke disagree, to draw from political theorist Hanna Pitkin, over “…the 
substance of the activity of representation.”19  In everyday uses of the term, 
‘representation’ can signify a ‘standing in for’ or an authorization to act in 
someone’s name, like a legal representative or a political delegate; it also refers 
to the making-present of that which cannot be seen: the conjuring of an idea or 
a concept; an image or a mood.  These everyday uses capture two accounts of 
political representation—the authorization view and ‘standing for’ 
representation—, which Pitkin explores in The Concept of Representation.    The 
former refers to the formal arrangements by which a representative is 
                                                           
19 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California Pres, 1967)., p. 114 
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authorized to act20 and the latter “…depends on the representative’s 
characteristics, on what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing 
something.”21  Standing for representation, Pitkin points out, “can be 
accomplished equally well with inanimate objects,”22 such as maps, flags, and 
works of art, and takes two different modes—descriptive, in which the 
representative makes present something absent by resemblance or reflection, 
or symbolic, “in which no resemblance or reflection is required… [and the 
connection between represented an representative] is of a different kind.”23   
According to Pitkin while each mode of representation implies a relationship 
between the representative and the represented (the representative is either 
authorized by the represented or corresponds to it) neither neither the 
authorization nor the ‘standing for’ view of representation “…takes account 
for the substance of the activity of representation as acting for others.”  If as a 
concept, representation is articulated at the intersection of politics and 
aesthetics, thinking about artists representing images on a canvas, experiences, 
observations, scenes or stories in a poem or a novel suggests that we need 
something more: a way of thinking about representing as an action, and not as 
the “ownership of action” from which authorization is derived. 
 
What is needed here is some kind of activity or way of acting 
that is the equivalent of the way in which pictures or maps or 
symbols correspond to or embody what they represent.  Any 
number of writers tell us that there must be some connection or 
relationship or tie between a representative and those for whom 
he acts; the difficulty lies in specifying what that tie is, in trying 
                                                           
20 “The basic features of the authorization view are these: a representative is someone who has 
been authorized to act.  This means that he has been given a right to act which he did not have 
before, while the represented has become responsible for the consequences of that action as if 
he had done it himself.”  Ibid. 39 
21 Ibid. 61 
22 Ibid. 11 
23 Ibid. 
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to characterize it.  It is spoken of… as a ‘connection,’ a ‘contact,’ a 
‘correspondence…’ We are variously told that his actions, or his 
opinions, or both must correspond to or be in accord with the 
wishes, needs, or interests, of those for whom he acts, that he 
must put himself in their place, act as they would act.24   
 
By suggesting that Du Bois and Locke debated the function of artwork instead 
of simply having different ‘tastes,’ I mean that they disagreed over the 
substance of artwork as representation, over the constellation of 
“correspondences,” “wishes,” “needs,” “actions,” etc. which constitute it.  
Each thought of artwork (and artists) as representative (although not 
necessarily as representatives) but they debated the ‘nature’ of ‘the represented’ 
of which artwork was to be representative. In his criticism, Locke saw 'New 
Negro' art as distinctly modern, i.e. he thought of it as belonging with a larger 
universe of modern art, which in turn was characterized, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, by its ability to capture (i.e. to represent) the fullness of 
modern live in all its empowering and debilitating, mobilizing and uprooting 
sensations. New Negro art hence was racial only insofar as the lives it 
represented were the lives of blacks. Du Bois, in contrast, wanted artwork to 
bring 'beauty' to bear on false representations of black people in artwork and 
'truth' to mischaracterizations of blacks in historical accounts, i.e. he wanted it 
to represent 'race' and make its contribution to solving the 'race problem'.  
 I by no means want to imply that Locke did not have in view the ‘race 
problem.’  For Du Bois, “the problem of the 20th century” took shape in “white 
supremacist” propaganda and was, for black people, a matter of lived 
experience as a ‘race problem’ and the ‘double consciousness’ this experience 
produced. For Locke, the ‘race problem’ was displaced to the “mind of 
America” in which “…the Negro has been more of a formula than a human 
                                                           
24 Ibid. 113 
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being—a something to be argued about, condemned or defended, to be ‘kept 
down,’ or ‘in his place’ or ‘helped up…’”25    But as I argued at the outset, 
Locke refused to be seen as a “race problem.”  
 
II. In Pursuit of Proselytes, In Pursuit of Art:  Du Bois and Locke on the 
Function of Art 
 
Artistically it is the one fundamental question for us today.—Art or 
Propaganda.  Which?  Is this more the generation of the prophet or that 
of the poet; shall our intellectual and cultural leadership preach and 
exhort or sing? I believe we are at that interesting moment when the 
prophet becomes the poet and when prophecy becomes the expressive 
song, the chant of fulfillment…  Art in the best sense is rooted in self 
expression and whether naïve or sophisticated is self-contained.  In our 
spiritual growth, genius and talent must more and more choose the role 
of group expression, or even at the times the role of free individualistic 
expression, -- in a word, must choose art and put aside propaganda.26 
  For Du Bois, propaganda meant the propagation of truths to counter white 
supremacist treatments of black persons in history as well as artwork.  This 
means that artwork should defend the “rights” of black persons.  Artists ought 
to act in defense of black people.   Locke more or less agreed with Du Bois 
about the definition of propaganda, but disliked it precisely because it 
“harangued, cajoled and threatened” – even if it did so on behalf of blacks or 
for a good purpose.  That is to say, art as propaganda left the artist in the 
position of the politician—as a representative of blacks.  According to Du Bois, 
art ought ultimately to serve the same objective that all activity on behalf of 
blacks should serve—that blacks become “Americans, full-fledged Americans, 
with all the rights of other American citizens.”27  
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27 Harris makes this point himself when he suggests that Du Bois sees racial uplift (an 
apparent product of Beauty) as a precondition for liberation. 
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 Du Bois’s best-known treatise on the subject of art, published as “The 
Criteria of Art,” was first given at a speech honoring the black historian, 
Carter Woodson.   Du Bois opens by acknowledging the unexpectedness of his 
subject.  He imagines his audience wondering,  
 
How is it that an organization like this, a group of radicals trying 
to bring new things into the world, a fighting organization 
which has come up out of the blood and dust of battle, 
struggling for the right of black men to be ordinary human 
beings—how is it that an organization of this kind can turn aside 
to talk about Art? After all, what have we who are slaves and 
black to do with Art? Or perhaps there are others who feel a 
certain relief and are saying, ‘After all it is rather satisfactory 
after all this talk about rights and fighting to sit and dream of 
something which leaves a nice taste in the mouth.”28 
 
It is revealing that Du Bois feels that, speaking to activists, radicals even, he 
must apologize to bring up something as light, pleasant, and even frivolous as 
art at all. Note the antithetical series in the quote, where fighting, blood, dust, 
battle, struggle stand against dreaming and having a nice taste in the mouth. 
And the only reason Du Bois can give for talking about Art is that it is “part of 
the great fight.”  “…[So] long as you are climbing, the direction, --north, south, 
east and west—is of less important.”  Art is one of many channels for 
advancement.     “…When gradually the vista widens and you begin to see the 
world at your feet and the far horizon, then it is time to know more precisely 
whither you are going and what you really want.”29  ‘This’ is the moment to 
assess direction; arriving at the proper criteria for Negro art is part of this 
reflection.  At the same time, Du Bois widens the scope of the needed 
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reflection beyond the best practices to achieve the particular objective he has 
mind—“…the right of black men to be ordinary human beings…” 
 
What do we want?  What is the thing we are after?... We want to 
be Americans, full-fledged Americans, with all the rights of 
other American citizens.  But is that all?  Do we want simply to 
be Americans?  Once in a while through all of us there flashes 
some clairvoyance, some clear idea, of what America really is.  
WE who are dark can see America in a way that white 
Americans can not.  And seeing our country thus, are we 
satisfied with its present goals and ideas?”30 
 
Du Bois does not respond to his rhetorical questions with answers.  Instead, in 
a move to be found in so many of his texts, Du Bois tells an illustrative story, 
as if the full meaning of the questions could not be addressed in 
straightforward answers.  He recalls a visit to the lake featured in a favorite 
poem of his, Walter Scott’s “Lady of the Lake.” “It was quiet.  You could 
glimpse the deer wandering in unbroken waters…Around me fell the cadence 
of that poetry of my youth.  I fell asleep full of the enchantment of the Scottish 
border.  A new day broke and with it came a sudden rush of excursionists.  
They were mostly Americans and they were loud and strident… They tried to 
get everywhere all at once.”31   The beauty of the place carries Du Bois beyond 
it, linking the Scottish lake to a forest of his childhood.  He experiences this 
reverie as the rhythmic pattern of poetry.   But this moment in art cannot last, 
for insistently the social world pushes back in—“Americans, loud and 
strident… [making] all sorts of incoherent noises and gestures so that the quiet 
home folk and visitors from other lands…gave way before them…”  “They 
struck a note not evil but wrong.  They carried, perhaps, a sense of strength 
and accomplishment, but their hearts had no conception of the beauty which 
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pervaded this holy place.”32  In a few deft, metaphorical lines, Du Bois 
captures both the essential impact and the real challenge for art.  It can and 
does arise effortlessly from “Beauty,” carries “Beauty” in it; art has its effects, 
carrying its devotee to other places, connecting those places in an 
unanticipated fashion (Scotland—home).  Places it may connect, however 
fleetingly, but because art cannot invade “hearts [with for whatever reason] no 
conception of beauty,” it cannot so easily connect different people (the “loud 
and boisterous,” “visitors from other lands,” “the quiet home folk”).      
 Leaving this evocative anecdote behind, its full meaning barely 
grasped, Du Bois then takes yet another of his characteristic abrupt turns.  The 
scene set, Du Bois asks “if you tonight suddenly should become full-fledged 
Americans,” he asks his audience, “if your color faded, or the color line here in 
Chicago was miraculously forgotten suppose, too, you became at the same 
time rich and powerful;-- what is it that you would want?  What would you 
immediately seek?  …the most powerful of motor cars…the most elaborate 
estate on the North Shore? Would you become a Rotarian…of the very last 
degree? …[Wear] the most striking clothes, give the richest dinners and buy 
the longest press notices?”33  These questions, unlike the earlier ones, Du Bois 
is all too willing to answer.  “Even as you visualize such ideals you know in 
your hearts that these things are not the things you really want.”  This is 
because his black audience, “pushed aside as [they] have been in America,” 
has a “vision of what the world could be if it were really a beautiful world.”   
Du Bois lays out the components of the really beautiful world, “…if we had… 
not perfect happiness, but plenty of good hard work, the inevitable suffering 
that always comes with life; sacrifice and waiting, all that—but nevertheless, 
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lived in a world where men know, where men create, where they realize 
themselves and where they enjoy life.  It is that sort of world we want to create 
for ourselves and for all America.”34   The world that evades ‘our’ grasp is 
imperfect, full of suffering, it is nevertheless a beautiful world.  The beautiful 
world is a world within which “men create…and realize themselves.” 
 Why then does Du Bois raise the questions that follow.  “After all, who 
shall describe Beauty?  What is it?,”35 abruptly turning from the well-
articulated account of the ‘beautiful, wished-for world’ he has already 
proffered.  He offers examples of “Beauty:” “the Cathedral at Cologne,” “a 
village of the Veys in West Africa,” “the broken curves of the Venus of Milo, 
“a single phrase of music in the Southern South.” But these, even the “single 
phrase of music” (he insists upon its singularity, “utter melody, haunting and 
appealing, suddenly arising out of night and eternity…), are cleanly 
demarcated objects, beautiful representations, that carry none of the 
animation, the created-ness, of the wished-for world he has already 
characterized.  “Such is beauty,” he continues. “Its variety is infinite, its 
possibility is endless.  In normal life all may have it and have it yet again.  The 
world is full of it; and yet today, the mass of human beings are choked away 
from it, and their lives distorted and made ugly.”  It is not (yet), Du Bois 
seems to imply, a ‘normal world.’   Yet by confining beauty to objects, to 
representations, Du Bois seems to foreclose the possibilities of artistry he 
opened up in his own characterization of the ‘black imagination,” of what 
‘blacks’ know, having been “pushed aside as [blacks] have been in America.”  
On the other hand, like Locke, Du Bois recognizes “new stirrings” among 
“Negro Youth.”  “Who shall restore to men the glory of sunsets and the peace 
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of quiet sleep?”36   Du Bois responds that “black folk…[who have within them] 
as a race new stirrings; stirrings of the beginning of a new appreciation of joy, 
of a new desire to create, of a new will to be…” may help restore “Beauty” to 
men.    
The abrupt turns in the series of anecdotes and questions which open 
Du Bois’s speech reveal his struggle: how can we take the measure of ‘Negro’ 
art in the ‘new’ circumstance: ‘new’ not just because of the “new stirrings in 
Negro Youth, [who] in some new way…bears this mighty prophecy on its 
breast,” but also because “as the vista widens,” “we” may take stock of our 
objectives and ask whether it is enough to pursue “our right… to be full-
fledged Americans.  Du Bois seems to ask, in this moment of change and 
quickened development, whether ‘Negro’ art can afford to turn altogether to 
representing “Beauty?”  For Du Bois, the answer is clearly ‘no.’  “What has 
this Beauty to do with the world?  What has Beauty to do with Truth and 
Goodness? ‘Nothing,’ the artists rush to answer.  They may be right.  I am but 
a humble disciple of art and cannot presume to say.  I am one who tells the 
truth and exposes evil and seeks with Beauty and for Beauty to set the world 
right.”37  Artists, perhaps overly taken with what Locke would call the “Spirit 
of the age,” all too hastily want to disentangle Beauty from Truth and 
Goodness, thereby robbing art of what Du Bois sees as its rightful purpose: 
“setting the world right.”   The ‘new stirrings’ ought to be set to good use, for 
they are accompanied by a “realization of [the] past, of which for long years 
we have been ashamed, for which we have apologized.  We thought nothing 
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could come out of that past which we wanted to remember; which we wanted 
to hand down to our children.”38    
The black artist, however tempted by “Beauty,” ought to serve a function 
similar to that of the black historian since the black subject and his stories have 
been misrepresented by omission of “the kind of people you know and like 
and imagine.”    Du Bois argues that artists have a “bounden duty” to 
reconstruct and re-tell “our own past.”  They represent the past anew by 
telling of under-reported or mischaracterized experiences.   It is in this sense 
that Du Bois held ‘Negro’ artwork should be propagandistic. 
Significantly, as objects calling out for representation, Du Bois offers 
“stories” that would appeal to the journalist or historian as much as to the 
artist— a dark skinned girl not invited to her light skinned sister’s wedding 
commits suicide; a white woman blackmails a black lawyer by threatening to 
cry rape; the conquest of German East Africa (!).39  “Such is the true and 
stirring stuff of which Romance is born,” writes Du Bois, “and from this stuff 
come the stirrings of men who are beginning to remember that this kind of 
material is theirs; and this vital life of their own kind is beckoning them on.”40  
The repeat here of the ‘stirring,’ which Du Bois identified in the hearts of 
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40 Ibid. 996 
 163  
 
‘Negro’ in opening of the text, is telling.   ‘Past’ and contemporary experiences 
heretofore unseen and unheard stir the reader because they are in themselves 
“romantic.”  Herein lies their ‘Beauty.’ Something ‘new’ may ‘stir’ the hearts 
of “Negro Youth,” Du Bois seems to suggest, but only remembrance of “…this 
kind of material…” will ‘stir them on to vital life.’   
The material is appealing to Du Bois precisely because it reveals the 
real impact of white supremacy on particular black persons; in doing so, it 
counters white supremacy’s false claims about black people. In that regard, it 
is propagandistic.  In itself, tragic and triumphant, handled correctly “this 
kind of material” is an exhortation.  It is the kind of writing that “cheers the 
weary traveler.” We might say that artwork is purposively Beautiful.  For 
Locke, as I argued in Chapter Two, the hortatory voice in artwork had had its 
day.  
  Propaganda was warranted because as Du Bois saw it, artwork should 
serve moral and didactic purposes.    
 
Suppose the only Negro who survived some centuries hence was 
the Negro painted by white Americans in the novels and essays 
they have written.  What would people in a hundred years say of 
black Americans?  Now turn it around.  Suppose you were to 
write a story and put in it the kind of people you know and like 
and imagine.  You might get it published and you might not.  
And the “might not” is still far bigger than the might…. The 
white publishers catering to white folk would say, ‘It is not 
interesting’ to white folk, naturally not.  They want Uncle Toms, 
Topsies, good ‘darkies’ and clowns.41   
 
Du Bois’s reference to the future in this passage is analogous to that in a later 
essay on history.  In that essay, Du Bois argues that histories, most particularly 
accounts of the Reconstruction period, have falsely represented the ‘Negro’s’ 
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part in history.   Du Bois opens this later essay, “The Propaganda of History,” 
with a list of quotations from historical accounts of the Negro in the 
Reconstruction period.  Just as in “white” artwork, the historical record 
presents a “typical Negro” who is almost always depicted as a failure; 
furthermore, important historical events have been entirely misrepresented so 
that  
 
Grounded in such elementary and high school teaching, an 
American youth attending college today would learn from 
current textbooks of history that the Constitution recognized 
slavery; that the chance of getting rid of slavery by peaceful 
methods was ruined by the Abolitionists;… He would read 
that… Negroes were the only people to achieve emancipation 
with no effort on their part.  That Reconstruction was a 
disgraceful attempt to subject white people to ignorant “Negro 
rule…42 
 
Not only has the ‘Negro’ been represented one-sidedly so that “whenever a 
black head rises to historic view, it is promptly slain by an adjective—
‘shrewd,’ ‘notorious,’ ‘cunning,’”43 but the broader context—Reconstruction—
has also been misunderstood.  These representations of the ‘Reconstruction’ 
and the ‘Negro’s’ part in it are “openly and blatantly propaganda.”44   
Such white supremacist propaganda must be countered, with truthful 
reports and not just because, as Harris seems to imply, black autonomy must 
be preceded by ‘racial uplift.’   
 
It is propaganda like this that has led men in the past to insist 
that history is “lies agreed” upon; and to point out the danger of 
such misinformation.  It is indeed extremely doubtful if any 
permanent benefit comes to the world through such action.  
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Nations reel and stagger on their way; they make hideous 
mistakes; they commit frightful wrongs; they do great and 
beautiful things.  And shall we not best guide humanity by 
telling the truth about all this, so far as the truth is 
ascertainable.45 
 
There is, as Harris argues, an “objectively real truth” in history that 
must be reported.  The truth that Du Bois calls for, nevertheless, counters the 
false “propaganda of history,” attending to truth be [by?] reconstruction.  
Such reconstruction is called for since “history” ought to serve as a guidepost 
for contemporary and future political and social behavior.  Most available 
treatments of the Reconstruction are inaccurate, and thus cannot serve its 
broader purpose to present “human experience for the guidance of mankind.” 
History is thus analogous to artwork in a double sense: it must be truthful 
since, just as art ought not exist for the sake of art, history is not an end in 
itself.  Where in addition to representing the Negro and his experiences, 
artwork also “stirs… the Negro to vital life” and creates Beauty in the world, 
history ought to “establish the Truth, on which Right in the future may be 
built” since it serves as a moral guide.   “If history is going to be scientific, if 
the record of human action is going to be set down with that accuracy and 
faithfulness of detail which will allow its use as a measuring rod and 
guidepost for the future of nations, there must be set some standards of ethics 
in research and interpretation.”46 
 We can see here that the “substance of the activity of representation as 
artwork” is quite similar to that as history.   Artists, like historians, must 
counter white supremacist propaganda by bringing the experiences of black 
Americans to light.  As artwork, experience must be “romanticized” so that it 
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“stirs to life” “a new desire to create… a new will to be; as though in this 
morning of group life we had awakened from some sleep that at once dimly 
mourns the past and dreams a splendid future…”47  Du Bois’ critical concern 
during this period may best be considered a defense of “Truth,” not only as 
revealing of “objective reality” as Harris insists, but rather reports that defend 
against contrary and false depictions of blacks in history and the 
contemporary context.  Art that meets its burden as propaganda is thus 
worthwhile Art, Art that is not reduced to ineffectual, although perhaps 
“beautiful,” decadence.    What is represented by ‘Negro’ artwork is more or 
less the same as that which is represented by history: the black experience 
(more often as not of white supremacy).  For Du Bois, the context for 
representation which requires that artwork act something like history is 
twofold:  First, mischaracterizations of black experiences constitute an 
hegemonic discourse about blacks in history and in the world.  Second, the 
“new stirrings” in ‘Negro youth’ present and imply an opportunity that these 
mischaracterizations can be righted in historical reports and art.    
Still, there are moments in Du Bois’s essays that reveal the myriad and 
lovely forms that socio-politically effective art can take.  Du Bois himself takes 
advantage of the possibilities of beauty captured in art, as the short anecdote 
about the Scottish lake, “Of the Coming of John” and the Postscript of 
Darkwater attest.  Nevertheless, although he is adamant about the 
propagandistic form that artwork should take, Du Bois struggles not to have 
‘fact’ overtaken by art.    
 
Between sterner flights of logic, I have sought to set some little 
alightings of what may be poetry.  They are tributes to Beauty, 
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unworthy to stand alone, yet perversely, in my mind, now at the 
end, I know not whether I mean the Thought for the Fancy—or 
the Fancy for the Thought, or why the book trails off to playing, 
rather than standing strong on unanswering fact.  But this is 
always—is it not?— the Riddle of Life.48  
 
Whence arrive these “little alightings of poetry?” Are they, should they be, 
ornaments, mere “playing,” compared to the “strong unanswering fact?”  Or 
are there objectives, like the “beautiful world,” which exceed the socio-
political body of thought, and necessitate a poetic imagination?   Du Bois, 
although insisting on the social and political function of art, never fully comes 
to terms with the potential effects and dangerous attractions of ‘pure’ Beauty 
lifted to the “high plane of pure Art.”   
 To Locke things look very different. For his confidence in art in the 
modern context is so great that he refuses to see it confined to a 
propagandistic function.  Although Locke’s chief’s objection to 
“…propaganda is its besetting sin of monotony and disproportion,” the real 
problem was that propaganda “…perpetuates the problem of group inferiority 
even in crying out against it.  For it leaves and speaks under the shadow of a 
dominant majority whom it harangues, cajoles, threatens or supplicates.”49  
True art, in contrast, is “rooted in self-expression and whether naïve or 
sophisticated is self-contained.”  Locke finds propaganda aesthetically 
displeasing (monotonous and disproportionate).  But the real problem, the 
basis for Locke’s rejection, is that, whatever its intentions to the contrary, it 
maintains the “inferior” status of the group.  As Harris interprets this passage, 
Locke objects to propaganda for “[failing] to accomplish its object—to change 
everyone’s beliefs in a predictable, definitive, and measurable way—because it 
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cannot reframe the debate. It must accept the terms of the debate.”50  Harris 
goes on to argue that “anti-racist propaganda is not morally odious, as [he] 
reads Locke, though it unintentionally maintains a relation that is emotively 
stilted within the same dynamic of action and reaction, hoping for change.” 
This is accurate so far as it goes.  The chief thrust of Locke’s objection, 
however, is not that propaganda fails to do what it intends, but rather that it is 
fundamentally different from art.  When art is asked to perform the 
propagandistic function, the real potential of art remains unmet.   We can see 
this in how Locke frames the essay: “Artistically it is the one fundamental 
question for us today. Art—or Propaganda.”  This is not merely a matter of 
aesthetic sensibility or choice.  It is a matter of how art reflects the ‘spirit of the 
age.’  “Is this more the generation of the prophet or that of the poet; shall our 
intellectual and cultural leadership preach and exhort or sing?  I believe we 
are at that interesting moment when the prophet becomes the poet and when 
prophecy becomes the expressive song, the chant of fulfillment.”51   This quote 
reveals the trace of the earlier assessment (1926) of ‘Negro poetry,’ that Locke 
provided in “The Negro Poets of the United States,” and I examined in 
Chapter Two.  In this ‘moment,’ “prophets become poets,” not by choice but 
because they occupy a transitional period in which ‘Negro life’ is freed from 
artistic representation on behalf of causes (even anti-racist ones), leaving 
‘Negro life’ to be ‘expressed’ in artwork.  (Propaganda, on the other hand, 
“leaves and speaks under the shadow of the dominant majority…”)  We can 
see Locke’s expression of ‘belief’ in response to the framing question as a 
confident expression of the modern moment’s potential.  That Locke opens, 
however, with questions is also significant.  In contrast to Du Bois, who begins 
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“Criteria of Art” by acknowledging that the subject of art is likely to be (and 
perhaps should be) seen as somewhat illegitimate.   Locke assumes the 
essentiality of art.  By asking “is this more the generation of the prophet or the 
poet,” Locke acknowledges the difficulty of transitioning from “prophecy” to 
“poetry” as a matter of art, and I want to suggest, enacts a (potential) new 
“we,” one where art and (political) imagination would be freed of the 
“dominant majority” and, I would add, ‘race thinking.’  
 Confident in the force of art as art, Locke nevertheless argues that art be 
chosen over propaganda.  “In our spiritual growth genius and talent must 
more and more choose the role of group expression, or even at times the role 
of free individualistic expression,--in a word must choose art and put aside 
propaganda.”52    Art is, on the one hand, always and already reflective of the 
‘self-expressive’ spirit of the age.  On the other, the “substance and activity [of 
art] as representation” is more than seeing ‘Negro life’ freed from 
propaganda; more than mixing folk art forms with modern ones; more than 
seeing ‘Negro life’ lifted to the plane of pure art.  It consists of choosing to free 
art from function, and in doing so, choosing to free the ‘Negro self’ from 
supplication before the ‘race problem.’  Locke does not merely make this case 
for ‘Negro’ freedom from the ‘race problem,’ he draws on multiple linguistic 
modes to enact the complexity of the modern moment as ‘Negro’ selves   
address the ‘race problem.’  He interweaves these different modes: description 
(“the literature and art of the younger generation already reflects this shift of 
psychology”); recommendation (“David should be its patron saint: it should 
confront the Phillistines [sic] with its five smooth pebbles fearlessly”); 
indication (“There is more strength in a confident camp than in a threatened 
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enemy”) and obligation (“The sense of inferiority must be innerly 
compensated, self-conviction must supplant self-justification…”).53   “Art,” he 
acknowledges finally “cannot completely accomplish this, but I believe it can 
lead the way.”   
 Locke then addresses Du Bois indirectly, taking him to task for 
mischaracterizing his expectations of art as “decadence.”   
 
Our espousal of art thus becomes no mere idle acceptance of “art 
for art’s sake,” of cultivation of the last decadences of the over-
civilized but rather a deep realization of the fundamental 
purpose of art and its function as a tap root of vigorous, 
flourishing living.54  
  
The redundant phrase “mere idle acceptance” is revealing.  It captures the 
magnitude of Locke’s disagreement with Du Bois about the function of art.  
Du Bois, this redundancy suggests, is absolutely wrong to demand that art 
perform a function—propaganda—to which it is not suited.  Art, at its best, is 
‘self-expressive,’ reflecting a ‘self-representative’ people.  Further, it works to 
grow (taproot) “vigorous, flourishing living,” beyond the limits to living that 
‘race thinking’ sets.   
Locke acknowledges the importance of the objectives that propaganda 
served. “Propaganda at least nurtured some form of serious social discussion, 
and social discussion was necessary, is still necessary.” But it nevertheless 
requires a substitute since even when propaganda takes its shape in “social 
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discussion,” it is still problematic: it is partisan, too “one-sided and often pre-
judging.” Here is revealed again Locke’s distaste for propaganda of every sort: 
in artwork it is aesthetically displeasing and confines the propagandist and his 
very life materials to service on behalf of a cause; as a form of discussion, it is 
also found wanting for circumscribing the means for and possibility of 
communication.   
In closing the essay, Locke defends the relationship between “Beauty” 
and “Truth,” which caused Du Bois such struggle.  “After Beauty,” Locke 
writes, “let Truth come in to the Renaissance picture, -- a later cue, but a 
welcome one.  This may be premature, but one hopes not,-- for eventually it 
must come and if we can accomplish that, instead of having to hang our 
prophets, we can silence them or change their lamentations to song with a 
Great Fulfillment.”55  Locke seems to say: Let us avoid in artwork the quest for 
truth. For truth, we have the sciences, for propaganda, politics: art trades in a 
different currency. Let our artists instead tap and release "vigorous, 
flourishing living," for such is the spirit of the age. That spirit is what New 
Negro poets ought to be led to express - like Emile Verhaeren had done before 
them, and like their fellow modern artists did, no matter whether they were 
black or white, and whether they were in Paris or Berlin, Vienna, Amsterdam, 
or Harlem. 
 
III.  Representation or Expressiveness:  The Drama of Negro Life   
 
It is more important to know how to cry, sob and laugh, 
stare and startle than to learn how to smile, grimace, 
arch and wink.  And more important to know how to 
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move vigorously and with rhythmic sweep than to 
pirouette and posture.56 
Locke’s insistence that ‘Negro’ art reflect the modern Zeitgeist is 
revealed in the peculiar dichotomy he uses so often to capture the modernist 
spirit: the transition, most particularly in poetry, from “rhetoric” to 
“expression” and to the “acceptance of race in art.”  When characterizing the 
best of ‘Negro’ art, Locke refers often to its “expressiveness” or its 
“representativeness,” differentiating its dynamic, vivid qualities from that of 
propagandistic or ‘persuasive” art forms.  “Racial expression as a conscious 
motive, it is true, is fading out of our latest art, but just as surely the age of 
truer, finer group expression is coming in…”57 Three years later, writing in The 
Nation, Locke turns from characterizing new artistic expressions to ask what 
might be made of “group expression.”  
 
Are we ever to have more than the simple first products 
and ground flow of this well-spring, and the fitful spurt 
of its released natural energies, or is the well-head to be 
drummed over and its resources conserved and refined to 
give us a sustained output of more mature products and 
by-products?58   
 
Locke hopes, it would seem, to see the modern outburst tamed, its 
capriciousness domesticated so that “more mature by-products” may be 
produced, suggesting that he is perhaps more concerned about quality of 
‘Negro’ artwork, and Harris might add, how effectively (and positively) it 
represents ‘Negro’ character. But Locke, turning fully to the indicative voice in 
this essay, sees an artistic cause—his own aesthetic convictions— advanced in 
                                                           
56 Alain Locke, “The Negro and The American Stage,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A 
Selection of His Essays on Art and Culture, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart, Critical Studies on Black Life 
and Culture (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983), 79 - 86., p. 79 
57 Locke, “Negro Youth Speaks.” 47 
58 Locke, “Beauty Instead of Ashes.” 23 
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the new “school” of ‘Negro’ artwork.  “To produce these second-process 
products is the particular raison d’être of a school of Negro poets and artists, 
and what most of our younger school really mean by an ‘acceptance of race in 
art’ is the consciousness of this as an artistic task and program.”59  Thus, 
‘group expression’ serves less the psychological program “to innerly 
compensate inferiority’ than an aesthetic one: “artistic revival.”  In “Beauty 
Instead of Ashes,” the “art movement” merely coincides with “new stirrings 
in the ‘Negro mind and the dawning of new social objectives.”  “…most 
Negro artists would repudiate their own art program if it were presented as a 
reformer’s duty or a prophet’s mission, and to the extent that they were true 
artists be quite justified.  But there is an ethics of beauty itself; the urgency of 
the right creative moment.”60   Freed of the duty to reform and prophecy, 
‘Negro’ artists are swept in to the “urgency of the right creative moment.”  
Locke is quite careful not to insist that ‘Negro’ artists are obligated to beautiful 
representations.  Rather, he characterizes how, given the transformations of 
the period, ‘Negro’ artists “accept race in art.” “Race materials come to the 
Negro artist today as much through his being the child of his age as through 
his being the child of his race; it is primarily because Negro life is creatively 
flowing in American art at present that it is the business of the Negro artist to 
capitalize it in his work.”61  The spirit of the age transforms the relationship 
between ‘Negro’ artists and his ‘natural’ materials, tendering a new 
relationship between the artist and his subject.  That ‘Negro’ life is now 
accessible and realizable in “American” art conditions the “business” of the 
‘Negro’ artist.  The choice of “business” and not duty or obligation is telling 
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here.  The reason that ‘Negro’ artists draw from ‘Negro’ materials is that 
‘Negro life’ “[flows] into American art.” The effects of this transformation do 
not demand that ‘Negro’ artists represent ‘Negro’ life. ‘Negro’ artists, like non-
Negro artists, may avail themselves of new aesthetic developments. “The 
proof of this,” Locke writes, “is the marked and unusually successful interest 
of the white writer and artist in Negro themes and materials, not to mention 
the vogue of Negro music and the conquest of the popular mind through the 
dance and the vaudeville stage.”62  This notwithstanding, the ‘Negro’ artist 
retains privileged access to ‘Negro’ life material, which is why “[from] the 
Negro himself naturally we expect…the most complete and sustained effort 
and activity.”63  But Locke is “…glad that Negro life is an artistic province free 
to everyone.”  All artists with an eye for the “beauty” of Negro life may 
represent it.   
After characterizing the context for art’s capitalization on the new 
appeal of ‘Negro’ life and folk art in American art and emphasizing once more 
the transformative character of the age, Locke describes some interesting 
differences between the ways in which ‘Negro’ and white artists approach the 
representation of ‘Negro life,’ which further complicate the path, as Locke lays 
it, from representing the interests of ‘the race’ in light of the race problem to 
‘self-representativeness.’   “White artists have taken, it might be expected, the 
descriptive approach and have opened up first the channels of drama and 
fiction.  Negro artists, not merely because of their more intimate emotional 
touch but also because of temporary incapacity for the objective approach to 
requisite for successful drama and fiction have been more effective in 
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expressing Negro life in the more subjective terms of poetry and music.”64  
‘Negro’ and white artists approach their subject both from different 
perspectives and via different forms.  This argument is based in part on 
Locke’s judgment of the quality of ‘Negro’ artwork in the period.  For Locke, 
(‘Negro’) artists produce the most expressive, and therefore the best ‘Negro’ art 
in the poetic form, either in poetry or music.   In fiction and drama, however, 
the ‘Negro’-artist-in-transition faces the greatest challenge to seeing ‘Negro’ 
life fully “objectified” in the realm of art.    How can the more descriptive 
arts—fiction and drama—see ‘Negro’ life expressed and poetized?   
Locke thus dichotomizes poetry, on the one hand, and fiction, on the 
other, i.e. between the more expressive and the more descriptive arts.  Poetry 
(along with other expressive arts, like music an painting) presents the ‘Negro’ 
artist with the smallest challenge. ‘Negro’ poetry fails only when it is forced to 
be persuasive and not expressive, or truly poetic.  Drama, however, is a 
double-edged sword: drama writing belongs, like the writing of fiction, with 
the descriptive arts, while dramatic performance, its actual acting-out on 
stage, belongs, like poetry and music, with the expressive forms.   Locke 
seems in danger here of “holding that black people were primarily bodies,”65 
as ‘race’ science and creed had done before, by arguing that ‘Negro’ artists are 
more comfortable with or better suited to the expressive than the descriptive 
arts.   Yet Locke is careful to differentiate the ‘Negro’ actor from the substance 
of performing, while all the while attending to particular dangers attendant to 
the form—vaudeville—to which ‘Negro’ acting had heretofore been confined.  
Just as the ‘Negro’ poet has, in the past, been limited by the demands of 
persuasion and propaganda, the ‘Negro’ actor has been confined by the 
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demands of “the popular amusement stage.” But now is the time for ‘Negro’ 
actors to free themselves from mere entertainment and move to serious drama 
instead.  Here, in the performance (as opposed to the writing) of serious 
drama (as opposed to vaudeville) is where ‘Negro’ artists can most the 
revitalize the theater; here, in dramatic acting, is where they can best 
contribute to returning the stage, which had gone stale, to expressiveness; 
here, the formula that Locke had used to describe the difference between old 
and new ‘Negro’ art in general comes to itself: the movement from ‘posing’ to 
‘poise.’   
In this we can see that Locke’s studied attention to expressiveness, 
whether enacted in poetry, by the ‘Negro’ actor, or in ‘Negro life,’ marks not 
just a radical departure from Du Bois’s insistence on a function (propaganda) 
for art, but also from the restrictive demands of representation itself—whether 
imposed by political necessity or artistic mandate.  With reference to the 
“American stage,” this radical refusal of representation takes shape as an 
embodied and vigorous emotiveness and experimentality, which demands and 
affects a revitalized ‘stage’ for its appearance.  By analogizing ‘Negro’ poetry 
and ‘Negro’ acting, Locke finally illuminates expressiveness, an affect that he 
leaves undefined when writing about ‘Negro’ poetry, except when insisting 
what it is definitively not: persuasion or propaganda.   Where Du Bois seeks to 
see artwork propagandize on behalf of the ‘Negro’ cause by representing the 
‘Negro’ experience and demanding further that it convey the ‘Negro’s’ part in 
history truthfully and effectively, Locke endeavors to see artwork simply 
express: to reveal “vigorous, flourishing living.”  What would it mean for 
artwork to express “vigorous, flourishing, living?   The subtle difference in 
emphasis between Locke’s criticism of ‘Negro’ poetry and ‘Negro’ drama and 
 177  
 
his suggestion that something as complex, various, transitory and mutable as 
‘life’ be expressed embodies Locke’s struggle to push ‘Negro’ artwork beyond 
the function of representation (toward propagandistic means). Locke on the 
other hand attempts to see artwork (and artists) freed of representational 
demands.  Importantly, those demands are, for the artist of ‘Negro’ life, 
particular; they are ‘raced:’ mandated by the signifying authority of ‘race 
thinking’ and ‘race practice.’       
  Locke’s imagines ‘Negro’ artwork transcending the bounds of ‘racial’ 
representation.  By doing so, he attempts to see the black imagination freed of 
race thinking and ‘group relations’ reconfigured, thereby conditioning a new 
political imaginary.   But dangers abound and Locke’s attempt is therefore 
marked by anxiety and struggle. Locke grapples with the still present 
(although he hopes waning) demands of racial representation, while 
attempting to see the transformative potential of modernity and its art 
through.  This is particularly apparent in the 1924 essay, “Max Rheinhardt 
[sic] Reads The Negro’s Dramatic Horoscope,66 in which Locke recounts his 
and black publisher Charles Johnson’s visit with Max Reinhardt67 and again in 
“The Negro and the American Stage,”68   His excitement at meeting Reinhardt 
is palpable.   “Perhaps no one could have a more pronounced ‘sixth sense’ 
with respect to drama or a more dependable knack of finding new veins of 
dramatic possibilities.  When, therefore, we learned that Director Rheinhardt 
[sic] had expressed keen interest in the work of the Negro actors whom he had 
                                                           
66 Alain Locke, “Max Rheinhardt Reads the Negro's Dramatic Horoscope,” in The Critical 
Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection of His Essays on Art and Culture, Critical Studies on Black Life 
and Culture (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983), 77 - 78. 
67 Austrian stage director of Jewish descent, who provided stage direction at the Deutsches 
Theater in Berlin and the Theater in der Josefstadt in Vienna, who was well known for 
introducing experimental stage techniques. After the Nazis annexed Austria, Rheinhardt 
immigrated to the U.S., where he later became a Hollywood film director.  
68 Locke, “The Negro and The American Stage.” 
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seen in his visit to New York…we were naturally most anxious to have a first 
hand opinion.  Max Rheinardt must be interviewed.”69  Several meetings were 
missed, “at Salzburg; and again, by the accidents of travel, at Vienna… [and in 
New York because] …there wasn’t sufficient time to talk over so important a 
subject adequately.”  At last, Locke and Johnson had an audience “with this 
rather busy and inaccessible man” and found themselves “…in a predicament 
of the fishermen who catches other fish than he was fishing for.” First, 
Reinhardt “interviewed them.”  (“But that is not our story.”)  Finally, 
Reinhardt offers his ‘impressions’ of ‘Negro’ theatre, sounding very much like 
Locke celebrating Negro artwork.  “Yes, I am very interested [in ‘Negro’ 
drama],” Locke quotes Reinhardt as saying,  
 
—it is intriguing, very intriguing, these musical comedies of 
yours that I have seen.  But, remember, not as achievements, not 
as things in themselves, artistic, but in their possibilities, their 
tremendous artistic possibilities.  They are the most modern, the 
most American, most expressionistic.  They are highly original in 
spite of obvious triteness, and artistic in spite of superficial 
crudeness.  To me, they reveal new possibilities of technique in 
drama, and if I should ever try to do anything American, I 
should build it on these things.70  
 
What is interesting here is how Locke recounts his immediate reaction to what 
ought to have sounded very familiar and all in all quite correct.  “We didn’t 
enthuse. What Negro who stands for culture with the hectic stress of a social 
problem weighing on the minds of an over-serious minority could enthuse?  
Liza, Shuffle Along, Runnin’ Wild!  We had come to discuss the possibilities of 
serious Negro drama, of the art—drama, if you please….We didn’t protest, 
but raised brows already too elevated perhaps and shrugged the shoulder that 
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carries the proverbial racial chip.”71  Locke’s immediate reaction mirrors the 
response he disdains in others (like Du Bois) who demand ‘over-seriousness’ 
and social purposes for art. Reinhardt’s excitement about the potential of 
‘Negro’ theatre leaves Locke—and Johnson—temporarily speechless, unable 
to speak past the representational mandates of the ‘race problem.’ Not only 
are Locke and Johnson (in fact) speechless, Locke leaves it to Reinhardt to 
interpret their speechlessness.  Reinhardt argues that in viewing “these plays 
for what they are,” Locke and Johnson are “right,” but that because he “views 
them for what they will become” he is “more than right.” Reinhardt descries, 
even in ‘Negro’ comedy, the “most basic aspect of drama for a new starting 
point,” not for ‘Negro’ theatre as such, but for “a revival for the art.” Although 
“prostituted to farce… the technique is there. Now it is exploited, when will it 
be utilized?”72  “Now, we understood,” Locke continues.  “Baronial arm chairs 
moved as lightly and as instinctively as ouija boards.  Understanding made a 
circle, and the interview was ended though the conversation continued thrice 
as long.”73  Interrogation and evaluation are traded for exchange, itself 
personated, treated less as spoken exchange than as movement, “as light and 
instinctive as ouija boards.”  Locke records the opening salvo of this 
conversation: “No, not the story, not the acting in the conventional sense, not 
the setting, not even the music, and certainly no the silly words; but the 
voices, the expressive control of the whole body, the spontaneity of motion, 
the rhythm…”74 Importantly, Locke does not name the speaker, leaving the 
reader to guess or better, to imagine a cacophony of voices, accounting for the 
particular expressiveness of (‘Negro’) art.   
                                                           
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid. 
 180  
 
Yet, the opening to embodied and active communication, shaped into a 
new collective—(“understanding made a circle”) so that even the over-
civilized seat (“baronial”) moves to the tune of the primitive (“ouija board”)—
and extended (“thrice as long”) into a convivial anticipation of (‘Negro’) 
expressiveness, is almost immediately occupied again by the ‘race question,’ 
enacting the critical challenge Locke faces in this transformational period. 
‘Race’ continues to insist, to re-articulate itself in the form of the ever-present 
question.  “But how, Mr. Rheinhardt, are we to develop these, --especially in 
the face of exploitation?” “You must not even try to line up to the drama of the 
past, to the European drama. That is why there is no American drama… I 
would gladly help…but I would have to saturate myself with the folk spirit, 
and really this requires the Negro dramatist eventually.” “Eventually, why we 
have already many plays of Negro life…several attempts at Negro theatre…” 
That is most interesting…But I am afraid of that sort of thing…It is too 
academic….With such control of body, such pantomime, I believe I could 
portray emotion as it has never been portrayed…You are perhaps to near to 
see it.”75  With that the interview ends.  The implication (perhaps) is that  
‘Negro’ critics are too tied up in the ‘race problem’ to really see Negro artwork 
and is potential.  It is telling, in any case, that Locke uses ‘interview’ again 
here, suggesting that the series of questions and comments which begin with 
“But, how Mr. Rheinhardt…” returned expressions of conviviality to 
interview, and the substance and evaluation of ‘Negro’ theatre in 
representational terms.  Still, the interview does not just end, for Reinhardt is 
“still talking, still ‘intrigued,” adumbrating the imaginative and creative 
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powers of (increasingly) collective conversation, even in light of the ever-
present and thorny mandates of ‘race.’    
Though it is clear from the Reinhardt essay that Locke was troubled, 
like Du Bois, by misrepresentations of black people, he nevertheless insisted 
that artwork was not truly artwork when it was forced to serve a 
propagandistic purpose.   Locke describes the "artistic impediments" to 
‘Negro’ theater, revealing his own unease, both with the "racial chip on his 
shoulder," and with his own dichotomy between the expressive strength and 
the descriptive weakness of black art.  The unease is quite palpable, 
throughout the passage on the Reinhardt interview.  Yet, we can read in the 
Reinhardt interview, in how Locke describes its movement between interview 
and conversation, between addressing “artistic impediment” and ‘Negro’ 
performance, Locke’s insistence that ‘Negro’ artwork, even in light of 
impediments to its proper reception, reveal ‘Negro’ life.   In the next chapter, I 
address again this back-and-forth movement, this time in the context of 
individual and collective becoming.   
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CHAPTER 6 
“TO USWARD” 
 
Now it isn’t easy to be or live a social problem and it is 
far from pleasant to be an alarming symptom... 
Constitutional guarantees, legal and civil rights, 
political machinery of democratic action and control are, 
of course, the skeleton foundation of democracy, but you 
and I know that attitudes are the flesh and blood of 
democracy, and that without their vital reinforcement, 
democracy is really moribund or dead.1 
 
I have argued that in contrast to W.E.B. Du Bois, for whom worthy 
artwork served a political function, Locke insisted that the mark of good 
artwork was precisely that it eschewed propaganda in favor of ‘expression.’  
Against those theorists who insist that Locke hoped artwork would provide 
the medium by which black people could achieve cultural recognition in 
advance of political inclusion, I have argued instead that Locke is better 
understood to celebrate and publicize black artwork for revealing the plurality 
of black life.  Before the advent of black modernity, this always-existing 
variety had been obscured in artwork, both by the requirement that black 
artists advance moral arguments in service of solving the problem of race and 
by the reception of their artwork either as mere entertainment or imitation.  
For Locke, whatever its historical period, artwork was always a ‘mirror’ of 
existing social conditions.  Thus, if black artwork was reduced to a 
propagandistic function, as it had been in black poetry during the post-Civil 
                                                           
1 Alain Locke, “Alain Locke: Four Talks Redefining Democracy, Education and World 
Citizenship,” ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J. Fisher, World Order Vol. 38, no. 3 (2008): 21 - 
41..  This quote is taken from a talk called “The Preservation of the Democratic Ideal.” 
According to Christopher Buck, “Archival records do not reveal when Alain Locke gave [this 
talk but internal evidence (his reference to something he ‘wrote in 1935, three and a half years 
ago’) suggests that it can be dated to 1938 or 1939.  The audience, according to references in 
the talk, is social workers plying their profession in the tradition of settlement houses 
providing services directly to the poor in urban areas.” p. 23 
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War period, it was because social conditions required it.  Locke insisted that 
black artwork need not and should no longer only serve political purposes 
and illuminated the source of that change: the “new spirit in the masses”  
modern social developments (the Great Migration, ‘intra-cultural’ contact) had 
made possible.  Political exclusion, racial violence and white supremacy had 
not ended.  But by reading, for Locke the age of the total confinement of the 
black imagination to race-thinking— even as compensation for exclusion and 
oppression—had passed. 
   Locke described his role in the Harlem Renaissance as that of a 
midwife.  But he was also the movement’s chief interpreter.   In this chapter, I 
suggest that Locke articulated a democratically workable context for the 
flourishing of black artwork that we have come to call the Harlem 
Renaissance.   Because black artwork was no longer confined to performing a 
purely political function, it required a new viewpoint.  What could replace the 
old attitudes that required black artists to exhort or persuade on behalf of 
causes?   Insisting ever that artwork was only recognizable as artwork because 
it was expressive, Locke did not impose a ‘new’ doctrine on black art.  He was 
adamant however that black artwork not become “counter-jingo.”   
This, I think, is among his greatest gifts to the American political 
imaginary.  His art criticism consists not just of analysis—of artistic 
achievement, of new interpretations of black traditions or of the application of 
particular artistic forms—but also of exhortation of a particular sort. Locke, in 
my view, encouraged “the new spirit” he descried in the black masses: to 
demonstrate that black artwork revealed that the black imagination—the black 
political imagination—was not bound by race thinking.  It could become more 
than “counter-jingo.”  
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To pursue this intuition, I shall turn away from Locke’s art criticism 
and culture theory and offer an interpretation of Gwendolyn Bennett’s 1924 
poem, “To Usward.”  I ‘read’ the poem as announcing the Harlem 
Renaissance moment as one of transition from ‘identification’ and ‘race 
thinking’ to becoming: to ‘self-expressiveness’ and ‘self-representativeness.’  I 
stage an encounter between the poem and an unlikely interlocutor, Jacques 
Derrida’s Declaration of Independence.  That I juxtapose two very different 
genres—a work of art, on the one hand, and a public document—on the other 
is no accident.  Though Locke refused a political function for artwork as 
artwork, I want to suggest that we can read in his insistence on and 
exhortation to ‘self-expressiveness’ a political act: a declaration not of political 
independence (for such a statement was not yet warranted) but instead of 
psychological and spiritual independence from the problem of race.  And yet, 
as I suggest in my interpretation of Bennett’s poem, the times were not yet 
ripe for statives: I propose instead that Locke’s art criticism and the artworks 
he most celebrated were performative.  They attempted to see independence 
achieved in artistic utterances.    
Finally, turning to a review of the year’s black literature, “Jingo, 
Counter-Jingo and Us: a Retrospective Review of the Literature of the Negro, 
1937,” I authenticate what it is an admittedly experimental approach in the 
first section of the chapter.  Locke differentiated between “jingo” (the racist 
attitudes of the majority) and “counter-jingo” (the defensive, counter-racist 
response), he argued that “counter-jingo” was, at the very least, explicable as a 
response to jingoism.  Though racial oppression and exclusion were 
necessarily sources for the content of black ‘self-expressiveness,’ Locke insisted 
that black artwork not be overwhelmed by a “counter-jingoistic” attitude.  “  
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I. “To Usward” 
Although a number of events, persons and publications, including 
Roland Hayes’ appearance as soloist with the Boston Symphony orchestra, the 
publication of James Weldon Johnson’s 1922 anthology The Book of American 
Negro Poetry, or of Jean Toomer’s remarkable 1923 novel Cane compete for 
designation as the Harlem Renaissance’s opening salvo, the moment of its 
arrival as what came to be called a movement is arguably the “debut” of the 
younger Negro writers that Opportunity Magazine publisher Charles S. Johnson 
arranged on March 21, 1924. In attendance were Countee Cullen, Walter 
White, Jessie Fausset, Gwendolyn Bennett, Alain Locke and “the old Negro 
guard,” W.E.B. Du Bois, James Weldon Johnson, and Georgia Douglas.  
Publishing representatives from Century, Harper’s, Scribner’s, The World 
Tomorrow, Survey, Boni and Liveright Publishers also attended. Several guests 
spoke at the event, including Locke, Du Bois,  J.W. Johnson and Carl Van 
Doren, editor of Century2.   The March 21 event was a “coming out party,” of 
sorts, whose objective was strategic. In a letter to his secretary, Charles 
                                                           
2 Opportunity Magazine reported:  “Although there was no formal, prearranged program, the 
occasion provoked a surprising spontaneity of expression both from the members of the 
writers’ group and from the distinguished visitors present.  A brief interpretation of the object 
of the Guild2 was given by Charles S. Johnson, Editor of Opportunity, who introduced Alain 
Locke, virtual dean of the movement, who had been selected to act as Master of Ceremonies 
and to interpret the new currents manifest in the literature of this younger school.  Alain 
Locke has been one of the most resolute stimulators of this group… Horace Liveright, 
publisher, told about the difficulties, even yet, of marketing books of admitted merit… He 
regarded Jean Toomer’s Cane as one of the most interesting that the had handled, and yet, less 
than 500 copies had been sold… Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois made his first public appearance and 
address since his return to this country from Africa…  Dr. Du Bois explained that the Negro 
writers of a few years back were of necessity pioneers, and much of their style was forced 
upon them by the barriers against publication of literature about Negroes of any sort.  James 
Weldon Johnson was introduced as an anthologist of Negro verse… Walter F. White… also 
spoke and made reference to the passing of the stereotypes of the Negroes of fiction. .. Dr. 
Albert C. Barnes, art connoisseur and foremost authority in America on primitive Negro art, 
sketched the growing interest in this art which had had such tremendous influence on the 
entire modern art movement…  Miss Jessie Fausset was given a place of distinction on the 
program…”2  
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Johnson wrote that: 
 
It was a most unusual affair—a dinner meeting at the Civic Club 
at which all of the younger Negro writers…met and chatted with 
the passing generation… and with the literary personages of the 
city… about 100 guests and tremendously impressive 
speaking… [P]rincipally, it served to stimulate a market for the 
new stuff which these young writers are turning out.  The first 
definite reaction came in the form of an offer of one magazine to 
devote an entire issue to the similar subjects as treated by 
representatives of the group.  A big plug was bitten off.  Now it’s 
a question of living up to the reputation.  Yes, I should have 
added, a stream of manuscripts has started into my office from 
other aspirants.3  
 
The “one magazine” offering to devote an issue to Harlem and its’ 
artists was Survey Graphic.  The “Harlem: Mecca Of the New Negro” issue 
was published on March 6, 1925 and became the basis for The New Negro: An 
Interpretation, which Locke edited to feature the “stream of manuscripts” 
Johnson mentioned in his letter.  Although a number of artists read poetry, 
Bennett’s is the most representative and speaks most clearly, by my reading, 
to the objectives and potential of the Harlem Renaissance.    I have excerpted 
the poem in its entirety.  
 
 
 “To Usward” 
 
Let us be still 
As ginger jars are still 
Upon a Chinese shelf, 
And let us be contained 
By entities of Self… 
 
Not still with lethargy and sloth, 
But quiet with the pushing of our growth; 
Not self-contained with smug identity, 
But conscious of the strength in entity. 
 
                                                           
3 Bontemps, Harlem Renaissance Remembered, 11 
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If any have a song to sing that’s different from the rest, 
Oh, let him sing before the urgency of Youth’s behest! 
 
And some of us have songs to sing  
Of jungle heat and fires; 
And some of us are solemn grown 
With pitiful desires; 
And there are those who feel the pull 
Of seas beneath the skies; 
And some there be who want to croon 
Of Negro lullabies. 
We claim no part with racial dearth,  
We want to sing the songs of birth! 
 
And so we stand like ginger jars, 
Like ginger jars bound round 
With dust and age; 
Like jars of ginger we are sealed 
By nature’s heritage. 
But let us break the seal of years  
With pungent thrusts of song, 
For there is joy in long dried tears, 
For whetted passions of a throng! 
The poem’s title suggests both movement toward a non-destination 
movement and a tribute to an already existing entity, a celebratory toast of 
sorts.    Indeed, the continual movement suggested by “to usward,” which 
might instead have been written “toward us,” thus demarcating movement in 
terms of its clear stopping point— is forestalled in the first line by the words, 
“let us be still as ginger jars are still.”  (Why let us be still like Chinese jars?  
Why not, if “we” are moving “usward,” be animated, a “throng,” as at the end 
of the poem?) The hortatory subjunctive phrase “let… be” first makes the 
implied “we” apparent since the poem’s title names no “we.”   There is, rather, 
only movement  “usward,” suggesting both that the “us” does and yet does not 
exist.   The movement toward us seems hindered “by entities of self.”  “We,” 
who are on our way “usward,” ought also be contained by a peculiar set of 
abstractions—entities of self.   The potentially material or “real” selves are 
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immediately defined in terms of the self in abstraction— “we” are not 
contained by an entity of selves but rather by entities of a singular self.   A 
cursory reading suggests that the plural forms are misplaced—plural 
abstractions, a single self— since, generally, when we speak of abstraction, we 
mean to abbreviate or conceptualize something more complex; to offer it, we 
might say, in digest form; to formalize it; to reduce complexity into simplicity.  
Why speak of multiple abstractions of a singular self?   One obvious suggestion 
would be to read “To Usward” as prescribing an identity, particularly in light 
of the exhortation, “let us be.”    Let us be “still” and “contained” by a single 
self.   I am going to suggest that this reading of the poem would be hasty for 
entity itself has multiple (even contradictory) meanings  (essence, 
quintessence, soul, personage, individual, being, spirit, substance) whose 
variety is further magnified by the plural form of the word.      
The change in mode in the final stanza, reprinted just below, from 
hortatory subjunctive to indicative (We stand), and again to hortatory 
subjunctive (Let us break the seal of years) further complicates both the status 
of the un-named “we” and the objective of the exhortation, “let us be…”  
And so we stand like ginger jars, 
Like ginger jars bound round 
With dust and age; 
Like jars of ginger we are sealed 
By nature’s heritage. 
But let us break the seal of years  
With pungent thrusts of song, 
For there is joy in long dried tears, 
For whetted passions of a throng! 
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In the final stanza, the hortatory subjunctive mood’s hold is momentarily 
broken, so that “we stand like ginger jars, Like ginger jars bound round With 
dust and age.”   For a moment, the poem’s speaker offers a description of “us,” 
as those who are “bound” and “sealed,” that stands, if we read it as an 
indicative phrase (We stand), in sharp contrast to the containment in the first 
stanza.     At this moment in stanza three, a “We” is described as bound and 
sealed, but after a moment, the hortatory subjunctive voice returns: “Let us 
break the seal of years With pungent thrusts of song.” But it is a hortatory 
subjunctive whose character is different from that in the first stanza; its verb, 
“break,” is dynamic and not stative as is the “be” in the first.   We might say 
that the final hortatory subjunctive “Let us break” has carried some of the 
dynamism over into it from “we stand.” But has it?  After all, the status of “we 
stand,” is also unclear.  Is it a declarative phrase, proclaiming an action—We 
stand—as we do it?  Or is it an indicative, describing what we do (now). “We 
stand LIKE ginger jars Bound Round?”   A call to action—“Let us break the 
seal of years”— contrasts the peculiar exhortation (even call to inaction) that 
we “be still like ginger jars.”    
Now, a clear “we” stands like ginger jars whereas before (or at least 
earlier in the poem) we were called to resemble ginger jars.  Later, “we” are 
disassociated from our container (“Like jars of ginger” instead of ginger jars) 
only to be “immediately” described as sealed.  “Like jars of ginger, we are 
sealed…)   The status of the unnamed “we,” its “action” and what it “ought 
to” do grows yet more un-decidable.   We might turn to the poem’s other 
presence—Youth—who appears unbidden in the second stanza.  But who is 
this newly introduced “Youth?”   The poem’s speaker has implored us to be 
still while insisting that “our” stillness be neither “sloth,” nor “smug identity,” 
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implying that it be reasoned and willful but demand no selfsameness.     The 
second and third stanza seem to demonstrate that while we anchor 
“ourselves-”or are revealed as stationery and neatly rowed on shelves,  “our” 
open, or as the last stanza indicates—newly unsealed—mouths can or are 
called to (again the un-decidable status—declaration or indication?) both 
awaken and testify to many different moods and themes. I suggest one way to 
“still” the poem’s variously unsettled meanings, modes, and materials to turn 
to the temporal to decipher it.  Perhaps, the unexpected arrival of youth in the 
second stanza, clarifies (although fails to settle) the un-decidable status of “us” 
and “our” actions. Perhaps “Youth” marks the moment at which the balance 
begins to shift, when we tip forward from the old, given self—standing sealed, 
dusted, and aged— not toward some new, prescribed self  (smug identity) but 
rather “to usward,” toward new entities, ever-forming, entities of self.  
There are, of course, many potential readings of Bennett’s poem.  One 
might focus on the evocative image (perhaps scent) of ginger in the poem.  
Such an interpretation might read:  The third stanza suggests that we no more 
be still but rather stand open.   For in this moment, we already stand like jars of 
ginger and not ginger jars (or, perhaps gingerly jars, as in the sense of 
reluctance) but rather jars whose material ginger (whose “brown-ness,” for 
ginger, too, is an adjective for brown) can finally be divulged and demarcated 
from the prior “self.”   With “pungent thrusts of song,” (sharp with the scent 
of brown ginger), we might allow our material (songs of “jungle heat and 
fires,” “pitiful desires,” “seas beneath the skies,” “Negro lullabies”) to fill the 
air with scent and song.    In this reading, a kind of stable, essential, “pre-
existing,” self is divulged, suggesting not only the presence of an “identity” to 
be “freed” as a counter identity to claim.   I would argue that the former 
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reading, in which the (un-decidable) status of “us” and the types of “actions” 
“we” and the speaker of the poem perform (exhortation, description) is a 
better, richer one because it points the poem (and the Harlem Renaissance, for 
which this poem, as the opening salvo of the Harlem Renaissance’s coming 
out party, is, in my account, a metaphor) towards a democratic politics instead 
of in the direction of identity politics.  
 For Locke black culture is meaningful because it is a significant source 
for self-cultivation and self-representativeness. Self-representativeness for 
black people, as revealed in black artwork, is only manifest under modern 
conditions, when black people refuse the limits to black life set by the practice 
of race.  Self-representativeness marks a new status, enacted and assumed 
both by individuals and by black people as a ‘group.’ In the final section of 
this chapter, I return again to “To Usward,” to further explore the relationship 
between these two modes of ‘representativeness.’ By reading the poem along 
side Jacques Derrida’s “Declarations of Independence,” I sketch an account of 
post-racial foundations for the new collectivities I believe Locke’s sensitive 
and cosmopolitan criticism to imply.   
 Above I argued that while one might be tempted to interpret Bennett’s 
“To Usward” as a call to ‘identity,’ the multiple shifts in mode from 
exhortation to indication and back again enact the un-decidable status of a 
‘we’ in formation, which attempts to ‘declare independence’ from a prior 
(false) identity avoiding the prescription of a new identity.    To further 
explore and clarify my reading of this poem, I turn to Jacques Derrida’s 
“Declarations of Independence.”4  Just as my reading of Bennett’s poem 
explores the implications of its “discursive modalities”—description and 
                                                           
4 Jacques Derrida, “Declarations of Independence,” trans. T. Keenan and T. Pepper, New 
Political Science 15 (Summer 1986): 3 - 19. 
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exhortation— Derrida’s analysis of the Declaration of Independence is also 
attentive to a fundamental linguistic tension in it—between description and 
performance.  Indeed, Derrida argues ultimately, that the Declaration’s 
“sought after effect,” what he calls a coup of right, is only possible in light of 
this productive tension.   By my reading, the “sought after effect,” of Bennett’s 
“To Usward,” like Locke’s Harlem Renaissance, is to constitute a new ‘we,’ 
while remaining ever vigilant to the effects of prior sources of collectivity—
those imposed by ‘race thinking’ and its practice.  
  “Declarations of Independence” asks “Who signs, and with what so-
called proper name, the declarative act which founds an institution?”5   
Derrida thus treats the Declaration not as a statement of fact but rather as a 
kind of action that by performative language (We hold these truths to be self 
evident…) “does what it says it does.”     The question, “who signs?” cannot 
be answered with a list of the proper names of the “representatives.”  
The “good people,” are a people not by virtue, say, of a common past or 
ethnicity, but rather through an act of declaration, which “dissolves” their 
relationship with another state6.  They make themselves—they become— by 
signing “in the name of the people,” who exist only after the signature.   
According to Derrida, without this “fabulous event…, this people do not 
exist.7” The “sought after effect” of the instituting act is not the creation of a 
particular institution or a particular people; it is, rather, the authorization of a 
                                                           
5 Ibid.  
6 Derrida writes, “In this case, another state signature had to be effaced in ‘dissolving’ the 
links of colonial paternity or paternity.” (11) 
7 Ibid. 10 
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people to act on its own behalf by it’s own signature as well as the institution of 
authorization as politics per se.8  
“The signature of American citizen today,” Derrida writes, “depends, 
in fact and by right, on this indispensable confusion.”  Further,  “the 
constitution and laws of [the US] somehow guarantee the signature, as they 
guarantee your passport and the circulation of subjects and of seals foreign to 
this country.”9   For Derrida, the performative declaration of a “we” in the 
Declaration of Independence depends upon the un-decidable, discursive 
status of the Declaration’s language and the signature, which “captures” and 
authorizes this ‘we.’  
 What makes the Declaration of Independence “fabulous,” on Derrida’s 
account is that it is made by and on behalf of a people that do not yet exist.  
 
I will have given myself a “name” and an “ability, or a “power, ” 
understood in the sense of power- or ability-to-sign by 
delegation of signature.  But this future perfect, the proper tense 
for this coup of right… should not be declared, mentioned or 
taken into account.  It is as though it didn’t exist.10    
 
The act is fabulous because it summons a “fictitious” people while at the same 
proving an authorization that could continually be re-invoked, supplying the 
source for a (continually) regenerative politics by maintaining the un-
decidable status and constitution of the ‘we,’ on whose behalf it declares 
independence. 
 I want to suggest that “Declarations” gives the clue to how one might 
avoid reading “smug identity,” into Bennett’s poem or the larger project of 
                                                           
8  “By this fabulous event, by this fable which implies the structure of the trace and is only in 
truth possible thanks to the inadequation to itself of a present, a signature gives itself a name. 
It opens for itself a line of credit, its own credit, for itself to itself.” Ibid. 10    
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
 196  
 
Harlem Renaissance.    The status of “most current we” in the Bennett poem is 
not, of course, fully undecided; we might say, instead, that it has already been 
specified, generalized, identified, “bound round,” and “ginger-jarred.”     By 
my reading, the oscillation between indicative/declarative mood and 
hortatory subjunctive in the second and third stanzas  (We stand… Let us 
break the seal of years…) (Let him sing before the urgency of Youth’s behest… 
Some of us have songs to sing), suggests less about the peculiarly un-
decidable status of a particular phrase, as in “Declarations,” than it does about 
the “un-decidability” of a particular moment.   This moment (Youth) demands 
(behest) that the variety of songs, the multiplicity of black life be revealed.  The 
hortatory subjunctive that follows the moment of declaration/indication (We 
stand) in the third stanza seems to pull both speaker and event back from 
description and declaration by exhortation while (perhaps only momentarily) 
crystallizing the speaker/representative as one who wants nothing more than 
to “sing the songs of birth...”  (To “speak,” only of becoming.)   
As I suggested in Chapter Three, Locke associates the hortatory mood 
of some Negro poetry both with a particular historical moment and with a 
particular type of politics.   He writes, 
 
Poetry of Negro life itself…was still unattained at the time of 
emancipation and for at least three decades after.  Later the 
causes of this may stand out more clearly.  But this much is 
certainly clear; --no such social satisfaction and stimulus came into 
Negro life with the emancipation as accompanies normal political 
freedom; the concrete realities of reconstruction could by no 
means fill in and vivify the abstract Abolitionist hopes or realize 
the roseate anti-slavery dream.  The poetic impulse was checked 
by steep social disillusionment, by the dint of moral momentum 
it plodded on in hortatory modes and accents to “cheer the weary 
traveler.11”  [my emphasis] 
                                                           
11 Locke, “The Negro Poets of the United States,” 43 
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Although it did free the slaves, the Emancipation Proclamation was a 
discursive act that could not “free” politics or inter/intra-cultural relations 
from the processes of ascription with which American politics was so bound 
up.   The “realities of reconstruction” politics could not “vivify” those political 
ideals or take full advantage of the undecidable status of the ‘we,’ which 
Derrida illuminates in “Declarations of Independence.” The poetry of blacks 
from that period made this clear.    By my reading, that Bennett’s poem is not 
only hortatory is significant, even augural.   That Bennett’s poem cannot fully 
“achieve” a stable description of a newly re-constituted “Us” suggests not just 
selves freed from identification (indeed the oscillation may hint at the 
difficulties of attaining such an objective) but rather a new concept of self, as 
itself plural (“entities of self.”)  The poem “says what it does” as in Derrida’s 
account of the Declaration of Independence, by revealing the transformational 
potential of its moment in its language.  Its’ sought after effect, the ‘objective’ 
toward which it urges remains open and perhaps ever in formation: “to 
usward.”    The title “To Usward” along with the peculiar abstraction, “entities 
of self” implies that the status of the un-named “we” in the poem is also, if not 
entirely un-decidable— it has, indeed, been identified and jarred—but is, in 
fact, opening itself out.     “We” cannot return to this founding moment for a 
prescriptive “us.”  But we ought mark this moment (that is the “behest” of 
Youth, by my reading), recognize it, for what it is, a transitory, albeit—it will 
turn out—not transitional one.  
 I want to suggest we take seriously the idea that there is a similarity 
between the Declaration of Independence, as Derrida understands it, and the 
the Harlem Renaissance, as Locke continually characterizes it, as moments of 
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self-constitution, each of which leaves behind useful democratic resources.  
 
There was no signer, by right, before the text of the 
Declaration… By this fabulous event, by this fable, which… is 
only in truth possible thanks to the inadequation to itself of a 
present, a signature gives itself a name.  It opens for itself a line of 
credit, its own credit, for itself to itself.  The self surges up here in 
all cases (nominative, dative, accusative) as soon as a signature 
gives or extends credit to itself, in a single coup of force makes 
right, founds right or the law, gives right, brings the law to the 
light of day, gives both birth and day to the law.12  
 
I am interested here in the productive capacity of the signature as Derrida 
describes it, not as the source of ‘law’ and ‘right’ but instead as that within 
which the “self surges up…in all cases.”  I want to suggest that for Locke, 
black artwork of the Harlem Renaissance period was a ‘signature’ of sorts, 
permitting black expression in its vitality and multiplicity.  When Locke writes 
that New Negroes or New Negro poets have lately become “representative,” it 
is because he sees a (potential) new ‘we’ expressed in black artwork.   Black 
artwork reflects and signs off on the development of the new ‘we.’      
Locke is adamant that the Renaissance is not ‘about’ black artists. They 
are but a ‘medium’ of the new spirit. To return to the surprising arrival of 
Youth in the second stanza of Bennett’s poem:  I suggest that “Youth” is 
symbolic of moment.  The poem has no ‘speaker’ or ‘protagonist’ as such.  
Instead, it reflects the moment at which a new ‘self-expressiveness’ surges up.  
I take Bennett’s poem, “To Usward” as something of a stand-in for the 
Harlem Renaissance and the artworks and artists which composed it.  The 
phrase captures something essential about the Renaissance:  it was not, as 
Locke made clear, about black artists, and therefore as I have understood 
                                                           
12 Derrida, “Declarations of Independence,” 11 
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Locke also not about “us.” The Renaissance marked a spontaneous, new, black 
self-expressiveness that was also its “sought after effect.”   
 
II.  “Jingo, Counter-Jingo and Us” 
 
…minority expression has its healthy as well as its unhealthy growths, 
and that the same garden of which jingo and counter-jingo are the 
vexatious and even dangerous weeds has its wholesome grains and 
vegetables, its precious fruits and flowers.  Selective 
cultivations…rather than wholesale plowing under or burning over 
should be the sane order of the day.13   
 
 
 But how could the “sought after effect,” “to usward,” be achieved?  
Throughout the Harlem Renaissance period, Locke saw black art and its 
reception by a broader public as reflecting contemporary developments.  He 
exhorted artists to ‘express’ black life and suggested that the “…Negro 
Renaissance…must be an integral phase in American culture.”14     After the 
Renaissance subsided in the early to mid 1930s, Locke began to temper some 
of his own expectations of black art, while defending its autonomy against 
new patrons, who sought for black art new, socialist political objectives.   How 
could art remain fundamentally self-expressive, while attending to the 
‘broadened social mind’ that left politics implied?  How could good art and 
“good sociology” be combined?  How could black artwork continue to move 
‘to usward,’ while refusing racial chauvinism?  In the final section of this 
chapter, I turn to Locke’s 1937 retrospective review, “Jingo, Counter-Jingo and 
Us.”  Locke responds to Nation critic Ben Stolberg, who in a scathing review of 
                                                           
13 Alain Locke, “Jingo, Counter-Jingo and Us,” in The Critical Temper of Alain Locke: A Selection 
of His Essays on Art and Culture (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983), 245 - 
257. 
14 Locke, “Our Little Renaissance,” 23 
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Benjamin Brawley’s15 Negro Builders and Heroes, accused Brawley and other 
“professional race men” of “minority jingoism.”    
 Beginning in 1928, Locke wrote a lengthy ‘retrospective’ review of the 
year’s black literature.   ‘Literature’ was quite a broad category in these 
reviews, covering fiction, biography, ‘poetry and belles lettres,’ ‘anthropology 
and Africana,’ and ‘sociology and race relations.’  Locke critiqued books by 
both black and white authors.   In each review, he offered a general 
characterization of the literature of the year, paying particular attention to 
how black life was portrayed in artwork and studied by sociologists and 
anthropologists.  What reception did black life and black people receive?  
What did the year’s developments in black literature bode for American 
democracy?   
 In 1937, Locke wrote,  
 
...the literature of the year…still continues to be racially tinged, 
some of it pro, some of anti, little or none of it objective enough 
to be called ‘neutral.’ And yet some of it…is healthy and sane 
and true enough to be called art rather than propaganda and 
science rather than polemic or partisan jingo…Let’s consider by 
way of an aperitif, jingo,  counter-jingo and ‘us’ : meaning 
Negro.16 [sic] 
 
‘Jingoism’ was Locke’s focus in ’37 because of a particularly scathing review 
that had appeared in the October 23 issue of Nation. The well-known leftist 
and labor journalist Benjamin Stolberg berated Brawley for engaging in 
“colored jingoism” instead of providing an analysis of the “…Negro’s deep 
                                                           
15 Benjamin Brawley was a Howard University professor and author of several books 
recording black achievement, including A Social History of the American Negro (1921), Early 
Negro American Writers (1935), Paul Laurence Dunbar: Poet of His People (1936), and The Negro 
Genius (1937).  He was also a critic of the Harlem Renaissance, who thought that the “under-
class” was over represented in Harlem Renaissance art.    
16 Locke, “Jingo, Counter-Jingo, and Us,” 258 
 201  
 
and complex and distorted tragedy in the class relations of American 
society…”17  Brawley’s “colored jingoism” he wrote, “is like that of all career 
men in the oppressed minorities…the usual solution of racial self-pity in racial 
vainglory.”18  Though Brawley was Stolberg’s chief target, deserving of “heavy 
[critical] artillery,” he was not the only one: W.E.B. Du Bois, the historian 
Carter Woodson, and the sociologist Kelly Miller, though more sophisticated 
in Stolberg’s view, were also guilty.  Their crime?  Refusing the “…splendid 
and necessary job of teaching the black workers that their oppression is 
merely a highly complicated function of class exploitation…[and encouraging] 
every  trick of ‘success,’ that of pseudo-assimilation to the class culture of the 
dominant group.”19   
 Locke agreed with Stolberg that Brawley deserved criticism.  Brawley’s 
book displayed “…a shabby psychology of Pollyanna optimism and 
sentimentalism…[that was still the] meat and bread of many professional 
inter-racialists.”20  But the source of Brawley’s “Pollyanna optimism’ was  a 
“majority pathology,” that of the American success story, falsely applied.  For 
Locke, the historical moment for Brawley’s approach (“inevitable a generation 
ago”) had already passed.  In the present period, such work resulted in 
“…cultural vertigo and [a] split or dislocated social vision.”  According to 
Locke,  “the root of the evil”—minority Jingo—that so offended Stolberg was 
“majority jingo,” and not, as Stolberg would have it, “racial vainglory.”  Locke 
accused Stolberg of applying a “vicious double standard” and of not 
recognizing Brawley’s work as “compensatory,” though no longer timely, 
“racialism.” “A Negro, or anyone, who writes…history inaccurately or in 
                                                           
17 Benjamin Stolberg, “Minority Jingo,” Nation, no. October 23, 1937: 437 - 439. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Locke, “Jingo, Minority Jingo and Us,” 262 
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distorted perspective should be scorned as a ‘black chauvinist,’ but he can also 
be scotched as a tyro.”21[my emphasis]  There were “sound degrees” of 
racialism.  Black expression had “healthy” and “unhealthy outgrowths;” the 
healthy forms required “selective cultivation.”  They could not simply be 
abandoned or falsely classified as “jingoism.” Stolberg, in Locke’s view, was 
guilty of “proletarian jingo,” of shoring up pride in class by treating as 
illegitimate any form of ‘group’ or ‘self’ expression that did not valorize left-
political objectives.  Still, Locke insisted that Stolberg’s criticism served a 
useful function by “…warning against…any soft tolerance of the fallacies and 
opiates of internal minority chauvinism at the very time we were making a 
point of the exposure and discrediting majority jingoism.”22   Worthy group 
and self-expression would “aim at folk realism and the discovery of basic 
human and social denominators.”23  
 Locke’s attention to the staged development of ‘racialism’ is apparent 
here.  For following his acknowledgment of Stolberg’s criticism, he takes the 
Harlem Renaissance to task for “exhibitionism and demagoguery.”  But the 
problem with the Renaissance was not, as Stolberg would have it, bad politics, 
but instead the fact that Harlem Renaissance artists were “…handicapped by 
having no internal racial support for their art.”24   We might say that, in 
retrospect, Harlem Renaissance authors, who required white patronage, could 
not offer the “more penetrating, even handed and less-illusioned portrayal of 
Negro life” that a “second generation” of artists was ‘now’ offering.  On the 
other hand, we might argue that the ‘internal racial support’ to which Locke 
refers is expression itself, a renewable resource that inspires “good art.” 
                                                           
21 Ibid. 258 
22 Ibid. 259 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
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Quoting an essay he had written a decade earlier, “Our Little Renaissance,” 
Locke nevertheless reclaims what he had seen as the movements “original 
aims:” to become “an integral phase in American art and literature…to 
divorce [the Renaissance] from propaganda and politics.”25 Just as a decade 
before he had refused ‘race’ propaganda as the sole function of black artwork, 
in 1937, Locke refused ‘class’ propaganda as its new function, while 
acknowledging in a manner that he had not before, the importance of “a 
penetrating perception of the basis of the race problem.”26   “Let’s consider,” 
Locke insisted, “…us.”  
 I want to emphasize here Locke’s keen attention to what moves ‘us’ 
‘usward’ (to borrow Bennett’s insightful title). By refusing to use Stolberg’s 
terminology—minority jingo—to describe the failures of Brawley’s work, 
favoring instead “counter-jingo,” Locke identifies the dangerous influence of 
‘race thinking’ on black people while insisting that it can only be explained 
(though, importantly, not justified) as a compensatory response to “majority 
jingo.” There is no such thing, to Locke, as “minority jingo,” a race pride so 
thoughtless that it refuses analysis of the sources of oppression.  “Counter 
jingo,” though displaying the same evil tendencies as “majority jingo,” 
responds to ‘race thinking.’  That said, for Locke, “counter jingo” was never a 
legitimate function of black expression; it was simply an historical stage 
through which black expression had to develop.   
“To usward,” as I demonstrated above in my interpretation of Bennett’s 
poem and authenticated in my interpretation of Locke’s response to Stolberg, 
is a moving target, and ‘smug identity,’ whether of the racial or the class sort, 
always a tempting but ultimately dangerous possibility.  
                                                           
25 Ibid. 259 
26 Ibid.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL VALUE OF BLACK PLURALITY 
 
‘Race thinking’ and racism impose an easy order to our study of black 
political thinkers: any black thinker worth her salt considers the effects of 
racism on the black body, the black imaginary and on black politics because 
none can be fully understood without attention to racial oppression.  Racial 
oppression, exclusion and violence have necessitated reconstituting ‘black 
identity’ and ‘black culture,’ –- to provide some foundation for a politically 
useful ‘black collective,’ which could end racial oppression, violence and 
exclusion.  Black artwork would best serve a pedagogical function: teaching 
blacks and non-blacks alike the truth about black experiences and history, or a 
transvaluative one: providing the basis for a re-evaluation of black life, 
experience and history.  By emphasizing, in my interpretations of Locke’s 
writings, difference over identity (Chapter Two), cultivation over culture 
(Chapter Three), a modernism of substance over a modernism of style 
(Chapter Four), expression over propaganda (Chapter Five) and the 
movement from “counter-jingo to usward” (Chapter Six), I have represented 
Locke both as a helpful interlocutor of the negative effects of ‘race thinking’ on 
black people and as a prophet of modernity, who recognizes as imminent the 
time when black artwork could fully commit itself to the expression of black 
life in all its vitality and variety.  For the most part, I have not attempted to 
prove that Locke is best understood to pursue difference, cultivation, 
substantive modernism, and expression over identity, culture, formal 
modernism and propaganda by situating him in the tradition of black political 
thought or by providing an intellectual biography of Locke’s life.  Instead, I 
have attended to the continuities in Locke’s theorizations of race and culture 
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and his critical writings about art, thereby recovering an early 20th century 
black thinker who would be able to (I think) respond to early 21st century 
concerns about negative effects of ‘identity thinking’ on democracy.   I want to 
defend the idea that attention to plurality (of political thought, representations 
of culture and artistic expression) in 20th century black writing is itself 
politically valuable.   
In Alain Locke: Culture and the Plurality of Black Life, I have attempted to 
recover from the seemingly self-evident constellation of ideas, practices and 
beliefs that constitute both our ‘every day’ and politically-strategic thinking 
about ‘race,’ ‘culture,’ ‘identity,’ the Alain Locke who, arriving at Oxford in 
1908 wrote in a letter to his mother, “I am Alain Leroy Locke.  I am not a race 
problem;” to retrieve this declaration by seeing its effects in Locke’s writings 
on ‘race,’ ‘culture’ and ‘democracy.’  It is a redemptive act: since some have 
read in his work only a ‘necessary’ or ‘strategic’ atavism in service of the 
‘Negro’ cause. I am, I suppose, a Locke apologist of a different sort.  By my 
reading, Locke saw certain forms of  “race consciousness, race pride, and race 
solidarity” as compensatory responses to ‘race thinking,’ whose time and 
effectiveness were nevertheless limited.  He theorized ‘race’ as a political 
form, as an authoritative body of thought and practice and an every day set of 
beliefs, which shape and corrupt our social and political relations.   He 
attempted to reclaim black life and its ‘folk art’ both from the clutches of the 
“Old Negro” myth and from the attractions of ‘race-thinking.’  
I am by no means the first to characterize Locke’s subtle thinking by 
useful dichotomies.  Anthony Dawahare, for example, uncovers in The New 
Negro: an Interpretation, “dual nationalisms,” arguing that Locke  
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claimed that his black contributors stand as ideal representatives 
of ‘the New Negro,’ a postwar generation of black Americans 
whose cultural contributions…would strengthen democracy in 
America…. The New Negro narrowly comprises literary works 
that, taken as a whole, confirm Locke’s own desire that the New 
Negro possesses a black national identity and a patriotic loyalty 
to American capitalism that transcends class differences and 
interests.1  
 
For Everett Akam, on the other hand, Locke is a “cosmopolitan 
pluralist” who sought a merger of black nation without total fusion to the 
American nation on the grounds of democratic culture.   Literary theorist Ross 
Posnock calls Locke an “anti-race race man,” insisting that though Locke 
celebrated and publicized black artwork and culture, he was a consummate 
cosmopolitan, who retained an anti-proprietary notion of culture. 
Because of its perennial concern with the effects ‘identity’ on 
democratic politics, I want to suggest that, broadly speaking, the agonistic 
school of contemporary political theory is a useful interlocutor of Locke’s 
thought, although it must be open to Locke’s theorization of ‘race difference’ 
to be fruitful.  In conclusion, I would like to briefly sketch some lines of 
contact between Locke’s lectures and the work of just one agonist, the political 
theorist Bonnie Honig.  Like Locke, Honig is sensitive to the ill effects of 
identity on democracy.  The difference is that for Locke, the source of identity 
is to be found in the ‘race making’ powers of ‘the political,’ as I argued in 
Chapter Two, while for Honig, writing nearly a century later, ‘identity’ 
represents a problematic way of thinking about oneself in relation to the 
(political) world.  While Locke argues that the response of social formations to 
‘difference’—assimilation/dissimilation are crucial to the development of 
modern civilization, Honig advances the case that difference and ‘conflict over 
                                                           
1 Anthony Dawahare, Nationalism, Marxism, and African American Literature between the Wars: a 
New Pandora's Box (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2007). 
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difference’ are fundamental to the cultivation of robust democratic practice.  
She insists that we must understand difference as “more than identities that 
are different than ours.”   
We must rethink difference so that 
 
...it is not just a different identity, nor is it merely… the 
constitutive matter out of which identity is formed; it is also that 
which resists or exceeds the closures of identity.  It signals not a 
difference from others but a difference that troubles identity from 
within its would-be economy of the same.  Difference is what 
identity perpetually seeks (and fails) to expunge, fix, or hold in 
place.  … [D]ifference is a problem for identity not one of its 
adjectives.2 
By characterizing difference thus, Honig intends to (re)theorize the 
“problems that ‘difference’ poses for democracy.”  According to Honig, 
theories that operate from a premise that conflates difference with identity not 
only “domesticate difference” so that “group identities and affiliations [are 
taken] as a starting point” for politics, thereby understanding group identities  
to be ‘pre-political conditions’ of a sort, instead of depicted as always-in-
formation.   Democratic theory, she insists, must move beyond “…simply 
orchestrating multiple conflicting group needs and toward a new 
responsiveness to…the propensity of [more traditional models of democratic 
theory] to involve democratic cultures and institutions in violent and resentful 
dynamics of identity/difference.”3   Theorists ought to “shift from an 
administrative to politicizing democratic theory.”4  Suggesting that political 
theory attend to difference, warning political theory against the temptations of 
identity and insisting that theorists not further buttress identity by offering 
                                                           
2 Bonnie Honig, “Difference, Dilemmas and the Politics of Home,” in Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 257 - 277., 
p. 257 
3 Ibid. 258 
4 Ibid. 273 (footnote 1) 
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‘administrative’ solutions, Honig advocates instead for a political theory of 
difference that “…disrupts liberal-democratic dreams of home, but… posits 
alternative, and perhaps broader, sites of potential empowerment. It disables 
certain conceptions of agency; but it enables others at the same time.  It 
renders problematic…certain identity- and interest-based concepts of 
pluralism, but it also animates more coalitional varieties of social democratic 
organizations and affiliation.”5   As I read Locke, he largely supports Honig’s 
desire for “broader sites of empowerment” and “coalitional affiliation” as well 
as her intuition that  ‘attendance to difference’ can broaden our political 
imaginary and condition new affiliations.  
Nevertheless, Locke would likely be suspicious of Honig’s valorization 
of conflict, unless assured that such thinking would take seriously the damage 
and continued effects of the ascriptive processes that can arise from it.    Locke 
would wonder why should we expect difference re-theorized to clear the way 
to more robust coalition.  Of course, Honig by no means suggests that new 
political theory by itself generates new coalitions.  But I do think that my 
reading of Locke questions the ease with which Honig links the concept of 
difference and the practice of coalition.  In contrast to Alain Locke, Honig does 
not attend to the meanings that particular differences acquire or how those 
meanings affect the production of group identities.    To Honig, like Locke, 
difference is a creative force, making selves and forever redefining contextual 
boundaries.  If, she says, we heed it; if we refuse to see even the most painful 
conflicts that arise from difference—religious, ethno-racial or over sexual 
orientation and constructions of gender— domesticated, we will have “[given] 
up the dream of a place called home, a place free of power, conflict, a struggle, 
                                                           
5 Ibid. 271 
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a place, an identity, a form of life…”  For Locke, as I suggested in Chapter 
One,  ‘difference’ is at once a perception of one group’s particularity in 
contrast with an Other, and at the same time, when paired with assimilative 
forces, results in forms of social coherence.   Yet ‘race difference’ is a 
particularly pernicious type of difference, which ascribes damaging ‘identities’ 
to particular groups of people.  Locke would, I imagine, be curious about what 
Honig would dream up to replace the ‘place called home.’   As I have read 
Locke, he would appreciate “places, identities and forms of life” that refuse to 
be permanently fixed but coalesce and dissociate, rise and subside, offering a 
rich palette from which the political can be painted. But Locke would insist 
that ‘difference/identity’ as ‘race thinking’ have articulated it, is also a 
destructive force, generating real inequalities and antipathies, affecting 
profoundly the potential and function of our collectivities.  Locke’s version of 
‘the political’ sees some differences converted into nearly inescapable 
identities.   If we are to agree that our selves/identities and our politics are best 
envisioned as unstable—constituted by flux and conflict— my reading of 
Locke’s work suggests that we attend to (black) ‘difference’ as (black) 
plurality, while keeping in view as did Locke, the profound difficulties ‘race 
thinking’ presents to its public reception.   Like Locke responding to Stolberg 
about “minority jingo,” we must keep in view those sticky, solid 
differences/identities, such as race, whose material effects and sources in/of 
the imagination refuse to easily dissipate, while pushing (black) cultural 
expression beyond the attractions of reconstituted identity.  
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I. Future Directions  
 
I must, nevertheless, acknowledge the dangers of reading the ‘past’ 
through the lens of the present.  In a review of Posnock’s Color and Culture: 
Black Writings and the Making of the Modern Intellectual, historian Kevin 
Mumford argues that Posnock relies too much on “the accomplishment of 
postmodernism” (as opposed to historical context) to articulate “…the 
victorious release of black intellectuals from black nationalist essentialism.”  
Mumford describes Posnock’s project in a manner that might fruitfully 
capture my own in this dissertation: “a major goal is to demonstrate [what] 
allowed black writers to resist classification, elude racialism, and locate spaces 
so that they could engage their imaginations.”6  The problem, as Mumford 
sees it, that such an approach is historically unreliable, resulting in 
“idiosyncratic” and potentially misrepresentative interpretations of the work 
of black intellectuals.   
In view of this criticism of Posnock and its clear applicability to my 
own work, I would like to suggest what I see as the future direction of 
research for this project.  While the project will continue to emphasize in 
Locke’s writings the value of black expression as plural and vital instead of 
merely ‘politically useful’ in their particular context, as I see it, the next step 
will be to provide historical support for my objectives.  First, I plan to more 
firmly define the context for Locke’s early 20th century writings about ‘race’ as 
a center of meaning.  To do this, I will offer an account of the continuities and 
discontinuities between Locke’s theorization of ‘race’ and the fruitful research 
on ‘race’ and ‘race thinking’ of his contemporaries, including Franz Boas and 
                                                           
6 Kevin Mumford, Review Color & Culture: Black Writers and the Making of the Modern 
Intellectual, The Journal of American History, Vol. 86, No. 3, (Dec., 1999), pp. 1357-1358, 1357 
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his students.  Second, the contrast that I draw between Locke’s theorization of 
culture and his appeal to cultivation will be improved by a closer study of the 
multiple influences (the American pragmatic tradition and German sociology) 
on Locke’s thinking.  Third, in the dissertation, I characterize the ‘great debate’ 
between Du Bois and Locke over artwork as arising from profoundly different 
views over artwork.  In my future research, I will likely treat their 
disagreement as resulting from mutual misunderstanding.  Both Du Bois and 
Locke misunderstand and misrepresent the other’s thinking about ‘race’ and 
about the social ‘function’ of artwork.  Fourth, Locke’s biographer, Leonard 
Harris, has suggested the influence on Locke’s thought of the Austrian school 
of psychology (vis-à-vis Franz Brentano, Christian von Ehrenfels and Alexius 
Meinong).  My intuition (and I must emphasize that this is, as yet, an 
intuition) is that this school of thought informs Locke’s attention to “self-
expressiveness” and “self-representativeness.”  I suspect that attention to this 
school of thought will reveal significant differences between ‘self-
expressiveness’ and dialogic, ‘authentic identity,’ which as theorized by 
Charles Taylor, has become a profoundly influential (if not hegemonic) 
account of identity.  Fifth, I should like to trace with greater detail, 
developments in Locke’s thinking about the function of artwork, which I 
merely hinted at in Chapter Six.  Locke did lose some faith in the potential 
effects of artwork after the Renaissance.  Yet, he retained his intuition about 
avoiding chauvinism.  I expect to trace this development in further detail by 
characterizing how the rising influence (in black literature) of socialism 
affected Locke’ principled defense of artwork qua artwork.     
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